use top level method signature for iterators

internet/pcap/capture.go

@@ -52,11 +52,12 @@ type PacketBreakdown struct {
 //	0: Ethernet (3 base + VLAN tag = 4)
 //	1: L3 max(IPv4=12, ARP=9, IPv6=8) = 12
 //	2: L4 max(TCP=10, ICMP=8, UDP=4) = 10
-//	3: App max(DHCP=15, NTP=13, HTTP=2, DNS=1) = 16
-//	4-5: overflow/remaining = 2
+//	3: App max(DHCP=15, NTP=13, HTTP=2, DNS=1, TLS record=4) = 16
+//	4: TLS handshake message (ClientHello=8) = 8
+//	5-7: extra TLS records/overflow/remaining = 4,2,2
 func (pc *PacketBreakdown) initFrames() []Frame {
-	const nframes = 6
-	var fieldCaps = [nframes]int{4, 12, 10, 16, 2, 2}
+	const nframes = 8
+	var fieldCaps = [nframes]int{4, 12, 10, 16, 8, 4, 2, 2}
 	frames := make([]Frame, nframes)
 	for i := range frames {
 		frames[i].Fields = make([]FrameField, 0, fieldCaps[i])
@@ -328,9 +329,18 @@ func (pc *PacketBreakdown) CaptureTCP(dst []Frame, pkt []byte, bitOffset int) ([
 	}
 	payload := tfrm.Payload()
 	if len(payload) > 0 {
-		debuglog("pcap:tcp:http-start")
-		dst, err = pc.CaptureHTTP(dst, pkt, end)
-		debuglog("pcap:tcp:http-done")
+		// Application protocol is picked by inspecting the payload rather than
+		// by port, so that TLS on a port other than 443 and HTTP on a port
+		// other than 80 are both broken down correctly.
+		if payloadIsTLS(payload) {
+			debuglog("pcap:tcp:tls-start")
+			dst, err = pc.CaptureTLS(dst, pkt, end)
+			debuglog("pcap:tcp:tls-done")
+		} else {
+			debuglog("pcap:tcp:http-start")
+			dst, err = pc.CaptureHTTP(dst, pkt, end)
+			debuglog("pcap:tcp:http-done")
+		}
 		if err != nil {
 			reclaimRemainingFrame(&dst, unknownPayloadProto, FieldClassPayload, end, octet*len(pkt))
 		}
@@ -835,10 +845,13 @@ const (
 	// FlagContainer is used for [FrameField]s whose SubFields represent
 	// the entirety of the FrameField's data. i.e: DNS Questions/Answers.
 	FlagContainer
+	// FlagEncrypted marks fields whose bytes are ciphertext. i.e: TLS application_data fragment.
+	FlagEncrypted
 )
 
 func (ff Flags) IsLegacy() bool       { return ff&FlagLegacy != 0 }
 func (ff Flags) IsRightAligned() bool { return ff&FlagRightAligned != 0 }
+func (ff Flags) IsEncrypted() bool    { return ff&FlagEncrypted != 0 }
 
 type Frame struct {
 	PacketBitOffset int
@@ -1009,6 +1022,9 @@ func (frm Frame) LenBits() (totalBitlen int) {
 
 func (ff FrameField) String() string {
 	if ff.Class == FieldClassPayload {
+		if ff.Flags.IsEncrypted() {
+			return "Encrypted len=" + strconv.Itoa(ff.BitLength/8)
+		}
 		return "Payload len=" + strconv.Itoa(ff.BitLength/8)
 	}
 	if ff.Name != "" {

internet/pcap/capture_bench_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/soypat/lneto/dns"
 	"github.com/soypat/lneto/ethernet"
 	"github.com/soypat/lneto/ipv4"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/tcp"
 	"github.com/soypat/lneto/udp"
 )
 
@@ -106,6 +107,39 @@ func buildDNSPacket(b testing.TB) []byte {
 	return pkt
 }
 
+// buildTLSPacket builds an Ethernet+IPv4+TCP packet carrying a real
+// ClientHello record, exercising the string-heavy TLS path: cipher suite and
+// extension subfields, SNI and ALPN text.
+func buildTLSPacket(b testing.TB) []byte {
+	const (
+		ethSize  = 14
+		ipv4Size = 20
+		tcpSize  = 20
+	)
+	hello := captureClientHelloRecord(b, "example.com", []string{"h2", "http/1.1"})
+	pkt := make([]byte, ethSize+ipv4Size+tcpSize+len(hello))
+
+	efrm, _ := ethernet.NewFrame(pkt)
+	*efrm.DestinationHardwareAddr() = [6]byte{0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xca, 0xfe}
+	*efrm.SourceHardwareAddr() = [6]byte{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff}
+	efrm.SetEtherType(ethernet.TypeIPv4)
+
+	ifrm, _ := ipv4.NewFrame(pkt[ethSize:])
+	ifrm.SetVersionAndIHL(4, 5)
+	ifrm.SetID(0x1234)
+	ifrm.SetTTL(64)
+	ifrm.SetProtocol(lneto.IPProtoTCP)
+	ifrm.SetTotalLength(uint16(ipv4Size + tcpSize + len(hello)))
+
+	tfrm, _ := tcp.NewFrame(pkt[ethSize+ipv4Size:])
+	tfrm.SetSourcePort(51000)
+	tfrm.SetDestinationPort(443)
+	tfrm.SetOffsetAndFlags(5, tcp.FlagPSH|tcp.FlagACK)
+
+	copy(pkt[ethSize+ipv4Size+tcpSize:], hello)
+	return pkt
+}
+
 func configureBenchFormatter(f *Formatter) {
 	f.SubfieldLimit = benchSubfieldLimit
 	f.FrameSep = "\n"
@@ -123,6 +157,7 @@ func BenchmarkPcap(b *testing.B) {
 	}{
 		{"DHCP", buildDHCPPacket(b)},
 		{"DNS", buildDNSPacket(b)},
+		{"TLS", buildTLSPacket(b)},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		b.Run(tc.name, func(b *testing.B) {
@@ -182,6 +217,7 @@ func BenchmarkPcapPhases(b *testing.B) {
 	}{
 		{"DHCP", buildDHCPPacket(b)},
 		{"DNS", buildDNSPacket(b)},
+		{"TLS", buildTLSPacket(b)},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		b.Run(tc.name, func(b *testing.B) {

internet/pcap/capture_tls.go

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+package pcap
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/internal"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// maxTLSRecordsPerPacket bounds how many record frames a single packet may
+// produce. A TCP segment commonly coalesces several small records, but without
+// a bound a segment full of 5-byte empty records would produce thousands of
+// frames.
+const maxTLSRecordsPerPacket = 8
+
+// payloadIsTLS reports whether payload begins with what could be a TLS record
+// header. TLS has no magic number, so this is a heuristic: the content type
+// must be one of the four TLS 1.3 defines, the legacy record version must be
+// 0x03xx and the declared fragment length must be legal.
+//
+// It is what lets TLS be captured on any port instead of only on 443, and it
+// does not collide with HTTP, whose first byte is a method or version letter
+// and never a valid content type.
+func payloadIsTLS(payload []byte) bool {
+	if len(payload) < tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
+		return false
+	}
+	switch tls.ContentType(payload[0]) {
+	case tls.ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec, tls.ContentTypeAlert,
+		tls.ContentTypeHandshake, tls.ContentTypeApplicationData:
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+	if payload[1] != 0x03 || payload[2] > 0x04 {
+		// Every record version in use is 3.x: TLS 1.0 through 1.3 inclusive.
+		return false
+	}
+	n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[3:5]))
+	return n > 0 && n <= tls.MaxCiphertext
+}
+
+// CaptureTLS breaks down the TLS records starting at bitOffset. A single entry
+// point handles every kind of TLS traffic: a record names its own content type,
+// so the caller does not need to know whether it is looking at a handshake, an
+// alert or application data, which is what makes capturing a whole port 443
+// conversation possible without tracking connection state.
+//
+// One [Frame] is produced per record, plus one more per cleartext handshake
+// message carried inside a handshake record. Everything after the ServerHello
+// is encrypted and appears on the wire as application_data; its fragment is
+// reported as an opaque payload, since decrypting it needs keys a capture does
+// not have.
+//
+// TLS is a byte stream: a record may span TCP segments and a handshake message
+// may span records. Whatever arrived is reported and the affected frame carries
+// [tls.ErrNeedMore]; reassembly is out of scope for a stateless breakdown.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) CaptureTLS(dst []Frame, pkt []byte, bitOffset int) ([]Frame, error) {
+	debuglog("pcap:tls:start")
+	if bitOffset%8 != 0 {
+		return dst, errNotByteAligned
+	}
+	off := bitOffset / 8
+	for nrec := 0; off < len(pkt); nrec++ {
+		if nrec == maxTLSRecordsPerPacket {
+			reclaimRemainingFrame(&dst, "TLS records?", FieldClassPayload, off*octet, octet*len(pkt))
+			break
+		}
+		newdst, consumed, err := pc.captureTLSRecord(dst, pkt, off*octet)
+		dst = newdst
+		if err != nil {
+			if nrec == 0 {
+				// Not TLS after all; let the caller frame the payload.
+				return dst, err
+			}
+			// Bytes trailing the last complete record that are too few or too
+			// malformed to be a record header of their own.
+			reclaimRemainingFrame(&dst, unknownPayloadProto, FieldClassPayload, off*octet, octet*len(pkt))
+			break
+		}
+		off += consumed
+	}
+	debuglog("pcap:tls:done")
+	return dst, nil
+}
+
+// captureTLSRecord appends the frames of the single record at bitOffset and
+// returns how many bytes of pkt the record occupied.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) captureTLSRecord(dst []Frame, pkt []byte, bitOffset int) ([]Frame, int, error) {
+	rec := pkt[bitOffset/8:]
+	rfrm, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(rec)
+	if err != nil {
+		return dst, 0, err
+	}
+	rfrm.ValidateSize(pc.validator())
+	if pc.validator().HasError() {
+		return dst, 0, pc.validator().ErrPop()
+	}
+	debuglog("pcap:tls:validated")
+	const fragOff = tls.SizeHeaderRecord * octet
+	ctype := rfrm.ContentType()
+	finfo := reclaimFrame(&dst, "TLS", bitOffset, baseTLSRecordFields[:])
+	finfo.Fields[0].Name = ctype.StringConst()
+	frag := rfrm.Payload()
+	if frag == nil {
+		// Fragment continues in a later segment. Report what arrived.
+		avail := len(rec) - tls.SizeHeaderRecord
+		finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, tls.ErrNeedMore)
+		if avail > 0 {
+			var flags Flags
+			if ctype == tls.ContentTypeApplicationData {
+				flags = FlagEncrypted
+			}
+			finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+				Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+				FrameBitOffset: fragOff,
+				BitLength:      avail * octet,
+				Flags:          flags,
+			})
+		}
+		return dst, len(rec), nil
+	}
+
+	switch ctype {
+	case tls.ContentTypeHandshake:
+		// Handshake messages get frames of their own. finfo must not be touched
+		// past this point: appending to dst may move the Frame it points at.
+		dst = pc.captureTLSHandshake(dst, pkt, bitOffset+fragOff, len(frag))
+
+	case tls.ContentTypeAlert:
+		if len(frag) < 2 {
+			finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+			break
+		}
+		// The level byte is advisory only: in TLS 1.3 every alert except
+		// close_notify and user_canceled is fatal whatever it says.
+		finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+			Name:           tls.AlertLevel(frag[0]).StringConst(),
+			Class:          FieldClassType,
+			FrameBitOffset: fragOff,
+			BitLength:      octet,
+			Flags:          FlagLegacy,
+		}, FrameField{
+			Name:           tls.AlertDescription(frag[1]).StringConst(),
+			Class:          FieldClassType,
+			FrameBitOffset: fragOff + octet,
+			BitLength:      octet,
+		})
+
+	case tls.ContentTypeApplicationData:
+		// Either genuine application data or a protected handshake or alert
+		// record; which of the three is only knowable after decryption.
+		finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+			Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+			FrameBitOffset: fragOff,
+			BitLength:      len(frag) * octet,
+			Flags:          FlagEncrypted,
+		})
+
+	default: // change_cipher_spec and unrecognized content types.
+		finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+			Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+			FrameBitOffset: fragOff,
+			BitLength:      len(frag) * octet,
+		})
+	}
+	return dst, rfrm.RecordLength(), nil
+}
+
+// captureTLSHandshake appends one frame per handshake message found in the
+// fragLen bytes of handshake record fragment starting at bitOffset.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) captureTLSHandshake(dst []Frame, pkt []byte, bitOffset, fragLen int) []Frame {
+	debuglog("pcap:tls:hs-start")
+	const hdr = tls.SizeHeaderHandshake
+	frag := pkt[bitOffset/8:][:fragLen]
+	fragEnd := bitOffset + fragLen*octet
+	for off := 0; off < fragLen; {
+		msgBitOff := bitOffset + off*octet
+		hfrm, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(frag[off:])
+		if err != nil {
+			// Fewer than 4 bytes left: a message header split across records.
+			reclaimRemainingFrame(&dst, "TLS Handshake?", FieldClassPayload, msgBitOff, fragEnd)
+			return dst
+		}
+		mtype := hfrm.MsgType()
+		finfo := reclaimFrame(&dst, tlsHandshakeProto(mtype), msgBitOff, baseTLSHandshakeFields[:])
+		finfo.Fields[0].Name = mtype.StringConst()
+		body := hfrm.Body()
+		if body == nil {
+			// Message body continues in the next record.
+			finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, tls.ErrNeedMore)
+			if avail := fragLen - off - hdr; avail > 0 {
+				finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+					Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+					FrameBitOffset: hdr * octet,
+					BitLength:      avail * octet,
+				})
+			}
+			return dst
+		}
+		switch mtype {
+		case tls.HandshakeTypeClientHello:
+			pc.captureTLSClientHello(finfo, body)
+		case tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello:
+			pc.captureTLSServerHello(finfo, body)
+		default:
+			if len(body) > 0 {
+				finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+					Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+					FrameBitOffset: hdr * octet,
+					BitLength:      len(body) * octet,
+				})
+			}
+		}
+		off += hfrm.MessageLength()
+	}
+	debuglog("pcap:tls:hs-done")
+	return dst
+}
+
+// captureTLSClientHello appends the fields of a ClientHello body to finfo.
+// Field positions come from the parsed message, so the only arithmetic here is
+// shifting past the handshake header.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) captureTLSClientHello(finfo *Frame, body []byte) {
+	msg, err := tls.ParseClientHello(body)
+	if err != nil {
+		appendTLSHelloError(finfo, body, err)
+		return
+	}
+	sp := msg.Spans()
+	appendTLSHelloHead(finfo, sp)
+	pc.appendTLSCipherSuites(finfo, msg, sp.CipherSuites)
+	finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+		Name:           "compression methods",
+		Class:          FieldClassOptions,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.Compression.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.Compression.Len * octet,
+		Flags:          FlagLegacy,
+	})
+	pc.appendTLSExtensions(finfo, msg.ExtensionList(), sp.Extensions)
+}
+
+// captureTLSServerHello appends the fields of a ServerHello body to finfo. It
+// differs from the client's in naming one suite and one compression method
+// where the client offers a list of each.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) captureTLSServerHello(finfo *Frame, body []byte) {
+	msg, err := tls.ParseServerHello(body)
+	if err != nil {
+		appendTLSHelloError(finfo, body, err)
+		return
+	}
+	sp := msg.Spans()
+	appendTLSHelloHead(finfo, sp)
+	finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+		Name:           msg.CipherSuite().StringConst(),
+		Class:          FieldClassType,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.CipherSuites.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.CipherSuites.Len * octet,
+	}, FrameField{
+		Name:           "compression method",
+		Class:          FieldClassOptions,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.Compression.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.Compression.Len * octet,
+		Flags:          FlagLegacy,
+	})
+	pc.appendTLSExtensions(finfo, msg.ExtensionList(), sp.Extensions)
+}
+
+// helloBitOffset converts an offset within a hello body to one within the
+// handshake message frame.
+func helloBitOffset(bodyOff int) int {
+	return (tls.SizeHeaderHandshake + bodyOff) * octet
+}
+
+// appendTLSHelloHead appends the fields both hellos begin with.
+func appendTLSHelloHead(finfo *Frame, sp tls.HelloSpans) {
+	finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+		// legacy_version. TLS 1.3 pins it to 0x0303 and carries the real version
+		// in supported_versions.
+		Class:          FieldClassVersion,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(0),
+		BitLength:      2 * octet,
+		Flags:          FlagLegacy,
+	}, FrameField{
+		Name:           "Random",
+		Class:          FieldClassID,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.Random.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.Random.Len * octet,
+	})
+	if sp.SessionID.Len > 0 {
+		// TLS 1.3 has no resumption by session ID; a non-empty value means
+		// middlebox compatibility mode, echoed verbatim by the server.
+		finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+			Name:           "Session ID",
+			Class:          FieldClassID,
+			FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.SessionID.Off),
+			BitLength:      sp.SessionID.Len * octet,
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// appendTLSHelloError reports a hello that did not parse. The parsers reject a
+// whole message on any inconsistent length, which is what makes their iterators
+// error-free, so there are no field offsets to show: the error and the raw bytes
+// are all a capture can say.
+func appendTLSHelloError(finfo *Frame, body []byte, err error) {
+	finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, err)
+	finfo.Fields = append(finfo.Fields, FrameField{
+		Class:          FieldClassPayload,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(0),
+		BitLength:      len(body) * octet,
+	})
+}
+
+// appendTLSCipherSuites appends a cipher_suites container field whose subfields
+// name each offered suite. GREASE values show up as such, which is what a
+// capture should display: they carry no meaning and are not an error.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) appendTLSCipherSuites(finfo *Frame, msg tls.ClientHelloMsg, sp tls.Span) {
+	// Reclaim from the Fields backing array to reuse its SubFields backing array.
+	sfield := internal.SliceReclaim(&finfo.Fields)
+	*sfield = FrameField{
+		Name:           "cipher suites",
+		Class:          FieldClassOptions,
+		SubFields:      sfield.SubFields[:0],
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.Len * octet,
+	}
+	if pc.SubfieldLimit <= 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	for off, suite := range msg.CipherSuites {
+		if len(sfield.SubFields) >= pc.SubfieldLimit {
+			finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, ErrLimitExceeded)
+			return
+		}
+		sfield.SubFields = append(sfield.SubFields, FrameField{
+			Name:           suite.StringConst(),
+			Class:          FieldClassType,
+			FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(off),
+			BitLength:      2 * octet,
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// appendTLSExtensions appends an extensions container field whose subfields are
+// the individual extensions.
+func (pc *PacketBreakdown) appendTLSExtensions(finfo *Frame, exts tls.ExtensionList, sp tls.Span) {
+	extfield := internal.SliceReclaim(&finfo.Fields)
+	*extfield = FrameField{
+		Name:           "extensions",
+		Class:          FieldClassOptions,
+		SubFields:      extfield.SubFields[:0],
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(sp.Off),
+		BitLength:      sp.Len * octet,
+	}
+	if pc.SubfieldLimit <= 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	for off, ext := range exts.All {
+		if len(extfield.SubFields) >= pc.SubfieldLimit {
+			finfo.Errors = append(finfo.Errors, ErrLimitExceeded)
+			return
+		}
+		extfield.SubFields = append(extfield.SubFields, tlsExtensionField(ext, off))
+	}
+}
+
+// tlsExtensionField describes a single hello extension. Extensions carrying a
+// human readable value point at that value, located by the extension's own
+// iterators, and the bulky opaque ones are classed as payload so that a
+// [Formatter.FilterClasses] can drop them without losing the rest of the hello.
+func tlsExtensionField(ext tls.ExtensionFrame, dataOff int) FrameField {
+	field := FrameField{
+		Name:           ext.Type().StringConst(),
+		Class:          FieldClassOptions,
+		FrameBitOffset: helloBitOffset(dataOff),
+		BitLength:      len(ext.Data()) * octet,
+	}
+	switch ext.Type() {
+	case tls.ExtServerName:
+		for off, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+			if name.Type != 0 {
+				continue // Only host_name is defined.
+			}
+			field.Class = FieldClassText
+			field.FrameBitOffset = helloBitOffset(off)
+			field.BitLength = len(name.Name) * octet
+			break
+		}
+
+	case tls.ExtALPN:
+		// Span the first name through the last so every offered protocol stays
+		// visible; the length bytes between them show up as escapes.
+		first, end := -1, 0
+		for off, proto := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+			if first < 0 {
+				first = off
+			}
+			end = off + len(proto)
+		}
+		if first >= 0 {
+			field.Class = FieldClassText
+			field.FrameBitOffset = helloBitOffset(first)
+			field.BitLength = (end - first) * octet
+		}
+
+	case tls.ExtKeyShare, tls.ExtPreSharedKey, tls.ExtPadding, tls.ExtSessionTicket,
+		tls.ExtCookie, tls.ExtEncryptedClientHello, tls.ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp:
+		// Opaque and large: a post-quantum key share alone runs past 1kB.
+		field.Class = FieldClassPayload
+	}
+	return field
+}
+
+// tlsHandshakeProto names the frame of a handshake message. Only the messages a
+// capture can see in cleartext get a name of their own; the rest travel inside
+// a protected record and never reach here undecrypted.
+func tlsHandshakeProto(t tls.HandshakeType) string {
+	switch t {
+	case tls.HandshakeTypeClientHello:
+		return "TLS ClientHello"
+	case tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello:
+		return "TLS ServerHello"
+	}
+	return "TLS Handshake"
+}
+
+var baseTLSRecordFields = [...]FrameField{
+	{
+		// Name is filled in with the content type's name by captureTLSRecord.
+		Class:          FieldClassType,
+		FrameBitOffset: 0,
+		BitLength:      1 * octet,
+	},
+	{
+		// legacy_record_version, which TLS 1.3 receivers ignore entirely.
+		Class:          FieldClassVersion,
+		FrameBitOffset: 1 * octet,
+		BitLength:      2 * octet,
+		Flags:          FlagLegacy,
+	},
+	{
+		Class:          FieldClassSize,
+		FrameBitOffset: 3 * octet,
+		BitLength:      2 * octet,
+	},
+}
+
+var baseTLSHandshakeFields = [...]FrameField{
+	{
+		// Name is filled in with the message type's name by captureTLSHandshake.
+		Class:          FieldClassType,
+		FrameBitOffset: 0,
+		BitLength:      1 * octet,
+	},
+	{
+		Class:          FieldClassSize,
+		FrameBitOffset: 1 * octet,
+		BitLength:      3 * octet,
+	},
+}

internet/pcap/capture_tls_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
+package pcap
+
+import (
+	stdtls "crypto/tls"
+	"math/rand"
+	"net"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/ethernet"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/internal/ltesto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/tcp"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// captureClientHelloRecord drives a standard library TLS client far enough to
+// emit its first flight and returns the complete handshake record, header
+// included. A real client gives realistic extension ordering, a 32-byte
+// middlebox compatibility session ID and a post-quantum key share.
+func captureClientHelloRecord(t testing.TB, serverName string, protos []string) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	client, server := net.Pipe()
+	defer client.Close()
+	defer server.Close()
+	go func() {
+		c := stdtls.Client(client, &stdtls.Config{
+			ServerName: serverName,
+			MinVersion: stdtls.VersionTLS13,
+			MaxVersion: stdtls.VersionTLS13,
+			NextProtos: protos,
+		})
+		_ = c.Handshake() // Will fail; only the first flight is needed.
+	}()
+	server.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
+	var buf [4096]byte
+	n, err := server.Read(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading ClientHello: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(buf[:n])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rec.Complete() {
+		t.Fatalf("ClientHello record split across reads: have %d want %d", n, rec.RecordLength())
+	}
+	return append([]byte{}, rec.RawData()...)
+}
+
+// TestCaptureTLSClientHello runs a real ClientHello through the full
+// Ethernet/IPv4/TCP path to check that TLS is detected by payload content
+// rather than by port, and that the SNI hostname is recovered.
+func TestCaptureTLSClientHello(t *testing.T) {
+	const mtu = ethernet.MaxMTU
+	const serverName = "example.com"
+	payload := captureClientHelloRecord(t, serverName, []string{"h2", "http/1.1"})
+
+	var buf [mtu]byte
+	var gen ltesto.PacketGen
+	rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(1))
+	gen.RandomizeAddrs(rng)
+	pkt := gen.AppendRandomIPv4TCPPacket(buf[:0], rng, tcp.Segment{
+		SEQ:     100,
+		ACK:     200,
+		DATALEN: tcp.Size(len(payload)),
+		WND:     1024,
+		Flags:   tcp.FlagPSH | tcp.FlagACK,
+	})
+	copy(pkt[len(pkt)-len(payload):], payload)
+
+	var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+	pbreak.SubfieldLimit = 32
+	frames, err := pbreak.CaptureEthernet(nil, pkt, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Ethernet+IPv4+TCP+TLS record+TLS ClientHello = 5 frames.
+	if len(frames) != 5 {
+		for i := range frames {
+			t.Logf("frame[%d]=%s", i, frames[i].String())
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("want 5 frames, got %d", len(frames))
+	}
+	if frames[3].Protocol != "TLS" {
+		t.Errorf("frame 3 protocol=%q want TLS", frames[3].Protocol)
+	}
+	if frames[4].Protocol != "TLS ClientHello" {
+		t.Errorf("frame 4 protocol=%q want TLS ClientHello", frames[4].Protocol)
+	}
+	if len(frames[3].Errors) > 0 || len(frames[4].Errors) > 0 {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected errors: %v %v", frames[3].Errors, frames[4].Errors)
+	}
+	// A handshake record frame describes the record header only; its fragment is
+	// broken down by the handshake frame that follows, so that no bytes are
+	// claimed by two frames at once.
+	if got := frames[3].LenBits() / 8; got != tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
+		t.Errorf("TLS record frame len=%d want %d", got, tls.SizeHeaderRecord)
+	}
+	if got := frames[4].LenBits() / 8; got != len(payload)-tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
+		t.Errorf("handshake frame len=%d want %d", got, len(payload)-tls.SizeHeaderRecord)
+	}
+
+	ctype := fieldByName(frames[3], "handshake")
+	if ctype == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no handshake content type field")
+	}
+	if v, _ := frames[3].FieldAsUint(indexOfField(frames[3], "handshake"), pkt); v != uint64(tls.ContentTypeHandshake) {
+		t.Errorf("content type=%d want %d", v, tls.ContentTypeHandshake)
+	}
+
+	// SNI and ALPN live as subfields of the extensions container.
+	exts := fieldByName(frames[4], "extensions")
+	if exts == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no extensions field in ClientHello")
+	}
+	var sni, alpn *FrameField
+	for i := range exts.SubFields {
+		switch exts.SubFields[i].Name {
+		case tls.ExtServerName.String():
+			sni = &exts.SubFields[i]
+		case tls.ExtALPN.String():
+			alpn = &exts.SubFields[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if sni == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no server_name extension field")
+	}
+	got := string(pkt[(frames[4].PacketBitOffset+sni.FrameBitOffset)/8:][:sni.BitLength/8])
+	if got != serverName {
+		t.Errorf("server_name=%q want %q", got, serverName)
+	}
+	if alpn == nil {
+		t.Error("no application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension field")
+	}
+
+	// Formatted output is the point of the exercise: the hostname and the
+	// negotiated suites must be readable in one line.
+	var f Formatter
+	f.SubfieldLimit = 32
+	out, err := f.FormatFrames(nil, frames, pkt)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	str := string(out)
+	for _, want := range []string{"TLS", "handshake=", "client_hello=", serverName,
+		"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", "http/1.1"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(str, want) {
+			t.Errorf("formatted output missing %q:\n%s", want, str)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCaptureTLSRecordSequence checks the multi-record path: a server flight
+// coalesces ServerHello, the compatibility ChangeCipherSpec and the first
+// protected record into a single segment.
+func TestCaptureTLSRecordSequence(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	var buf [512]byte
+	b.Reset(buf[:])
+
+	// ServerHello record.
+	b.AddU8(uint8(tls.ContentTypeHandshake))
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12)
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU8(uint8(tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello))
+	b.OpenU24()
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12) // legacy_version
+	for range tls.SizeRandom {
+		b.AddU8(0xab) // server_random
+	}
+	b.OpenU8() // legacy_session_id echo
+	for range 32 {
+		b.AddU8(0xcd)
+	}
+	b.Close()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256))
+	b.AddU8(0)  // legacy_compression_method
+	b.OpenU16() // extensions
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS13)
+	b.Close()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtKeyShare))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.GroupX25519))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	for range 32 {
+		b.AddU8(0xee)
+	}
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close() // extensions
+	b.Close() // handshake body
+	b.Close() // record fragment
+
+	// change_cipher_spec record.
+	b.AddU8(uint8(tls.ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec))
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12)
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU8(1)
+	b.Close()
+
+	// First protected record: outwardly application_data.
+	b.AddU8(uint8(tls.ContentTypeApplicationData))
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12)
+	b.OpenU16()
+	for range 24 {
+		b.AddU8(0x5a)
+	}
+	b.Close()
+
+	pkt, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !payloadIsTLS(pkt) {
+		t.Fatal("payloadIsTLS did not recognize a ServerHello record")
+	}
+
+	var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+	pbreak.SubfieldLimit = 8
+	frames, err := pbreak.CaptureTLS(nil, pkt, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	want := []string{"TLS", "TLS ServerHello", "TLS", "TLS"}
+	if len(frames) != len(want) {
+		for i := range frames {
+			t.Logf("frame[%d]=%s", i, frames[i].String())
+		}
+		t.Fatalf("got %d frames want %d", len(frames), len(want))
+	}
+	for i, wantProto := range want {
+		if frames[i].Protocol != wantProto {
+			t.Errorf("frame[%d] protocol=%q want %q", i, frames[i].Protocol, wantProto)
+		}
+		if len(frames[i].Errors) > 0 {
+			t.Errorf("frame[%d] errors=%v", i, frames[i].Errors)
+		}
+	}
+	if fieldByName(frames[1], tls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256.String()) == nil {
+		t.Error("ServerHello cipher suite field not named after the selected suite")
+	}
+	i, err := frames[3].FieldByClass(FieldClassPayload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Error("no payload field in application_data record:", err)
+	} else if !frames[3].Fields[i].Flags.IsEncrypted() {
+		t.Error("application_data fragment not flagged as encrypted")
+	}
+	// Record frames must start exactly where the previous record ended, and the
+	// last one must end at the packet end: no record skipped, none double read.
+	off := 0
+	for i := range frames {
+		if frames[i].Protocol != "TLS" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if frames[i].PacketBitOffset != off*octet {
+			t.Errorf("frame[%d] starts at bit %d want %d", i, frames[i].PacketBitOffset, off*octet)
+		}
+		rec, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(pkt[off:])
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		off += rec.RecordLength()
+	}
+	if off != len(pkt) {
+		t.Errorf("records cover %d bytes of %d", off, len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCaptureTLSIncomplete checks the stream cases a stateless breakdown cannot
+// reassemble: a record whose fragment continues in the next TCP segment, and a
+// handshake message whose body continues in the next record.
+func TestCaptureTLSIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("record", func(t *testing.T) {
+		pkt := []byte{byte(tls.ContentTypeApplicationData), 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x00, 1, 2, 3}
+		var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+		frames, err := pbreak.CaptureTLS(nil, pkt, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if len(frames) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d frames want 1", len(frames))
+		}
+		if len(frames[0].Errors) != 1 || frames[0].Errors[0] != tls.ErrNeedMore {
+			t.Errorf("errors=%v want %v", frames[0].Errors, tls.ErrNeedMore)
+		}
+		if got := frames[0].LenBits() / 8; got != len(pkt) {
+			t.Errorf("frame covers %d bytes want %d", got, len(pkt))
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("handshake", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// A 5-byte record carrying a Certificate message header that declares a
+		// 1000-byte body: the rest arrives in later records.
+		pkt := []byte{
+			byte(tls.ContentTypeHandshake), 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x06,
+			byte(tls.HandshakeTypeCertificate), 0x00, 0x03, 0xe8, 0xaa, 0xbb,
+		}
+		var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+		frames, err := pbreak.CaptureTLS(nil, pkt, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if len(frames) != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("got %d frames want 2", len(frames))
+		}
+		if frames[1].Protocol != "TLS Handshake" {
+			t.Errorf("protocol=%q want TLS Handshake", frames[1].Protocol)
+		}
+		if len(frames[1].Errors) != 1 || frames[1].Errors[0] != tls.ErrNeedMore {
+			t.Errorf("errors=%v want %v", frames[1].Errors, tls.ErrNeedMore)
+		}
+		if got := frames[1].LenBits() / 8; got != 6 {
+			t.Errorf("handshake frame covers %d bytes want 6", got)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// TestCaptureTLSAlert checks the cleartext alert path, which is the only way a
+// TLS 1.3 handshake failure is visible to a capture.
+func TestCaptureTLSAlert(t *testing.T) {
+	pkt := []byte{
+		byte(tls.ContentTypeAlert), 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02,
+		byte(tls.AlertLevelFatal), byte(tls.AlertHandshakeFailure),
+	}
+	var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+	frames, err := pbreak.CaptureTLS(nil, pkt, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(frames) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d frames want 1", len(frames))
+	}
+	if fieldByName(frames[0], tls.AlertHandshakeFailure.String()) == nil {
+		t.Errorf("no field named %q in %s", tls.AlertHandshakeFailure.String(), frames[0].String())
+	}
+	var f Formatter
+	f.DisableLegacyFilter = true
+	out, err := f.FormatFrame(nil, frames[0], pkt)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(out), "handshake_failure") {
+		t.Errorf("formatted alert missing description: %s", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPayloadIsTLS guards the heuristic that routes a TCP payload to CaptureTLS
+// against the HTTP traffic it shares the datapath with.
+func TestPayloadIsTLS(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		payload []byte
+		want    bool
+	}{
+		{"client hello", []byte{22, 3, 1, 0, 10}, true},
+		{"app data", []byte{23, 3, 3, 0x40, 0x00}, true},
+		{"alert", []byte{21, 3, 3, 0, 2}, true},
+		{"http request", []byte("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"), false},
+		{"http response", []byte("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"), false},
+		{"bad content type", []byte{25, 3, 3, 0, 10}, false},
+		{"bad version", []byte{22, 2, 1, 0, 10}, false},
+		{"future version", []byte{22, 3, 5, 0, 10}, false},
+		{"zero length", []byte{22, 3, 3, 0, 0}, false},
+		{"oversize length", []byte{23, 3, 3, 0xff, 0xff}, false},
+		{"short", []byte{22, 3, 3}, false},
+	} {
+		if got := payloadIsTLS(tc.payload); got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: payloadIsTLS=%v want %v", tc.name, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCaptureTLSRecordLimit checks that a segment packed with tiny records
+// cannot make a single packet produce unbounded frames.
+func TestCaptureTLSRecordLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	var pkt []byte
+	for range maxTLSRecordsPerPacket + 3 {
+		pkt = append(pkt, byte(tls.ContentTypeApplicationData), 3, 3, 0, 1, 0x99)
+	}
+	var pbreak PacketBreakdown
+	frames, err := pbreak.CaptureTLS(nil, pkt, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(frames) != maxTLSRecordsPerPacket+1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d frames want %d", len(frames), maxTLSRecordsPerPacket+1)
+	}
+	last := frames[len(frames)-1]
+	if last.Protocol != "TLS records?" {
+		t.Errorf("last frame protocol=%q want TLS records?", last.Protocol)
+	}
+	if end := (last.PacketBitOffset + last.LenBits()) / 8; end != len(pkt) {
+		t.Errorf("remaining frame ends at %d want %d", end, len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+func fieldByName(frm Frame, name string) *FrameField {
+	i := indexOfField(frm, name)
+	if i < 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &frm.Fields[i]
+}
+
+func indexOfField(frm Frame, name string) int {
+	for i := range frm.Fields {
+		if frm.Fields[i].Name == name {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
+}

internet/pcap/format.go

@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ func (f *Formatter) formatField(dst []byte, pktStartOff int, field FrameField, p
 	name := field.Name
 	if name == "" {
 		name = field.Class.String()
+		if field.Flags.IsEncrypted() {
+			name = "encrypted"
+		}
 	}
 	hasSpaces := strings.IndexByte(name, ' ') >= 0
 	if hasSpaces {
@@ -191,8 +194,10 @@ func (f *Formatter) formatField(dst []byte, pktStartOff int, field FrameField, p
 		nameOff := field.FrameBitOffset / 8
 		dst = dnsAppendDottedName(dst, dnsMsg, nameOff)
 	case FieldClassDst, FieldClassSrc, FieldClassSize, FieldClassAddress, FieldClassOperation:
-		// IP, MAC addresses and ports.
-		if field.BitLength <= 16 {
+		// IP, MAC addresses and ports. Sizes are always numbers, never
+		// addresses, so a wide one such as the TLS 24-bit handshake length is
+		// still printed in decimal.
+		if field.BitLength <= 16 || field.Class == FieldClassSize && field.BitLength <= 64 {
 			v, err := f.fieldAsUint(pkt, fieldBitStart, field.BitLength, field.Flags.IsRightAligned())
 			if err != nil {
 				return dst, err

x/tls/builder.go

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"unsafe"
+)
+
+// maxBuilderNest is the deepest length-prefix nesting the [Builder] supports.
+// The deepest real TLS 1.3 structure is the ClientHello key_share extension:
+// handshake body, extensions block, extension, client_shares list,
+// key_exchange. Eight leaves generous headroom.
+const maxBuilderNest = 8
+
+// Builder writes TLS wire structures into a caller-supplied buffer that never
+// grows. It exists because TLS nests length-prefixed vectors several levels
+// deep and the length of each is only known after its contents are written;
+// the standard answer, golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte, allocates.
+//
+// Open a length prefix, write the contents, then Close to backpatch the real
+// length:
+//
+//	var b tls.Builder
+//	b.Reset(buf)
+//	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+//	b.OpenU16()             // extension_data length
+//	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS13)
+//	b.Close()
+//	out, err := b.Bytes()
+//
+// Errors are sticky: once the destination buffer overflows or the nesting is
+// misused, every later call is a no-op and [Builder.Err] reports the first
+// failure. Callers therefore need to check only once, at the end.
+//
+// The zero Builder is not usable; call [Builder.Reset] first.
+type Builder struct {
+	buf   []byte
+	stack [maxBuilderNest]int32 // offset of each open length field
+	width [maxBuilderNest]int8  // 1, 2 or 3 byte length prefix
+	n     int8                  // open prefix count
+	err   error
+}
+
+// Reset prepares the Builder to write into dst, discarding any previous state
+// and error. The Builder writes into dst[:0] and never reallocates, so dst's
+// capacity is a hard ceiling on the structure being built.
+func (b *Builder) Reset(dst []byte) {
+	b.buf = dst[:0]
+	b.n = 0
+	b.err = nil
+}
+
+// Err returns the first error encountered since [Builder.Reset], if any.
+func (b *Builder) Err() error { return b.err }
+
+// Len returns the number of bytes written so far, including the placeholder
+// bytes of any currently open length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) Len() int { return len(b.buf) }
+
+// Bytes returns the built structure. It reports an error if the Builder failed
+// at any point, or if a length prefix was opened and never closed, since the
+// resulting bytes would contain an unpatched placeholder.
+func (b *Builder) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return nil, b.err
+	}
+	if b.n != 0 {
+		return nil, errBuilderUnbal
+	}
+	return b.buf, nil
+}
+
+// fail records err if no error has been recorded yet.
+func (b *Builder) fail(err error) {
+	if b.err == nil {
+		b.err = err
+	}
+}
+
+// grow extends the buffer by n bytes and returns the new region, or nil if the
+// buffer is full or the Builder has already failed.
+func (b *Builder) grow(n int) []byte {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if n > cap(b.buf)-len(b.buf) {
+		b.fail(errShortBuffer)
+		return nil
+	}
+	start := len(b.buf)
+	b.buf = b.buf[:start+n]
+	return b.buf[start:]
+}
+
+// AddU8 appends a single byte.
+func (b *Builder) AddU8(v uint8) {
+	if p := b.grow(1); p != nil {
+		p[0] = v
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU16 appends a big-endian uint16.
+func (b *Builder) AddU16(v uint16) {
+	if p := b.grow(2); p != nil {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU24 appends a big-endian 24-bit value, the length encoding used by
+// handshake message headers and certificate entries.
+func (b *Builder) AddU24(v uint32) {
+	if p := b.grow(3); p != nil {
+		p[0] = byte(v >> 16)
+		p[1] = byte(v >> 8)
+		p[2] = byte(v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU32 appends a big-endian uint32.
+func (b *Builder) AddU32(v uint32) {
+	if p := b.grow(4); p != nil {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddBytes appends raw bytes.
+func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) {
+	if p := b.grow(len(v)); p != nil {
+		copy(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddString appends the bytes of s without allocating. TLS labels and ALPN
+// protocol names are naturally string constants, and converting them with
+// []byte(s) would copy to the heap on every call.
+func (b *Builder) AddString(s string) {
+	if len(s) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	// unsafe.Slice over the string's backing array; the bytes are only read,
+	// and only for the duration of the copy inside AddBytes.
+	b.AddBytes(unsafe.Slice(unsafe.StringData(s), len(s)))
+}
+
+// openN reserves width bytes for a length prefix whose value is filled in by
+// the matching [Builder.Close].
+func (b *Builder) openN(width int8) {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if int(b.n) >= maxBuilderNest {
+		b.fail(errBuilderNest)
+		return
+	}
+	start := len(b.buf)
+	if b.grow(int(width)) == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	b.stack[b.n] = int32(start)
+	b.width[b.n] = width
+	b.n++
+}
+
+// OpenU8 begins a vector with a one-byte length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU8() { b.openN(1) }
+
+// OpenU16 begins a vector with a two-byte length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU16() { b.openN(2) }
+
+// OpenU24 begins a vector with a three-byte length prefix, as used by the
+// handshake message header.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU24() { b.openN(3) }
+
+// Close ends the innermost open vector and backpatches its length prefix with
+// the number of bytes written since the matching Open.
+//
+// A length that does not fit the reserved prefix width is a failure rather
+// than a silent truncation: writing a value modulo 2^16 into a two-byte prefix
+// would produce a structurally valid but semantically wrong record.
+func (b *Builder) Close() {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if b.n == 0 {
+		b.fail(errBuilderUnbal)
+		return
+	}
+	b.n--
+	start := int(b.stack[b.n])
+	width := int(b.width[b.n])
+	n := len(b.buf) - start - width
+	p := b.buf[start:]
+	switch width {
+	case 1:
+		if n > 0xff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		p[0] = byte(n)
+	case 2:
+		if n > 0xffff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(p, uint16(n))
+	case 3:
+		if n > 0xffffff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		p[0] = byte(n >> 16)
+		p[1] = byte(n >> 8)
+		p[2] = byte(n)
+	}
+}

x/tls/builder_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// buildSupportedVersions writes the extension a TLS 1.3 ServerHello carries,
+// exercising one level of nesting.
+func buildSupportedVersions(b *tls.Builder) {
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS13)
+	b.Close()
+}
+
+func TestBuilderRoundTripThroughParser(t *testing.T) {
+	// Build a ServerHello extensions block, then walk it back with the parser.
+	// Agreement between the two is the property that matters.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	buf := make([]byte, 64)
+	b.Reset(buf)
+	b.OpenU16() // extensions block length
+	buildSupportedVersions(&b)
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtKeyShare))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.GroupX25519)) // server form: one entry, no list prefix
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 8))
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Strip the outer block length the way ServerHelloMsg.ExtensionBytes does.
+	if len(out) < 2 {
+		t.Fatal("output too short")
+	}
+	exts := out[2:]
+	if int(out[0])<<8|int(out[1]) != len(exts) {
+		t.Fatalf("outer length %d != %d", int(out[0])<<8|int(out[1]), len(exts))
+	}
+
+	list, err := tls.ParseServerExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var seen []tls.ExtensionType
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		seen = append(seen, ext.Type())
+		if ext.Type() != tls.ExtKeyShare {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+			if ks.Group != tls.GroupX25519 || len(ks.Key) != 8 {
+				t.Errorf("key share got %v len %d", ks.Group, len(ks.Key))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if len(seen) != 2 || seen[0] != tls.ExtSupportedVersions || seen[1] != tls.ExtKeyShare {
+		t.Errorf("walked %v", seen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderStickyShortBuffer(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 4))
+	b.AddU32(0x01020304) // exactly fills
+	if b.Err() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error filling buffer: %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	b.AddU8(0xff) // overflows
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v want ErrShortBuffer", b.Err())
+	}
+	// Once failed, later writes must not panic, must not write, and must not
+	// replace the original error.
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 100))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.Close()
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("error changed to %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	if _, err := b.Bytes(); !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("Bytes returned %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderUnclosedPrefixIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	// Returning bytes with an unpatched placeholder would emit a structurally
+	// wrong record that looks valid.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 16))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU8(1)
+	if _, err := b.Bytes(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Bytes accepted an unclosed length prefix")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderUnbalancedClose(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 16))
+	b.Close()
+	if b.Err() == nil {
+		t.Error("Close without Open accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderNestingLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 64))
+	for range 8 {
+		b.OpenU8()
+	}
+	if b.Err() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("8 levels rejected: %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	b.OpenU8()
+	if b.Err() == nil {
+		t.Error("9th nesting level accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderLengthOverflowRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	// 300 bytes cannot be described by a one-byte prefix. Truncating modulo 256
+	// would produce a valid-looking but wrong structure, so this must fail.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 512))
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 300))
+	b.Close()
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", b.Err())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderU24RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 8))
+	b.AddU8(byte(tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello))
+	b.OpenU24()
+	b.AddBytes([]byte{1, 2, 3})
+	b.Close()
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hf.MsgType() != tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello {
+		t.Errorf("type got %v", hf.MsgType())
+	}
+	if hf.Length() != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %d want 3", hf.Length())
+	}
+	if !hf.Complete() || len(hf.Body()) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("body got % x", hf.Body())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderAddStringMatchesAddBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	const label = "tls13 derived"
+	var b1, b2 tls.Builder
+	buf1, buf2 := make([]byte, 32), make([]byte, 32)
+	b1.Reset(buf1)
+	b1.AddString(label)
+	b2.Reset(buf2)
+	b2.AddBytes([]byte(label))
+	out1, err1 := b1.Bytes()
+	out2, err2 := b2.Bytes()
+	if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("%v %v", err1, err2)
+	}
+	if string(out1) != string(out2) {
+		t.Errorf("AddString %q != AddBytes %q", out1, out2)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderZeroAlloc(t *testing.T) {
+	// The whole point of not using cryptobyte. A regression here means the
+	// outbound handshake path started allocating per connection.
+	buf := make([]byte, 256)
+	var b tls.Builder
+	n := testing.AllocsPerRun(100, func() {
+		b.Reset(buf)
+		b.AddU8(byte(tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello))
+		b.OpenU24()
+		b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12)
+		b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 0, 0)) // no-op, must not allocate
+		b.OpenU16()
+		buildSupportedVersions(&b)
+		b.Close()
+		b.AddString("x")
+		b.Close()
+		_, _ = b.Bytes()
+	})
+	if n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("Builder allocated %v times per run, want 0", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzBuilderNeverEscapesBuffer(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 3}, uint8(16))
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, payload []byte, size uint8) {
+		buf := make([]byte, size)
+		canary := make([]byte, len(buf))
+		var b tls.Builder
+		b.Reset(buf)
+		b.OpenU16()
+		b.AddBytes(payload)
+		b.OpenU8()
+		b.AddBytes(payload)
+		b.Close()
+		b.Close()
+		out, err := b.Bytes()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(out) > len(buf) {
+			t.Fatalf("wrote %d bytes into a %d byte buffer", len(out), len(buf))
+		}
+		// Whatever was produced must parse back as a well-formed vector.
+		if len(out) < 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("output %d bytes is too short to hold its own prefix", len(out))
+		}
+		if declared := int(out[0])<<8 | int(out[1]); declared != len(out)-2 {
+			t.Fatalf("declared %d != actual %d", declared, len(out)-2)
+		}
+		_ = canary
+	})
+}

x/tls/definitions.go

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+// Package tls implements a heapless, preallocated TLS 1.3 server (RFC 8446).
+//
+// All buffers are supplied by the caller and never grow. There is no
+// allocation in the steady-state record datapath, no goroutines, and no
+// dependency on an operating system. A [Conn] wraps any [io.ReadWriter], so it
+// works over a lneto tcp.Conn, over net.Pipe, or over a bytes.Buffer in tests.
+//
+// # Scope
+//
+// TLS 1.3 only. There is deliberately no TLS 1.2 fallback, no renegotiation,
+// no 0-RTT/early data, and no client certificate support. Each omission
+// removes a whole class of attack surface.
+//
+// # Cryptographic primitives
+//
+// This package implements the record layer, the key schedule and the handshake
+// state machine, but ships no cryptographic primitives of its own. Concrete
+// hashes, AEADs, key agreements and signers cross the [Hasher], [AEADSuite],
+// [KeyAgreement] and [Signer] interfaces. Standard library implementations
+// live in the tlsstd subpackage; a hardware AEAD or a secure-element signer
+// slots in at the same seam without protocol code changing.
+//
+// Note that on embedded targets the Signer is expected to be supplied by the
+// integrator: Go's crypto/ecdsa carries an 88kB precomputed P-256 basepoint
+// table that lands in RAM, which is a third of an RP2040's SRAM.
+//
+// # Randomness
+//
+// Config.Rand is required and has no default. Embedded targets frequently have
+// a weak or stubbed entropy source, and a biased ECDSA nonce recovers the
+// signing key from two signatures, so the choice is made explicit rather than
+// silently defaulted. Never seed anything here from internal.Prand32/64; those
+// are for TCP initial sequence numbers and DNS IDs, not for key material.
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// Sizes of fixed length headers and the record size limits of RFC 8446 5.2.
+const (
+	// SizeHeaderRecord is the size of a TLSPlaintext/TLSCiphertext header:
+	// content type(1) + legacy record version(2) + length(2).
+	SizeHeaderRecord = 5
+	// SizeHeaderHandshake is the size of a Handshake header:
+	// message type(1) + 24-bit length(3).
+	SizeHeaderHandshake = 4
+
+	// MaxPlaintext is the largest legal TLSPlaintext.fragment.
+	MaxPlaintext = 1 << 14 // 16384
+	// MaxCiphertext is the largest legal TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record.
+	// The extra 256 bytes cover the content type byte, padding and the AEAD tag.
+	MaxCiphertext = 1<<14 + 256 // 16640
+	// MaxRecord is the largest legal record as it appears on the wire.
+	MaxRecord = SizeHeaderRecord + MaxCiphertext // 16645
+
+	// MinRecordSizeLimit is the smallest value a peer may advertise in the
+	// record_size_limit extension of RFC 8449 4.
+	MinRecordSizeLimit = 64
+)
+
+//go:generate stringer -type=ContentType,HandshakeType,ExtensionType,AlertDescription,AlertLevel,NamedGroup,SignatureScheme,CipherSuite -linecomment -output stringers.go .
+
+// ContentType is the outermost record demultiplexing tag of RFC 8446 5.1.
+type ContentType uint8
+
+// Record content types. Values below are the only ones TLS 1.3 defines;
+// everything else must be rejected with an unexpected_message alert.
+const (
+	ContentTypeInvalid          ContentType = 0  // invalid
+	ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec ContentType = 20 // change_cipher_spec
+	ContentTypeAlert            ContentType = 21 // alert
+	ContentTypeHandshake        ContentType = 22 // handshake
+	ContentTypeApplicationData  ContentType = 23 // application_data
+)
+
+// HandshakeType identifies a handshake message, RFC 8446 4.
+type HandshakeType uint8
+
+// Handshake message types. Types this server never sends or accepts are still
+// listed so that a peer sending one can be logged and rejected precisely.
+const (
+	HandshakeTypeClientHello         HandshakeType = 1   // client_hello
+	HandshakeTypeServerHello         HandshakeType = 2   // server_hello
+	HandshakeTypeNewSessionTicket    HandshakeType = 4   // new_session_ticket
+	HandshakeTypeEndOfEarlyData      HandshakeType = 5   // end_of_early_data
+	HandshakeTypeEncryptedExtensions HandshakeType = 8   // encrypted_extensions
+	HandshakeTypeCertificate         HandshakeType = 11  // certificate
+	HandshakeTypeCertificateRequest  HandshakeType = 13  // certificate_request
+	HandshakeTypeCertificateVerify   HandshakeType = 15  // certificate_verify
+	HandshakeTypeFinished            HandshakeType = 20  // finished
+	HandshakeTypeKeyUpdate           HandshakeType = 24  // key_update
+	HandshakeTypeMessageHash         HandshakeType = 254 // message_hash
+)
+
+// ExtensionType identifies a hello extension, RFC 8446 4.2.
+type ExtensionType uint16
+
+// Extension types. Those marked "ignored" are ones a browser sends and this
+// server parses past without erroring; being strict about unknown extensions
+// breaks real clients.
+const (
+	ExtServerName                 ExtensionType = 0     // server_name
+	ExtMaxFragmentLength          ExtensionType = 1     // max_fragment_length
+	ExtStatusRequest              ExtensionType = 5     // status_request
+	ExtSupportedGroups            ExtensionType = 10    // supported_groups
+	ExtECPointFormats             ExtensionType = 11    // ec_point_formats
+	ExtSignatureAlgorithms        ExtensionType = 13    // signature_algorithms
+	ExtALPN                       ExtensionType = 16    // application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+	ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp ExtensionType = 18    // signed_certificate_timestamp
+	ExtPadding                    ExtensionType = 21    // padding
+	ExtExtendedMasterSecret       ExtensionType = 23    // extended_master_secret
+	ExtCompressCertificate        ExtensionType = 27    // compress_certificate
+	ExtRecordSizeLimit            ExtensionType = 28    // record_size_limit
+	ExtSessionTicket              ExtensionType = 35    // session_ticket
+	ExtPreSharedKey               ExtensionType = 41    // pre_shared_key
+	ExtEarlyData                  ExtensionType = 42    // early_data
+	ExtSupportedVersions          ExtensionType = 43    // supported_versions
+	ExtCookie                     ExtensionType = 44    // cookie
+	ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes        ExtensionType = 45    // psk_key_exchange_modes
+	ExtCertificateAuthorities     ExtensionType = 47    // certificate_authorities
+	ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert    ExtensionType = 50    // signature_algorithms_cert
+	ExtKeyShare                   ExtensionType = 51    // key_share
+	ExtApplicationSettings        ExtensionType = 17513 // application_settings
+	ExtEncryptedClientHello       ExtensionType = 65037 // encrypted_client_hello
+	ExtRenegotiationInfo          ExtensionType = 65281 // renegotiation_info
+)
+
+// AlertLevel is the legacy severity byte of an alert. In TLS 1.3 every alert
+// except close_notify and user_canceled is fatal regardless of this field
+// (RFC 8446 6.1), so it is carried for wire compatibility only and must never
+// be used to decide whether to continue.
+type AlertLevel uint8
+
+// Alert levels.
+const (
+	AlertLevelWarning AlertLevel = 1 // warning
+	AlertLevelFatal   AlertLevel = 2 // fatal
+)
+
+// AlertDescription is the alert code of RFC 8446 6.
+type AlertDescription uint8
+
+// Alert descriptions. Only the subset a TLS 1.3 server can legitimately send
+// or receive is listed.
+const (
+	AlertCloseNotify                  AlertDescription = 0   // close_notify
+	AlertUnexpectedMessage            AlertDescription = 10  // unexpected_message
+	AlertBadRecordMAC                 AlertDescription = 20  // bad_record_mac
+	AlertRecordOverflow               AlertDescription = 22  // record_overflow
+	AlertHandshakeFailure             AlertDescription = 40  // handshake_failure
+	AlertBadCertificate               AlertDescription = 42  // bad_certificate
+	AlertUnsupportedCertificate       AlertDescription = 43  // unsupported_certificate
+	AlertCertificateRevoked           AlertDescription = 44  // certificate_revoked
+	AlertCertificateExpired           AlertDescription = 45  // certificate_expired
+	AlertCertificateUnknown           AlertDescription = 46  // certificate_unknown
+	AlertIllegalParameter             AlertDescription = 47  // illegal_parameter
+	AlertUnknownCA                    AlertDescription = 48  // unknown_ca
+	AlertAccessDenied                 AlertDescription = 49  // access_denied
+	AlertDecodeError                  AlertDescription = 50  // decode_error
+	AlertDecryptError                 AlertDescription = 51  // decrypt_error
+	AlertProtocolVersion              AlertDescription = 70  // protocol_version
+	AlertInsufficientSecurity         AlertDescription = 71  // insufficient_security
+	AlertInternalError                AlertDescription = 80  // internal_error
+	AlertInappropriateFallback        AlertDescription = 86  // inappropriate_fallback
+	AlertUserCanceled                 AlertDescription = 90  // user_canceled
+	AlertMissingExtension             AlertDescription = 109 // missing_extension
+	AlertUnsupportedExtension         AlertDescription = 110 // unsupported_extension
+	AlertUnrecognizedName             AlertDescription = 112 // unrecognized_name
+	AlertBadCertificateStatusResponse AlertDescription = 113 // bad_certificate_status_response
+	AlertUnknownPSKIdentity           AlertDescription = 115 // unknown_psk_identity
+	AlertCertificateRequired          AlertDescription = 116 // certificate_required
+	AlertNoApplicationProtocol        AlertDescription = 120 // no_application_protocol
+)
+
+// Protocol versions as they appear on the wire.
+const (
+	// VersionTLS12 is the value TLS 1.3 requires in ClientHello.legacy_version
+	// and in ServerHello.legacy_version for middlebox compatibility.
+	VersionTLS12 uint16 = 0x0303
+	// VersionTLS13 is the real negotiated version, carried only in the
+	// supported_versions extension.
+	VersionTLS13 uint16 = 0x0304
+	// VersionTLS10 appears in the legacy_record_version of an initial
+	// ClientHello record. The field is ignored entirely on receipt.
+	VersionTLS10 uint16 = 0x0301
+)
+
+// NamedGroup identifies a key exchange group, RFC 8446 4.2.7.
+type NamedGroup uint16
+
+// Named groups. Only X25519 is implemented; the rest are recognized so that
+// group selection and HelloRetryRequest can report precisely what was offered.
+const (
+	GroupSECP256R1      NamedGroup = 0x0017 // secp256r1
+	GroupSECP384R1      NamedGroup = 0x0018 // secp384r1
+	GroupSECP521R1      NamedGroup = 0x0019 // secp521r1
+	GroupX25519         NamedGroup = 0x001d // x25519
+	GroupX448           NamedGroup = 0x001e // x448
+	GroupX25519MLKEM768 NamedGroup = 0x11ec // x25519mlkem768
+)
+
+// SignatureScheme identifies a signature algorithm, RFC 8446 4.2.3.
+type SignatureScheme uint16
+
+// Signature schemes. Browsers do not accept Ed25519 certificates, so
+// [SigECDSAP256SHA256] is the practical minimum for a public-facing server.
+const (
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA256   SignatureScheme = 0x0401 // rsa_pkcs1_sha256
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA384   SignatureScheme = 0x0501 // rsa_pkcs1_sha384
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA512   SignatureScheme = 0x0601 // rsa_pkcs1_sha512
+	SigECDSAP256SHA256  SignatureScheme = 0x0403 // ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
+	SigECDSAP384SHA384  SignatureScheme = 0x0503 // ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
+	SigECDSAP521SHA512  SignatureScheme = 0x0603 // ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
+	SigEd25519          SignatureScheme = 0x0807 // ed25519
+	SigRSAPSSPSSSHA256  SignatureScheme = 0x0809 // rsa_pss_pss_sha256
+)
+
+// CipherSuite identifies an AEAD plus hash pair, RFC 8446 B.4.
+type CipherSuite uint16
+
+// TLS 1.3 cipher suites. Only [SuiteAES128GCMSHA256] is implemented; it is the
+// one suite RFC 8446 9.1 makes mandatory to implement.
+const (
+	SuiteAES128GCMSHA256        CipherSuite = 0x1301 // TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+	SuiteAES256GCMSHA384        CipherSuite = 0x1302 // TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+	SuiteChaCha20Poly1305SHA256 CipherSuite = 0x1303 // TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+	SuiteAES128CCMSHA256        CipherSuite = 0x1304 // TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+	SuiteAES128CCM8SHA256       CipherSuite = 0x1305 // TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256
+)
+
+// IsGREASE reports whether v is one of the 16 reserved GREASE values of
+// RFC 8701. Chrome injects GREASE values into its offered cipher suites,
+// supported groups, extensions, ALPN protocol list and key shares. They carry
+// no meaning and must be skipped wherever they appear; rejecting them breaks
+// Chrome outright.
+//
+// GREASE values have both bytes equal and of the form 0x?a.
+func IsGREASE(v uint16) bool {
+	return v&0x0f0f == 0x0a0a && v>>8 == v&0xff
+}
+
+// ErrNeedMore is returned by incremental parsers and by the record layer when
+// the input available so far is a valid prefix but not yet a complete unit. It
+// is not a failure: the caller should retry once more data has arrived.
+//
+// It is deliberately distinct from [lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame], which means the
+// data is complete but malformed.
+var ErrNeedMore = errors.New("tls: need more data")
+
+// ErrUnexpectedClose is returned by Conn.Read when the underlying transport
+// reached EOF before a close_notify alert was received. Returning io.EOF here
+// instead would let an attacker who can inject a TCP FIN or RST silently
+// truncate a response or a request body. Callers must treat this as a failure
+// unless the application layer has independently confirmed the message was
+// complete, for example by satisfying a Content-Length.
+var ErrUnexpectedClose = errors.New("tls: connection closed without close_notify")
+
+// Errors reported by frame constructors and walkers. These reuse the generic
+// lneto error set so that callers can compare against a single vocabulary.
+var (
+	errTruncated        error = lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	errShortBuffer      error = lneto.ErrShortBuffer
+	errBadLength        error = lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	errBadField         error = lneto.ErrInvalidField
+	errUnsupported      error = lneto.ErrUnsupported
+	errTrailingBytes          = errors.New("tls: trailing bytes after structure")
+	errBuilderNest            = errors.New("tls: builder nesting depth exceeded")
+	errBuilderUnbal           = errors.New("tls: builder length prefix unbalanced")
+	errAllZeroPlaintext       = errors.New("tls: inner plaintext is all padding")
+)

x/tls/extension.go

@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// Iterators in this package have the signature of an [iter.Seq2] instead of
+// returning one, so they are ranged over as a method value without a call:
+//
+//	for off, ext := range list.All {
+//		for off, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+//		}
+//	}
+//
+// A method value bound to a receiver stays on the caller's stack, while a
+// closure returned from a method escapes to the heap. The int key is always the
+// item's offset within the enclosing message body, and nested iterators inherit
+// that base, so a decoder never has to add up prefix widths.
+//
+// Every length prefix was checked when the message was parsed, so no iterator
+// can fail and none returns an error.
+
+// ExtensionFrame provides access to a single hello extension (RFC 8446 4.2):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ExtensionType extension_type; // 2 bytes
+//	    opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+//	} Extension;
+//
+// The lists nested inside an extension are reached with the iterators below,
+// each of which walks only its own extension type.
+type ExtensionFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+	// base is where buf starts within the enclosing message body.
+	base int
+	// server records that this came from a server hello. The server forms of
+	// key_share and supported_versions carry a single value, not a list.
+	server bool
+}
+
+// NewExtensionFrame wraps buf as an [ExtensionFrame]. It checks the extension's
+// own framing but not the structure nested inside extension_data; prefer
+// [ParseClientExtensions] or [ParseServerExtensions], which check both.
+func NewExtensionFrame(buf []byte) (ExtensionFrame, error) {
+	return newExtensionFrame(buf, 0, false)
+}
+
+func newExtensionFrame(buf []byte, base int, server bool) (ExtensionFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < 4 {
+		return ExtensionFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[2:4]))
+	if 4+n > len(buf) {
+		return ExtensionFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return ExtensionFrame{buf: buf[:4+n], base: base, server: server}, nil
+}
+
+// Type returns the extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Type() ExtensionType {
+	return ExtensionType(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ef.buf[0:2]))
+}
+
+// Length returns the declared extension_data length.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Length() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ef.buf[2:4])
+}
+
+// Data returns the extension_data bytes.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Data() []byte { return ef.buf[4:] }
+
+// RawData returns the extension bytes, type and length included.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) RawData() []byte { return ef.buf }
+
+// DataOffset is where Data starts within the enclosing message body.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) DataOffset() int { return ef.base + 4 }
+
+// ExtensionList is an extensions block whose framing has been checked, down to
+// the lists inside the extensions this package recognizes.
+type ExtensionList struct {
+	buf    []byte
+	base   int
+	server bool
+}
+
+// ParseClientExtensions validates a ClientHello extensions block. exts is the
+// block contents with the outer two-byte length already stripped, and base is
+// where exts starts within the enclosing message body.
+//
+// Unknown extension types, GREASE among them, are accepted and left unchecked.
+// A repeated known type is rejected with [lneto.ErrInvalidField]: RFC 8446 4.2
+// forbids duplicates, and tolerating them lets this parser and a middlebox act
+// on different copies.
+func ParseClientExtensions(exts []byte, base int) (ExtensionList, error) {
+	return parseExtensions(exts, base, false)
+}
+
+// ParseServerExtensions validates a ServerHello extensions block. It differs
+// from [ParseClientExtensions] in the key_share and supported_versions forms.
+func ParseServerExtensions(exts []byte, base int) (ExtensionList, error) {
+	return parseExtensions(exts, base, true)
+}
+
+func parseExtensions(exts []byte, base int, server bool) (ExtensionList, error) {
+	var seen extSeen
+	for off := 0; off < len(exts); {
+		ef, err := newExtensionFrame(exts[off:], base+off, server)
+		if err != nil {
+			return ExtensionList{}, err
+		}
+		if seen.mark(ef.Type()) {
+			return ExtensionList{}, lneto.ErrInvalidField
+		}
+		err = ef.validate()
+		if err != nil {
+			return ExtensionList{}, err
+		}
+		off += len(ef.RawData())
+	}
+	return ExtensionList{buf: exts, base: base, server: server}, nil
+}
+
+// All iterates the extensions in wire order, keyed by the offset of each
+// extension's data within the enclosing message body.
+func (l ExtensionList) All(yield func(off int, ext ExtensionFrame) bool) {
+	for off := 0; off < len(l.buf); {
+		ef, err := newExtensionFrame(l.buf[off:], l.base+off, l.server)
+		if err != nil {
+			return // Framing was checked at parse.
+		}
+		if !yield(ef.DataOffset(), ef) {
+			return
+		}
+		off += len(ef.RawData())
+	}
+}
+
+// Bytes returns the block contents.
+func (l ExtensionList) Bytes() []byte { return l.buf }
+
+// validate checks the structure nested inside extension_data for the types this
+// package walks. The switch mirrors the iterators below: an extension with no
+// iterator has no shape to check here.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) validate() error {
+	data := ef.Data()
+	switch ef.Type() {
+	case ExtServerName:
+		return validateServerNames(data)
+	case ExtALPN:
+		return validateALPN(data)
+	case ExtSupportedGroups, ExtSignatureAlgorithms, ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert:
+		body, err := vectorU16(data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return validateU16List(body)
+	case ExtSupportedVersions:
+		if ef.server {
+			return validateU16List(data) // Bare uint16.
+		}
+		body, err := vectorU8(data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return validateU16List(body)
+	case ExtKeyShare:
+		return ef.validateKeyShare()
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validateU16List(b []byte) error {
+	if len(b)%2 != 0 {
+		return lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validateServerNames(data []byte) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		if len(body)-off < 3 {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off+1 : off+3]))
+		off += 3
+		if n > len(body)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func validateALPN(data []byte) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		n := int(body[off])
+		off++
+		if n == 0 {
+			// A zero-length name would make a walk unable to advance.
+			return lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+		} else if n > len(body)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) validateKeyShare() error {
+	data := ef.Data()
+	if ef.server {
+		// A ServerHello names one group and its key; a HelloRetryRequest names
+		// only the group.
+		if len(data) == 2 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return validateKeyShareEntries(data)
+	}
+	body, err := vectorU16(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return validateKeyShareEntries(body)
+}
+
+func validateKeyShareEntries(b []byte) error {
+	for off := 0; off < len(b); {
+		if len(b)-off < 4 {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[off+2 : off+4]))
+		off += 4
+		if n > len(b)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// KeyShare is one KeyShareEntry of a key_share extension:
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    NamedGroup group;
+//	    opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+//	} KeyShareEntry;
+//
+// A HelloRetryRequest names a group with no key, so Key may be empty. GREASE
+// key shares carry a deliberately absurd key, commonly one byte, so no length
+// constraint is placed on Key beyond fitting inside the extension.
+type KeyShare struct {
+	Group NamedGroup
+	Key   []byte
+}
+
+// ServerName is one entry of an SNI server_name_list. Type 0 is host_name, the
+// only type ever defined.
+type ServerName struct {
+	Type uint8
+	Name []byte
+}
+
+// KeyShares iterates the key shares of a key_share extension, in the client or
+// server form as the enclosing hello requires, keyed by the offset of the
+// key_exchange bytes. Yields nothing for any other extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) KeyShares(yield func(off int, ks KeyShare) bool) {
+	if ef.Type() != ExtKeyShare {
+		return
+	}
+	body, base := ef.Data(), ef.DataOffset()
+	if ef.server {
+		if len(body) == 2 { // HelloRetryRequest: selected_group only.
+			yield(base, KeyShare{Group: NamedGroup(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body))})
+			return
+		}
+	} else {
+		b, err := vectorU16(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		body, base = b, base+2
+	}
+	for off := 0; off+4 <= len(body); {
+		group := NamedGroup(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off+2 : off+4]))
+		off += 4
+		if n > len(body)-off {
+			return
+		}
+		if !yield(base+off, KeyShare{Group: group, Key: body[off : off+n]}) {
+			return
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+}
+
+// ServerNames iterates the server_name_list of an SNI extension, keyed by the
+// offset of the name. Yields nothing for any other extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) ServerNames(yield func(off int, name ServerName) bool) {
+	if ef.Type() != ExtServerName {
+		return
+	}
+	body, err := vectorU16(ef.Data())
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	base := ef.DataOffset() + 2
+	for off := 0; off+3 <= len(body); {
+		nameType := body[off]
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off+1 : off+3]))
+		off += 3
+		if n > len(body)-off {
+			return
+		}
+		if !yield(base+off, ServerName{Type: nameType, Name: body[off : off+n]}) {
+			return
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+}
+
+// ALPNProtos iterates the protocol names of an ALPN extension, keyed by the
+// offset of the name. Chrome includes a GREASE entry here, so callers must match
+// against their own offer list rather than assuming the first name is
+// meaningful. Yields nothing for any other extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) ALPNProtos(yield func(off int, proto []byte) bool) {
+	if ef.Type() != ExtALPN {
+		return
+	}
+	body, err := vectorU16(ef.Data())
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	base := ef.DataOffset() + 2
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		n := int(body[off])
+		off++
+		if n == 0 || n > len(body)-off {
+			return
+		}
+		if !yield(base+off, body[off:off+n]) {
+			return
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+}
+
+// SupportedVersions iterates a supported_versions extension. The ClientHello
+// form is a list behind a one-byte prefix, unlike every other hello list; the
+// ServerHello form is a bare uint16, which yields a single value. Yields nothing
+// for any other extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) SupportedVersions(yield func(off int, version uint16) bool) {
+	if ef.Type() != ExtSupportedVersions {
+		return
+	}
+	body, base := ef.Data(), ef.DataOffset()
+	if !ef.server {
+		b, err := vectorU8(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		body, base = b, base+1
+	}
+	for off := 0; off+2 <= len(body); off += 2 {
+		if !yield(base+off, binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off:off+2])) {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// SupportedGroups iterates a supported_groups extension, keyed by the group's
+// offset. Yields nothing for any other extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) SupportedGroups(yield func(off int, group NamedGroup) bool) {
+	body, base, ok := ef.u16Vector(ExtSupportedGroups)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	for off := 0; off+2 <= len(body); off += 2 {
+		if !yield(base+off, NamedGroup(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off:off+2]))) {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// SignatureSchemes iterates a signature_algorithms or signature_algorithms_cert
+// extension, keyed by the scheme's offset. Yields nothing for any other type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) SignatureSchemes(yield func(off int, scheme SignatureScheme) bool) {
+	want := ef.Type()
+	if want != ExtSignatureAlgorithms && want != ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert {
+		return
+	}
+	body, base, ok := ef.u16Vector(want)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	for off := 0; off+2 <= len(body); off += 2 {
+		if !yield(base+off, SignatureScheme(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off:off+2]))) {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// u16Vector returns the contents of a two-byte-prefixed vector and where it
+// starts within the message body, or ok false for another extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) u16Vector(want ExtensionType) (body []byte, base int, ok bool) {
+	if ef.Type() != want {
+		return nil, 0, false
+	}
+	body, err := vectorU16(ef.Data())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, 0, false
+	}
+	return body, ef.DataOffset() + 2, true
+}
+
+// vectorU16 strips a two-byte length prefix and returns the vector contents.
+// It requires the prefix to describe the buffer exactly: trailing bytes mean
+// the sender and this parser disagree on the structure, which is precisely the
+// ambiguity parser-differential attacks exploit.
+func vectorU16(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(b) < 2 {
+		return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[0:2]))
+	if n != len(b)-2 {
+		if n > len(b)-2 {
+			return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		return nil, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	return b[2:], nil
+}
+
+// vectorU8 strips a one-byte length prefix. See [vectorU16] for why trailing
+// bytes are rejected.
+func vectorU8(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(b) < 1 {
+		return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(b[0])
+	if n != len(b)-1 {
+		if n > len(b)-1 {
+			return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		return nil, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	return b[1:], nil
+}

x/tls/extension_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+func TestExtensionListWalksAndToleratesGREASE(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two extensions: a GREASE type with empty data, then supported_versions.
+	exts := []byte{
+		0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00, // GREASE, len 0
+		0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, // supported_versions
+	}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var types []tls.ExtensionType
+	for off, ext := range list.All {
+		if want := 4*len(types) + 4; off != want {
+			t.Errorf("%v at offset %d want %d", ext.Type(), off, want)
+		}
+		types = append(types, ext.Type())
+	}
+	if len(types) != 2 || types[1] != tls.ExtSupportedVersions {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v", types)
+	}
+	if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(types[0])) {
+		t.Errorf("first extension %#x not recognized as GREASE", types[0])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseExtensionsTruncated(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range [][]byte{
+		{0x00},                               // partial type
+		{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00},                   // partial length
+		{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03}, // length overruns
+	} {
+		_, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(tc, 0)
+		if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
+			t.Errorf("% x: got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", tc, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseExtensionsRejectsMalformedInnerList(t *testing.T) {
+	// Framing inside a recognized extension is checked at parse, which is what
+	// lets the iterators be error-free.
+	for _, tc := range [][]byte{
+		{0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x1d},             // supported_groups, odd list
+		{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04},             // supported_versions, prefix overruns
+		{0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00},       // alpn, zero-length name
+		{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09}, // server_name, name overruns
+	} {
+		if _, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(tc, 0); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("% x accepted", tc)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestExtensionIterationStopsOnBreak(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two extensions with no inner structure of their own.
+	exts := []byte{0x00, 0x15, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x00}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	n := 0
+	for range list.All {
+		n++
+		break
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("walk continued after break: %d iterations", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestKeySharesAcceptGREASEEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	// Chrome sends a GREASE key share whose key_exchange is a single byte.
+	// Rejecting it as malformed breaks Chrome outright.
+	exts := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x0d, // key_share, 13 bytes
+		0x00, 0x0b, // client_shares length 11
+		0x1a, 0x1a, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, // GREASE group, 1 byte body
+		0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x02, 0xab, 0xcd, // x25519, 2 byte body
+	}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	type share struct {
+		g tls.NamedGroup
+		n int
+	}
+	var got []share
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+			got = append(got, share{ks.Group, len(ks.Key)})
+		}
+	}
+	if len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d shares want 2", len(got))
+	}
+	if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(got[0].g)) || got[0].n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("GREASE share mishandled: %+v", got[0])
+	}
+	if got[1].g != tls.GroupX25519 || got[1].n != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("x25519 share mishandled: %+v", got[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServerKeyShareHelloRetryRequestForm(t *testing.T) {
+	// A HelloRetryRequest names a group with no key.
+	exts := []byte{0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d}
+	list, err := tls.ParseServerExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	n := 0
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+			n++
+			if ks.Group != tls.GroupX25519 || len(ks.Key) != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("got %v with %d key bytes", ks.Group, len(ks.Key))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("walked %d shares want 1", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestALPNProtos(t *testing.T) {
+	exts := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x0e,
+		0x00, 0x0c,
+		0x02, 'h', '2',
+		0x08, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1',
+	}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var names []string
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		for _, p := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+			names = append(names, string(p))
+		}
+	}
+	if len(names) != 2 || names[0] != "h2" || names[1] != "http/1.1" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q", names)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSupportedVersionsClientAndServerForms(t *testing.T) {
+	// The ClientHello form is a list behind a one-byte prefix; the ServerHello
+	// form is a bare uint16.
+	client := []byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x05, 0x04, 0x1a, 0x1a, 0x03, 0x04}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(client, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var vers []uint16
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+			vers = append(vers, v)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(vers) != 2 || vers[1] != tls.VersionTLS13 {
+		t.Errorf("client form got %#x", vers)
+	}
+
+	server := []byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}
+	list, err = tls.ParseServerExtensions(server, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	vers = vers[:0]
+	for _, ext := range list.All {
+		for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+			vers = append(vers, v)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(vers) != 1 || vers[0] != tls.VersionTLS13 {
+		t.Errorf("server form got %#x", vers)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVectorRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	// A prefix that under-describes its buffer leaves bytes whose meaning this
+	// parser and a middlebox could disagree about.
+	exts := []byte{0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d, 0xff}
+	if _, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, 0); err == nil {
+		t.Error("trailing bytes after vector accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSubIteratorOffsetsAreBodyRelative(t *testing.T) {
+	// base threads through every nesting level so a decoder adds no arithmetic.
+	const base = 100
+	exts := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, // server_name, 11 bytes
+		0x00, 0x09, // list length
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x06, // host_name, 6 bytes
+		'a', '.', 'c', 'o', 'm', '!',
+	}
+	list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(exts, base)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for off, ext := range list.All {
+		if off != base+4 {
+			t.Errorf("extension data at %d want %d", off, base+4)
+		}
+		for noff, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+			// 4 extension header + 2 list length + 3 entry header
+			if want := base + 9; noff != want {
+				t.Errorf("name at %d want %d", noff, want)
+			}
+			if string(name.Name) != "a.com!" {
+				t.Errorf("name %q", name.Name)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzParseClientExtensions(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04})
+	f.Add([]byte{0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		list, err := tls.ParseClientExtensions(b, 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		total := 0
+		for off, ext := range list.All {
+			total += 4 + len(ext.Data())
+			if total > len(b) {
+				t.Fatalf("walked %d bytes past input length %d", total, len(b))
+			}
+			if off+len(ext.Data()) > len(b) {
+				t.Fatalf("extension data at %d overruns %d byte input", off, len(b))
+			}
+			// No sub-iterator may escape its slice, whatever the type says.
+			for o, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				if o+len(ks.Key) > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("key share at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+			for o, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+				if o+len(name.Name) > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("server name at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+			for o, p := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+				if o+len(p) > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("alpn name at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+			for o := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+				if o+2 > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("version at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+			for o := range ext.SupportedGroups {
+				if o+2 > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("group at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+			for o := range ext.SignatureSchemes {
+				if o+2 > len(b) {
+					t.Fatalf("scheme at %d overruns input", o)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if total != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("clean walk consumed %d of %d bytes", total, len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}

x/tls/frame.go

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// RecordFrame provides zero-copy access to a TLS record (RFC 8446 5.1).
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ContentType type;                   // 1 byte
+//	    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version; // 2 bytes
+//	    uint16 length;                      // 2 bytes
+//	    opaque fragment[length];
+//	} TLSPlaintext;
+//
+// A RecordFrame may be constructed over a buffer holding only the header, so
+// that [RecordFrame.Length] can be consulted to decide how many more bytes to
+// read. Accessors that reach into the fragment return nil until the whole
+// record is present; call [RecordFrame.Complete] to test for that explicitly.
+type RecordFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewRecordFrame wraps buf as a [RecordFrame]. It validates only that the
+// 5-byte header is present, since the fragment commonly arrives later.
+func NewRecordFrame(buf []byte) (RecordFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < SizeHeaderRecord {
+		return RecordFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return RecordFrame{buf: buf}, nil
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the record's outer content type. For a protected record
+// this is always [ContentTypeApplicationData]; the real type lives in the
+// encrypted [InnerPlaintext].
+func (rf RecordFrame) ContentType() ContentType { return ContentType(rf.buf[0]) }
+
+// SetContentType sets the outer content type.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetContentType(ct ContentType) { rf.buf[0] = byte(ct) }
+
+// LegacyVersion returns the legacy_record_version field. TLS 1.3 requires
+// receivers to ignore this field entirely; it is exposed for logging only.
+func (rf RecordFrame) LegacyVersion() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rf.buf[1:3])
+}
+
+// SetLegacyVersion sets the legacy_record_version field.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetLegacyVersion(v uint16) {
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(rf.buf[1:3], v)
+}
+
+// Length returns the declared fragment length. It is attacker controlled and
+// must be checked against [MaxCiphertext] before being used to size a read;
+// [RecordFrame.ValidateSize] does this.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Length() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rf.buf[3:5])
+}
+
+// SetLength sets the declared fragment length.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetLength(n uint16) {
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(rf.buf[3:5], n)
+}
+
+// RecordLength returns the total wire size of this record, header included.
+func (rf RecordFrame) RecordLength() int {
+	return SizeHeaderRecord + int(rf.Length())
+}
+
+// Complete reports whether the whole record, header and fragment, is present
+// in the underlying buffer.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Complete() bool {
+	return len(rf.buf) >= rf.RecordLength()
+}
+
+// Payload returns the record fragment, or nil if the whole record has not
+// arrived yet. The result aliases the underlying buffer.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Payload() []byte {
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return rf.buf[SizeHeaderRecord:rf.RecordLength()]
+}
+
+// RawData returns the record bytes, header included, truncated to the declared
+// length when the full record is present.
+func (rf RecordFrame) RawData() []byte {
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		return rf.buf
+	}
+	return rf.buf[:rf.RecordLength()]
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the record is structurally invalid.
+// It does not require the fragment to have arrived; it only rejects a declared
+// length that could never be legal.
+func (rf RecordFrame) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if len(rf.buf) < SizeHeaderRecord {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+		return
+	}
+	if rf.Length() > MaxCiphertext {
+		// Checked before the length is ever used to size a read.
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField)
+	}
+}
+
+// InnerPlaintext provides access to a decrypted TLSInnerPlaintext
+// (RFC 8446 5.2):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    opaque content[length];
+//	    ContentType type;
+//	    uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
+//	} TLSInnerPlaintext;
+//
+// The real content type is the last non-zero byte, and everything after the
+// content is padding that must be stripped before use.
+type InnerPlaintext struct {
+	buf     []byte // content only, padding and type byte already stripped
+	ctype   ContentType
+	padding int
+}
+
+// NewInnerPlaintext scans decrypted for its trailing content type byte,
+// stripping any zero padding that follows it.
+//
+// A record whose plaintext is entirely zeros carries no content type and is a
+// protocol violation; it is reported so the caller can send an
+// unexpected_message alert rather than silently treating it as empty.
+func NewInnerPlaintext(decrypted []byte) (InnerPlaintext, error) {
+	i := len(decrypted) - 1
+	for i >= 0 && decrypted[i] == 0 {
+		i--
+	}
+	if i < 0 {
+		return InnerPlaintext{}, errAllZeroPlaintext
+	}
+	return InnerPlaintext{
+		buf:     decrypted[:i],
+		ctype:   ContentType(decrypted[i]),
+		padding: len(decrypted) - i - 1,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the true content type recovered from the inner plaintext.
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) ContentType() ContentType { return ip.ctype }
+
+// Content returns the plaintext with the content type byte and padding removed.
+// The result aliases the buffer passed to [NewInnerPlaintext].
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) Content() []byte { return ip.buf }
+
+// PaddingLen returns how many padding bytes followed the content type byte.
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) PaddingLen() int { return ip.padding }
+
+// HandshakeFrame provides zero-copy access to a handshake message
+// (RFC 8446 4):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    HandshakeType msg_type;  // 1 byte
+//	    uint24 length;           // 3 bytes
+//	    opaque body[length];
+//	} Handshake;
+//
+// As with [RecordFrame], a HandshakeFrame may be constructed over a buffer
+// holding only the 4-byte header so that the body length can be consulted
+// before the rest has arrived.
+type HandshakeFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewHandshakeFrame wraps buf as a [HandshakeFrame], validating that the
+// 4-byte header is present.
+func NewHandshakeFrame(buf []byte) (HandshakeFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < SizeHeaderHandshake {
+		return HandshakeFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return HandshakeFrame{buf: buf}, nil
+}
+
+// MsgType returns the handshake message type.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) MsgType() HandshakeType { return HandshakeType(hf.buf[0]) }
+
+// SetMsgType sets the handshake message type.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) SetMsgType(t HandshakeType) { hf.buf[0] = byte(t) }
+
+// Length returns the declared 24-bit body length. It is attacker controlled;
+// the value is returned as an int32 rather than an int so that behaviour is
+// identical on 32- and 64-bit targets.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Length() int32 {
+	return int32(hf.buf[1])<<16 | int32(hf.buf[2])<<8 | int32(hf.buf[3])
+}
+
+// SetLength sets the declared 24-bit body length. Values outside the 24-bit
+// range are silently masked; callers building messages should ensure the body
+// fits first.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) SetLength(n int32) {
+	hf.buf[1] = byte(n >> 16)
+	hf.buf[2] = byte(n >> 8)
+	hf.buf[3] = byte(n)
+}
+
+// MessageLength returns the total size of this handshake message, header
+// included.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) MessageLength() int {
+	return SizeHeaderHandshake + int(hf.Length())
+}
+
+// Complete reports whether the entire handshake message is present.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Complete() bool {
+	return len(hf.buf) >= hf.MessageLength()
+}
+
+// Body returns the handshake message body, or nil if the whole message has not
+// arrived. The result aliases the underlying buffer.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Body() []byte {
+	if !hf.Complete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return hf.buf[SizeHeaderHandshake:hf.MessageLength()]
+}
+
+// RawData returns the handshake message bytes, header included. This is what
+// must be fed to the transcript hash: the header is hashed along with the body,
+// exactly once per message, even when the message spanned several records.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) RawData() []byte {
+	if !hf.Complete() {
+		return hf.buf
+	}
+	return hf.buf[:hf.MessageLength()]
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the handshake header is malformed.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if len(hf.buf) < SizeHeaderHandshake {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+		return
+	}
+	if hf.Length() > MaxPlaintext {
+		// No handshake message this server accepts approaches 2^14 bytes.
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField)
+	}
+}

x/tls/frame_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+func TestRecordFrameHeaderBeforeBody(t *testing.T) {
+	// A record layer sees the 5 byte header first and must be able to consult
+	// the length to know how much more to read.
+	hdr := []byte{22, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10}
+	rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rf.ContentType() != tls.ContentTypeHandshake {
+		t.Errorf("content type got %v want handshake", rf.ContentType())
+	}
+	if rf.Length() != 16 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %d want 16", rf.Length())
+	}
+	if rf.RecordLength() != 21 {
+		t.Errorf("record length got %d want 21", rf.RecordLength())
+	}
+	if rf.Complete() {
+		t.Error("record with header only reported complete")
+	}
+	if rf.Payload() != nil {
+		t.Error("payload of incomplete record must be nil, not a short slice")
+	}
+
+	full := append(hdr, make([]byte, 16)...)
+	rf, err = tls.NewRecordFrame(full)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		t.Fatal("full record reported incomplete")
+	}
+	if len(rf.Payload()) != 16 {
+		t.Errorf("payload len got %d want 16", len(rf.Payload()))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecordFrameShortHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	for n := range tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
+		_, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(make([]byte, n))
+		if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
+			t.Errorf("len=%d got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", n, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecordFrameRejectsOversizeLength(t *testing.T) {
+	// The length field is attacker controlled and must be refused before it is
+	// ever used to size a read.
+	hdr := []byte{23, 0x03, 0x03, 0xff, 0xff} // 65535 > MaxCiphertext
+	rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var v lneto.Validator
+	rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+	if err := v.ErrPop(); !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+
+	// Exactly at the limit is legal.
+	maxCT := uint16(tls.MaxCiphertext)
+	hdr[3], hdr[4] = byte(maxCT>>8), byte(maxCT)
+	rf, _ = tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+	if err := v.ErrPop(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("MaxCiphertext rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInnerPlaintextStripsPadding(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		in      []byte
+		content string
+		ctype   tls.ContentType
+		padding int
+	}{
+		{"no padding", []byte{'h', 'i', 23}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 0},
+		{"padded", []byte{'h', 'i', 23, 0, 0, 0}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 3},
+		{"empty content", []byte{22}, "", tls.ContentTypeHandshake, 0},
+		{"content ends in zero", []byte{'a', 0, 'b', 21, 0}, "a\x00b", tls.ContentTypeAlert, 1},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(tc.in)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if string(ip.Content()) != tc.content {
+				t.Errorf("content got %q want %q", ip.Content(), tc.content)
+			}
+			if ip.ContentType() != tc.ctype {
+				t.Errorf("type got %v want %v", ip.ContentType(), tc.ctype)
+			}
+			if ip.PaddingLen() != tc.padding {
+				t.Errorf("padding got %d want %d", ip.PaddingLen(), tc.padding)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInnerPlaintextAllZeroRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	// An all-zero inner plaintext carries no content type. Silently treating it
+	// as empty would let a peer inject records the state machine cannot
+	// classify; RFC 8446 5.4 requires unexpected_message.
+	for _, n := range []int{0, 1, 8} {
+		_, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(make([]byte, n))
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("len=%d: all-zero plaintext accepted", n)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrame24BitLength(t *testing.T) {
+	hdr := []byte{1, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03} // ClientHello, length 0x010203
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hf.MsgType() != tls.HandshakeTypeClientHello {
+		t.Errorf("type got %v", hf.MsgType())
+	}
+	if hf.Length() != 0x010203 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %#x want 0x010203", hf.Length())
+	}
+	if hf.Complete() {
+		t.Error("header-only message reported complete")
+	}
+	if hf.Body() != nil {
+		t.Error("body of incomplete message must be nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrameRoundTripLength(t *testing.T) {
+	buf := make([]byte, tls.SizeHeaderHandshake)
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, n := range []int32{0, 1, 255, 256, 65535, 65536, 0xffffff} {
+		hf.SetLength(n)
+		if got := hf.Length(); got != n {
+			t.Errorf("SetLength(%d) round-tripped to %d", n, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrameRawDataIncludesHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	// The transcript hash covers the header plus body, exactly once per
+	// message. Getting this wrong breaks Finished verification.
+	msg := []byte{20, 0, 0, 2, 0xaa, 0xbb}
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(msg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got := hf.RawData(); len(got) != 6 {
+		t.Errorf("RawData len got %d want 6", len(got))
+	}
+	if got := hf.Body(); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != 0xaa {
+		t.Errorf("Body got % x", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsGREASE(t *testing.T) {
+	// The 16 reserved values of RFC 8701.
+	for i := range 16 {
+		v := uint16(i)<<12 | 0x0a00 | uint16(i)<<4 | 0x0a
+		if !tls.IsGREASE(v) {
+			t.Errorf("%#04x not detected as GREASE", v)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, v := range []uint16{
+		0x0000, 0x1301, 0x001d, 0x0403, 0x0a0b, 0x0b0a, 0x1a2a, 0xffff,
+	} {
+		if tls.IsGREASE(v) {
+			t.Errorf("%#04x falsely detected as GREASE", v)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzNewRecordFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{22, 3, 1, 0, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
+	f.Add([]byte{23, 3, 3, 0xff, 0xff})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		var v lneto.Validator
+		rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+		// Accessors must stay in bounds regardless of validation outcome.
+		_ = rf.ContentType()
+		_ = rf.LegacyVersion()
+		_ = rf.Length()
+		if p := rf.Payload(); p != nil && len(p) != int(rf.Length()) {
+			t.Fatalf("payload len %d != declared %d", len(p), rf.Length())
+		}
+		if raw := rf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func FuzzNewHandshakeFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4})
+	f.Add([]byte{20, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		var v lneto.Validator
+		hf.ValidateSize(&v)
+		if hf.Length() < 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("negative 24-bit length %d", hf.Length())
+		}
+		if body := hf.Body(); body != nil && len(body) != int(hf.Length()) {
+			t.Fatalf("body len %d != declared %d", len(body), hf.Length())
+		}
+		if raw := hf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func FuzzNewInnerPlaintext(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 23, 0, 0})
+	f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if ip.ContentType() == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("accepted a zero content type")
+		}
+		if len(ip.Content())+ip.PaddingLen()+1 != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("content %d + padding %d + 1 != input %d",
+				len(ip.Content()), ip.PaddingLen(), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}

x/tls/hello.go

@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// SizeRandom is the length of the client_random and server_random fields.
+const SizeRandom = 32
+
+// MaxSessionIDLen is the largest legal legacy_session_id. TLS 1.3 does not use
+// session IDs, but a client sends a 32-byte one to trigger middlebox
+// compatibility mode and the server must echo it verbatim.
+const MaxSessionIDLen = 32
+
+// Span is the position and length of a field within a message body.
+type Span struct {
+	Off int
+	Len int
+}
+
+// HelloSpans locates the fields of a ClientHello or ServerHello body. Packet
+// decoders need a field's wire position, which the slice returning accessors
+// cannot give.
+type HelloSpans struct {
+	Random       Span
+	SessionID    Span
+	CipherSuites Span // ServerHello: the single selected suite.
+	Compression  Span
+	Extensions   Span
+}
+
+// ClientHelloMsg provides zero-copy access to a ClientHello body
+// (RFC 8446 4.1.2), wrapping the handshake message body returned by
+// [HandshakeFrame.Body], not the handshake header.
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
+//	    Random random;                              // 32 bytes
+//	    opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
+//	    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
+//	    opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
+//	    Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
+//	} ClientHello;
+//
+// Unlike a [RecordFrame] or [HandshakeFrame], whose fields sit at fixed offsets,
+// a hello's fields are length-prefixed and its extensions may arrive in any
+// order. [ParseClientHello] resolves every offset once so accessors and
+// iterators need no bounds checks and cannot fail.
+type ClientHelloMsg struct {
+	buf  []byte
+	exts ExtensionList
+	// Offsets of each variable-length field's contents, resolved at parse time.
+	sessionIDOff, sessionIDLen int
+	suitesOff, suitesLen       int
+	compOff, compLen           int
+}
+
+// ParseClientHello parses a ClientHello body, validating that every length
+// prefix is consistent with the buffer, down to the lists inside the extensions
+// this package recognizes. It performs no policy checks: version negotiation,
+// cipher suite selection and extension validation are the handshake state
+// machine's job.
+//
+// Trailing bytes after the extensions block are rejected. A sender and parser
+// that disagree about where a structure ends is the ambiguity that
+// parser-differential attacks are built on.
+func ParseClientHello(body []byte) (ClientHelloMsg, error) {
+	var ch ClientHelloMsg
+	// legacy_version(2) + random(32) + session_id length(1)
+	const fixed = 2 + SizeRandom + 1
+	if len(body) < fixed {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	off := 2 + SizeRandom
+
+	sidLen := int(body[off])
+	off++
+	if sidLen > MaxSessionIDLen {
+		// Bounds-checked before it can reach a fixed [32]byte echo buffer.
+		return ch, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	} else if sidLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	ch.sessionIDOff, ch.sessionIDLen = off, sidLen
+	off += sidLen
+
+	if len(body)-off < 2 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	suitesLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+	off += 2
+	if suitesLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	} else if suitesLen%2 != 0 || suitesLen == 0 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	}
+	ch.suitesOff, ch.suitesLen = off, suitesLen
+	off += suitesLen
+
+	if len(body)-off < 1 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	compLen := int(body[off])
+	off++
+	if compLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	ch.compOff, ch.compLen = off, compLen
+	off += compLen
+
+	// TLS 1.3 requires extensions; a ClientHello without them cannot possibly
+	// carry supported_versions and so cannot be a 1.3 hello.
+	if len(body)-off < 2 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	extsLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+	off += 2
+	if extsLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	} else if extsLen != len(body)-off {
+		return ch, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	exts, err := ParseClientExtensions(body[off:off+extsLen], off)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ClientHelloMsg{}, err
+	}
+	ch.exts = exts
+	ch.buf = body
+	return ch, nil
+}
+
+// LegacyVersion returns the legacy_version field, which TLS 1.3 pins to
+// 0x0303 regardless of the version actually negotiated.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) LegacyVersion() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ch.buf[0:2])
+}
+
+// Random returns the 32-byte client_random.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) Random() *[SizeRandom]byte {
+	return (*[SizeRandom]byte)(ch.buf[2 : 2+SizeRandom])
+}
+
+// LegacySessionID returns the legacy_session_id, at most 32 bytes. A TLS 1.3
+// server must echo this verbatim in its ServerHello; a non-empty value means
+// the client is using middlebox compatibility mode and expects a dummy
+// ChangeCipherSpec record.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) LegacySessionID() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.sessionIDOff : ch.sessionIDOff+ch.sessionIDLen]
+}
+
+// CipherSuites iterates the offered suites in wire order, keyed by each suite's
+// offset within the body. The list includes GREASE values.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) CipherSuites(yield func(off int, suite CipherSuite) bool) {
+	suites := ch.CipherSuiteBytes()
+	for off := 0; off+2 <= len(suites); off += 2 {
+		if !yield(ch.suitesOff+off, CipherSuite(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(suites[off:off+2]))) {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// CipherSuiteBytes returns the cipher_suites vector with its length prefix
+// stripped.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) CipherSuiteBytes() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.suitesOff : ch.suitesOff+ch.suitesLen]
+}
+
+// LegacyCompressionMethods returns the legacy_compression_methods vector
+// contents. For a TLS 1.3 hello this must be exactly one zero byte; see
+// [ClientHelloMsg.ValidateCompression].
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) LegacyCompressionMethods() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.compOff : ch.compOff+ch.compLen]
+}
+
+// Extensions iterates this hello's extensions in wire order, keyed by the
+// offset of each extension's data within the body. Duplicates were rejected at
+// parse time, so the walk needs no bookkeeping.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) Extensions(yield func(off int, ext ExtensionFrame) bool) {
+	ch.exts.All(yield)
+}
+
+// ExtensionList returns the validated extensions block, for passing the block
+// itself around rather than ranging over it here.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) ExtensionList() ExtensionList { return ch.exts }
+
+// ExtensionBytes returns the extensions block contents with the outer length
+// prefix stripped.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) ExtensionBytes() []byte { return ch.exts.Bytes() }
+
+// RawData returns the whole ClientHello body.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) RawData() []byte { return ch.buf }
+
+// Spans locates this hello's fields inside [ClientHelloMsg.RawData].
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) Spans() HelloSpans {
+	return HelloSpans{
+		Random:       Span{Off: 2, Len: SizeRandom},
+		SessionID:    Span{Off: ch.sessionIDOff, Len: ch.sessionIDLen},
+		CipherSuites: Span{Off: ch.suitesOff, Len: ch.suitesLen},
+		Compression:  Span{Off: ch.compOff, Len: ch.compLen},
+		Extensions:   Span{Off: ch.exts.base, Len: len(ch.exts.buf)},
+	}
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the ClientHello is structurally invalid.
+// Since [ParseClientHello] already rejects every inconsistent length, this only
+// re-checks that the message was successfully parsed.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if ch.buf == nil {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+	}
+}
+
+// ValidateCompression reports whether legacy_compression_methods is exactly
+// the single null method TLS 1.3 mandates (RFC 8446 4.1.2). Anything else must
+// be rejected with an illegal_parameter alert: a client offering real
+// compression methods is either pre-1.3 or attempting a downgrade.
+func (ch ClientHelloMsg) ValidateCompression() bool {
+	return ch.compLen == 1 && ch.buf[ch.compOff] == 0
+}
+
+// ServerHelloMsg provides zero-copy access to a ServerHello body
+// (RFC 8446 4.1.3). Like [ClientHelloMsg] it wraps the handshake message body.
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
+//	    Random random;                              // 32 bytes
+//	    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+//	    CipherSuite cipher_suite;                   // 2 bytes
+//	    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+//	    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+//	} ServerHello;
+//
+// A HelloRetryRequest has this same structure; it is told apart by its random
+// being the special value of RFC 8446 4.1.3, which is policy, not framing.
+type ServerHelloMsg struct {
+	buf                        []byte
+	exts                       ExtensionList
+	sessionIDOff, sessionIDLen int
+	suiteOff                   int
+}
+
+// ParseServerHello parses a ServerHello body. Like [ParseClientHello] it
+// validates framing only, rejects trailing bytes, and validates the lists
+// inside recognized extensions, in their server forms.
+func ParseServerHello(body []byte) (ServerHelloMsg, error) {
+	var sh ServerHelloMsg
+	const fixed = 2 + SizeRandom + 1
+	if len(body) < fixed {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	off := 2 + SizeRandom
+
+	sidLen := int(body[off])
+	off++
+	if sidLen > MaxSessionIDLen {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	} else if sidLen > len(body)-off {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	sh.sessionIDOff, sh.sessionIDLen = off, sidLen
+	off += sidLen
+
+	// cipher_suite(2) + legacy_compression_method(1)
+	if len(body)-off < 3 {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	sh.suiteOff = off
+	off += 3
+
+	if len(body)-off < 2 {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	extsLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+	off += 2
+	if extsLen > len(body)-off {
+		return sh, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	} else if extsLen != len(body)-off {
+		return sh, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	exts, err := ParseServerExtensions(body[off:off+extsLen], off)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ServerHelloMsg{}, err
+	}
+	sh.exts = exts
+	sh.buf = body
+	return sh, nil
+}
+
+// LegacyVersion returns the legacy_version field, pinned to 0x0303 by TLS 1.3.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) LegacyVersion() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(sh.buf[0:2])
+}
+
+// Random returns the 32-byte server_random.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) Random() *[SizeRandom]byte {
+	return (*[SizeRandom]byte)(sh.buf[2 : 2+SizeRandom])
+}
+
+// LegacySessionIDEcho returns the client's legacy_session_id as echoed back. A
+// client in middlebox compatibility mode requires it to match what it sent.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) LegacySessionIDEcho() []byte {
+	return sh.buf[sh.sessionIDOff : sh.sessionIDOff+sh.sessionIDLen]
+}
+
+// CipherSuite returns the selected cipher suite.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) CipherSuite() CipherSuite {
+	return CipherSuite(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(sh.buf[sh.suiteOff : sh.suiteOff+2]))
+}
+
+// LegacyCompressionMethod returns the legacy_compression_method, which TLS 1.3
+// requires to be zero.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) LegacyCompressionMethod() uint8 {
+	return sh.buf[sh.suiteOff+2]
+}
+
+// Extensions iterates this hello's extensions in wire order, keyed by the
+// offset of each extension's data within the body.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) Extensions(yield func(off int, ext ExtensionFrame) bool) {
+	sh.exts.All(yield)
+}
+
+// ExtensionList returns the validated extensions block.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) ExtensionList() ExtensionList { return sh.exts }
+
+// ExtensionBytes returns the extensions block contents with the outer length
+// prefix stripped.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) ExtensionBytes() []byte { return sh.exts.Bytes() }
+
+// RawData returns the whole ServerHello body.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) RawData() []byte { return sh.buf }
+
+// Spans locates this hello's fields inside [ServerHelloMsg.RawData].
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) Spans() HelloSpans {
+	return HelloSpans{
+		Random:       Span{Off: 2, Len: SizeRandom},
+		SessionID:    Span{Off: sh.sessionIDOff, Len: sh.sessionIDLen},
+		CipherSuites: Span{Off: sh.suiteOff, Len: 2},
+		Compression:  Span{Off: sh.suiteOff + 2, Len: 1},
+		Extensions:   Span{Off: sh.exts.base, Len: len(sh.exts.buf)},
+	}
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the ServerHello was not parsed.
+func (sh ServerHelloMsg) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if sh.buf == nil {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+	}
+}
+
+// extSeen tracks which known extension types have already been encountered in
+// a single hello. RFC 8446 4.2 forbids a duplicate extension type, and
+// tolerating duplicates invites parser-differential attacks where this parser
+// and a middlebox act on different copies.
+//
+// Only known types are tracked; unknown and GREASE types are exempt because
+// they are skipped without being acted upon.
+type extSeen uint64
+
+// mark records ext and reports whether it had already been seen. Extension
+// types with no assigned bit are never reported as duplicates.
+func (s *extSeen) mark(ext ExtensionType) (duplicate bool) {
+	bit, ok := extBit(ext)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	if *s&bit != 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+	*s |= bit
+	return false
+}
+
+// extBit maps an extension type to its bit in [extSeen]. The mapping covers
+// every extension this server reads or must reject a duplicate of.
+func extBit(ext ExtensionType) (extSeen, bool) {
+	var i uint
+	switch ext {
+	case ExtServerName:
+		i = 0
+	case ExtMaxFragmentLength:
+		i = 1
+	case ExtStatusRequest:
+		i = 2
+	case ExtSupportedGroups:
+		i = 3
+	case ExtSignatureAlgorithms:
+		i = 4
+	case ExtALPN:
+		i = 5
+	case ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp:
+		i = 6
+	case ExtPadding:
+		i = 7
+	case ExtExtendedMasterSecret:
+		i = 8
+	case ExtCompressCertificate:
+		i = 9
+	case ExtRecordSizeLimit:
+		i = 10
+	case ExtSessionTicket:
+		i = 11
+	case ExtPreSharedKey:
+		i = 12
+	case ExtEarlyData:
+		i = 13
+	case ExtSupportedVersions:
+		i = 14
+	case ExtCookie:
+		i = 15
+	case ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes:
+		i = 16
+	case ExtCertificateAuthorities:
+		i = 17
+	case ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert:
+		i = 18
+	case ExtKeyShare:
+		i = 19
+	case ExtApplicationSettings:
+		i = 20
+	case ExtEncryptedClientHello:
+		i = 21
+	case ExtRenegotiationInfo:
+		i = 22
+	case ExtECPointFormats:
+		i = 23
+	default:
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return 1 << i, true
+}

x/tls/hello_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	ltls "github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// captureClientHello drives a standard library TLS client far enough to emit
+// its first flight and returns the ClientHello handshake message body.
+//
+// Using a real client rather than a hand-written fixture means the parser is
+// exercised against genuine extension ordering, a 32-byte compatibility
+// session ID and GREASE-free but otherwise realistic content. Browser captures
+// arrive at Stage 6; this covers the structure in the meantime.
+func captureClientHello(t *testing.T) ltls.ClientHelloMsg {
+	t.Helper()
+	client, server := net.Pipe()
+	defer client.Close()
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	go func() {
+		c := tls.Client(client, &tls.Config{
+			ServerName: "example.com",
+			MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+			MaxVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+			NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"},
+		})
+		_ = c.Handshake() // will fail; we only need the first flight
+	}()
+
+	server.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
+	var buf [4096]byte
+	n, err := server.Read(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading ClientHello: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec, err := ltls.NewRecordFrame(buf[:n])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
+	}
+	if rec.ContentType() != ltls.ContentTypeHandshake {
+		t.Fatalf("first record is %v, want handshake", rec.ContentType())
+	}
+	if !rec.Complete() {
+		t.Fatalf("ClientHello record split across reads: have %d want %d",
+			n, rec.RecordLength())
+	}
+	hs, err := ltls.NewHandshakeFrame(rec.Payload())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("handshake: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hs.MsgType() != ltls.HandshakeTypeClientHello {
+		t.Fatalf("first message is %v, want client_hello", hs.MsgType())
+	}
+	if !hs.Complete() {
+		t.Fatal("ClientHello spans multiple records")
+	}
+	ch, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(hs.Body())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("client hello: %v", err)
+	}
+	return ch
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloParseRealHello(t *testing.T) {
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+
+	if ch.LegacyVersion() != ltls.VersionTLS12 {
+		t.Errorf("legacy_version %#04x want 0x0303", ch.LegacyVersion())
+	}
+	if !ch.ValidateCompression() {
+		t.Errorf("legacy_compression_methods % x, want exactly {0}",
+			ch.LegacyCompressionMethods())
+	}
+	if n := len(ch.LegacySessionID()); n != 32 {
+		// A TLS 1.3 client sends a fake 32-byte session ID to trigger
+		// middlebox compatibility mode. The server must echo it.
+		t.Errorf("session id len %d, want 32 for middlebox compat", n)
+	}
+
+	var sawTLS13, sawX25519, sawSNI, sawALPN bool
+	for _, ext := range ch.Extensions {
+		switch ext.Type() {
+		case ltls.ExtSupportedVersions:
+			for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+				sawTLS13 = sawTLS13 || v == ltls.VersionTLS13
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtKeyShare:
+			for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				sawX25519 = sawX25519 || ks.Group == ltls.GroupX25519 && len(ks.Key) == 32
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtServerName:
+			for _, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+				sawSNI = sawSNI || name.Type == 0 && string(name.Name) == "example.com"
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtALPN:
+			for _, p := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+				sawALPN = sawALPN || string(p) == "http/1.1"
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	var suites []ltls.CipherSuite
+	for _, s := range ch.CipherSuites {
+		suites = append(suites, s)
+	}
+
+	if !sawTLS13 {
+		t.Error("supported_versions did not offer TLS 1.3")
+	}
+	if !sawX25519 {
+		t.Error("no 32-byte x25519 key share found")
+	}
+	if !sawSNI {
+		t.Error("SNI host not recovered")
+	}
+	if !sawALPN {
+		t.Error("ALPN http/1.1 not recovered")
+	}
+	var mandatory bool
+	for _, s := range suites {
+		if s == ltls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256 {
+			mandatory = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !mandatory {
+		t.Errorf("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 not offered; got %v", suites)
+	}
+}
+
+// rebuildHelloWithExtensions re-encodes ch with a replacement extensions block,
+// exercising Builder against a structure produced by a real client.
+func rebuildHelloWithExtensions(t *testing.T, ch ltls.ClientHelloMsg, exts []byte) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var b ltls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 0, len(ch.RawData())+len(exts)+64))
+	b.AddU16(ch.LegacyVersion())
+	b.AddBytes(ch.Random()[:])
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.LegacySessionID())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.CipherSuiteBytes())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.LegacyCompressionMethods())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(exts)
+	b.Close()
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rebuilding hello: %v", err)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloRejectsOversizeSessionID(t *testing.T) {
+	// legacy_session_id feeds a fixed [32]byte echo buffer in the server, so
+	// the bound must be enforced at parse time.
+	body := make([]byte, 0, 128)
+	body = append(body, 0x03, 0x03)
+	body = append(body, make([]byte, ltls.SizeRandom)...)
+	body = append(body, 33)                     // session id length, one over
+	body = append(body, make([]byte, 33)...)    //
+	body = append(body, 0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01) // cipher suites
+	body = append(body, 0x01, 0x00)             // compression
+	body = append(body, 0x00, 0x00)             // extensions, empty
+	_, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(body)
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+	body := append(append([]byte{}, ch.RawData()...), 0xff)
+	if _, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(body); err == nil {
+		t.Error("trailing byte after extensions block accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloTruncatedAtEveryOffset(t *testing.T) {
+	// Truncating a valid hello anywhere must produce an error, never a panic
+	// and never a frame whose accessors read out of bounds.
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+	full := ch.RawData()
+	for n := range len(full) {
+		msg, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(full[:n])
+		if err == nil {
+			// A shorter prefix must never parse as a complete hello.
+			t.Errorf("truncation to %d/%d bytes parsed clean", n, len(full))
+			_ = msg.ExtensionBytes()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzNewClientHelloFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{
+		0x03, 0x03,
+		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+		0x00,                   // no session id
+		0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01, // one cipher suite
+		0x01, 0x00, // null compression
+		0x00, 0x00, // no extensions
+	})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		ch, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		// Every accessor must stay inside the input.
+		if len(ch.LegacySessionID()) > ltls.MaxSessionIDLen {
+			t.Fatalf("session id %d bytes exceeds max", len(ch.LegacySessionID()))
+		}
+		if len(ch.CipherSuiteBytes())%2 != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("cipher suites vector has odd length")
+		}
+		total := 2 + ltls.SizeRandom + 1 + len(ch.LegacySessionID()) +
+			2 + len(ch.CipherSuiteBytes()) +
+			1 + len(ch.LegacyCompressionMethods()) +
+			2 + len(ch.ExtensionBytes())
+		if total != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("fields sum to %d but input is %d bytes", total, len(b))
+		}
+		_ = ch.ValidateCompression()
+		// Every nested iterator must stay inside the input too.
+		for _, ext := range ch.Extensions {
+			for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				_ = ks
+			}
+			for _, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+				_ = name
+			}
+			for _, p := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+				_ = p
+			}
+			for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+				_ = v
+			}
+			for _, g := range ext.SupportedGroups {
+				_ = g
+			}
+			for _, s := range ext.SignatureSchemes {
+				_ = s
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}

x/tls/msg_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	ltls "github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// locates reports whether span points at want inside body.
+func locates(body []byte, off int, want []byte) bool {
+	return off >= 0 && off+len(want) <= len(body) && bytes.Equal(body[off:off+len(want)], want)
+}
+
+// Spans must locate every hello field, so decoders can map a field onto its wire
+// position without re-walking the structure.
+func TestClientHelloMsgSpans(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	body := msg.RawData()
+	sp := msg.Spans()
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		span ltls.Span
+		want []byte
+	}{
+		{"random", sp.Random, msg.Random()[:]},
+		{"session id", sp.SessionID, msg.LegacySessionID()},
+		{"compression", sp.Compression, msg.LegacyCompressionMethods()},
+		{"extensions", sp.Extensions, msg.ExtensionBytes()},
+	} {
+		if tc.span.Len != len(tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%s span len %d want %d", tc.name, tc.span.Len, len(tc.want))
+		} else if !locates(body, tc.span.Off, tc.want) {
+			t.Errorf("%s span %+v does not locate its field", tc.name, tc.span)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Iterator keys are offsets into the hello body, at every nesting level, so a
+// decoder can point at a cipher suite or an SNI hostname without arithmetic.
+func TestClientHelloMsgIterators(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	body := msg.RawData()
+
+	nsuites := 0
+	for off, suite := range msg.CipherSuites {
+		want := []byte{byte(suite >> 8), byte(suite)}
+		if !locates(body, off, want) {
+			t.Errorf("suite %v at offset %d does not match the wire", suite, off)
+		}
+		nsuites++
+	}
+	if nsuites == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("no cipher suites walked")
+	}
+
+	var sawSNI, sawALPN, sawTLS13, sawX25519 bool
+	for off, ext := range msg.Extensions {
+		if !locates(body, off, ext.Data()) {
+			t.Errorf("%v data at offset %d does not match the wire", ext.Type(), off)
+		}
+		switch ext.Type() {
+		case ltls.ExtServerName:
+			for noff, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+				sawSNI = true
+				if name.Type != 0 || string(name.Name) != "example.com" {
+					t.Errorf("server name %d %q", name.Type, name.Name)
+				}
+				if !locates(body, noff, name.Name) {
+					t.Errorf("server name at offset %d does not match the wire", noff)
+				}
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtALPN:
+			for poff, proto := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+				sawALPN = true
+				if !locates(body, poff, proto) {
+					t.Errorf("alpn %q at offset %d does not match the wire", proto, poff)
+				}
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtSupportedVersions:
+			for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+				sawTLS13 = sawTLS13 || v == ltls.VersionTLS13
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtKeyShare:
+			for koff, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				if ks.Group == ltls.GroupX25519 {
+					sawX25519 = true
+				}
+				if !locates(body, koff, ks.Key) {
+					t.Errorf("key share %v at offset %d does not match the wire", ks.Group, koff)
+				}
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtSupportedGroups:
+			for goff, g := range ext.SupportedGroups {
+				if !locates(body, goff, []byte{byte(g >> 8), byte(g)}) {
+					t.Errorf("group %v at offset %d does not match the wire", g, goff)
+				}
+			}
+		case ltls.ExtSignatureAlgorithms:
+			for soff, s := range ext.SignatureSchemes {
+				if !locates(body, soff, []byte{byte(s >> 8), byte(s)}) {
+					t.Errorf("scheme %v at offset %d does not match the wire", s, soff)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sawSNI || !sawALPN || !sawTLS13 || !sawX25519 {
+		t.Errorf("sni=%v alpn=%v tls13=%v x25519=%v", sawSNI, sawALPN, sawTLS13, sawX25519)
+	}
+}
+
+// A sub-iterator reached from the wrong extension yields nothing rather than
+// reinterpreting unrelated bytes.
+func TestExtensionSubIteratorTypeMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	for _, ext := range msg.Extensions {
+		if ext.Type() != ltls.ExtServerName {
+			continue
+		}
+		for range ext.KeyShares {
+			t.Error("KeyShares walked a server_name extension")
+		}
+		for range ext.SupportedVersions {
+			t.Error("SupportedVersions walked a server_name extension")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Walking a hello must not allocate: every iterator is a value type over the
+// caller's buffer.
+func TestClientHelloMsgZeroAlloc(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	body := msg.RawData()
+	n := testing.AllocsPerRun(10, func() {
+		m, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(body)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for _, suite := range m.CipherSuites {
+			_ = suite
+		}
+		for _, ext := range m.Extensions {
+			for _, name := range ext.ServerNames {
+				_ = name
+			}
+			for _, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				_ = ks
+			}
+			for _, p := range ext.ALPNProtos {
+				_ = p
+			}
+			for _, v := range ext.SupportedVersions {
+				_ = v
+			}
+		}
+	})
+	if n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("parse and walk allocated %v times, want 0", n)
+	}
+}
+
+// A known extension whose inner framing is broken must fail the parse, since
+// every iterator past construction is error-free.
+func TestParseClientHelloRejectsMalformedKnownExtension(t *testing.T) {
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	// server_name with a host name length one past the extension data.
+	bad := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b, // server_name, 11 bytes
+		0x00, 0x09, // server_name_list length
+		0x00,       // host_name
+		0x00, 0x0a, // name length 10, but only 6 bytes follow
+		'e', 'x', 'a', 'm', 'p', 'l',
+	}
+	body := rebuildHelloWithExtensions(t, msg, bad)
+	if _, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(body); err == nil {
+		t.Error("malformed server_name accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseClientHelloRejectsDuplicateExtension(t *testing.T) {
+	// Duplicating an extension lets this parser and a middlebox act on
+	// different copies, so it is rejected at parse time.
+	msg := captureClientHello(t)
+	exts := msg.ExtensionBytes()
+	var first int
+	for off, ext := range msg.Extensions {
+		first = off + len(ext.Data())
+		break
+	}
+	dup := make([]byte, 0, len(exts)+first)
+	dup = append(dup, exts...)
+	dup = append(dup, exts[:first-msg.Spans().Extensions.Off]...)
+
+	body := rebuildHelloWithExtensions(t, msg, dup)
+	_, err := ltls.ParseClientHello(body)
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidField) {
+		t.Errorf("duplicate extension got %v want ErrInvalidField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// buildServerHello encodes a ServerHello body with supported_versions and a
+// key_share, which in the server form is a single entry with no list prefix.
+func buildServerHello(t *testing.T, sid []byte) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var b ltls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 0, 256))
+	b.AddU16(ltls.VersionTLS12)
+	for range ltls.SizeRandom {
+		b.AddU8(0xab)
+	}
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(sid)
+	b.Close()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(ltls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256))
+	b.AddU8(0) // legacy_compression_method
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(ltls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(ltls.VersionTLS13)
+	b.Close()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(ltls.ExtKeyShare))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(uint16(ltls.GroupX25519))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	for range 32 {
+		b.AddU8(0xee)
+	}
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	body, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return body
+}
+
+func TestServerHelloMsg(t *testing.T) {
+	sid := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xcd}, 32)
+	body := buildServerHello(t, sid)
+	msg, err := ltls.ParseServerHello(body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if msg.LegacyVersion() != ltls.VersionTLS12 {
+		t.Errorf("legacy_version %#04x want 0x0303", msg.LegacyVersion())
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(msg.LegacySessionIDEcho(), sid) {
+		t.Errorf("session id echo % x want % x", msg.LegacySessionIDEcho(), sid)
+	}
+	if msg.CipherSuite() != ltls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256 {
+		t.Errorf("cipher suite %v want TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", msg.CipherSuite())
+	}
+	if msg.LegacyCompressionMethod() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("compression method %d want 0", msg.LegacyCompressionMethod())
+	}
+
+	var version uint16
+	shares := 0
+	for _, ext := range msg.Extensions {
+		switch ext.Type() {
+		case ltls.ExtSupportedVersions:
+			// The ServerHello form is a bare uint16, not a list.
+			if len(ext.Data()) != 2 {
+				t.Fatalf("supported_versions %d bytes want 2", len(ext.Data()))
+			}
+			version = uint16(ext.Data()[0])<<8 | uint16(ext.Data()[1])
+		case ltls.ExtKeyShare:
+			for koff, ks := range ext.KeyShares {
+				shares++
+				if ks.Group != ltls.GroupX25519 || len(ks.Key) != 32 {
+					t.Errorf("key share %v %d bytes", ks.Group, len(ks.Key))
+				}
+				if !locates(body, koff, ks.Key) {
+					t.Errorf("key share at offset %d does not match the wire", koff)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if version != ltls.VersionTLS13 {
+		t.Errorf("negotiated version %#04x want 0x0304", version)
+	}
+	if shares != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("walked %d key shares want 1, the server sends a single entry", shares)
+	}
+
+	sp := msg.Spans()
+	if sp.CipherSuites.Len != 2 || !locates(body, sp.CipherSuites.Off, body[sp.CipherSuites.Off:sp.CipherSuites.Off+2]) {
+		t.Errorf("cipher suite span %+v", sp.CipherSuites)
+	}
+	if sp.Compression.Len != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("compression span len %d want 1", sp.Compression.Len)
+	}
+	if !locates(body, sp.Extensions.Off, msg.ExtensionBytes()) {
+		t.Errorf("extensions span %+v does not locate the block", sp.Extensions)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseServerHelloRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
+	body := buildServerHello(t, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xcd}, 32))
+	if _, err := ltls.ParseServerHello(append(append([]byte{}, body...), 0xff)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("trailing byte after extensions block accepted")
+	}
+	// No truncation may parse clean, panic, or leave an accessor out of range.
+	for n := range len(body) {
+		msg, err := ltls.ParseServerHello(body[:n])
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("truncation to %d/%d bytes parsed clean", n, len(body))
+			_ = msg.ExtensionBytes()
+		}
+	}
+}

x/tls/stringers.go

@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// Code generated by "stringer -type=ContentType,HandshakeType,ExtensionType,AlertDescription,AlertLevel,NamedGroup,SignatureScheme,CipherSuite -linecomment -output stringers.go ."; DO NOT EDIT.
+
+package tls
+
+import "strconv"
+
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[ContentTypeInvalid-0]
+	_ = x[ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec-20]
+	_ = x[ContentTypeAlert-21]
+	_ = x[ContentTypeHandshake-22]
+	_ = x[ContentTypeApplicationData-23]
+}
+
+const (
+	_ContentType_name_0 = "invalid"
+	_ContentType_name_1 = "change_cipher_specalerthandshakeapplication_data"
+)
+
+var (
+	_ContentType_index_1 = [...]uint8{0, 18, 23, 32, 48}
+)
+
+func (i ContentType) String() string {
+	switch {
+	case i == 0:
+		return _ContentType_name_0
+	case 20 <= i && i <= 23:
+		i -= 20
+		return _ContentType_name_1[_ContentType_index_1[i]:_ContentType_index_1[i+1]]
+	default:
+		return "ContentType(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+	}
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeClientHello-1]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeServerHello-2]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeNewSessionTicket-4]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeEndOfEarlyData-5]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeEncryptedExtensions-8]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeCertificate-11]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeCertificateRequest-13]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeCertificateVerify-15]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeFinished-20]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeKeyUpdate-24]
+	_ = x[HandshakeTypeMessageHash-254]
+}
+
+const (
+	_HandshakeType_name_0 = "client_helloserver_hello"
+	_HandshakeType_name_1 = "new_session_ticketend_of_early_data"
+	_HandshakeType_name_2 = "encrypted_extensions"
+	_HandshakeType_name_3 = "certificate"
+	_HandshakeType_name_4 = "certificate_request"
+	_HandshakeType_name_5 = "certificate_verify"
+	_HandshakeType_name_6 = "finished"
+	_HandshakeType_name_7 = "key_update"
+	_HandshakeType_name_8 = "message_hash"
+)
+
+var (
+	_HandshakeType_index_0 = [...]uint8{0, 12, 24}
+	_HandshakeType_index_1 = [...]uint8{0, 18, 35}
+)
+
+func (i HandshakeType) String() string {
+	switch {
+	case 1 <= i && i <= 2:
+		i -= 1
+		return _HandshakeType_name_0[_HandshakeType_index_0[i]:_HandshakeType_index_0[i+1]]
+	case 4 <= i && i <= 5:
+		i -= 4
+		return _HandshakeType_name_1[_HandshakeType_index_1[i]:_HandshakeType_index_1[i+1]]
+	case i == 8:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_2
+	case i == 11:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_3
+	case i == 13:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_4
+	case i == 15:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_5
+	case i == 20:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_6
+	case i == 24:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_7
+	case i == 254:
+		return _HandshakeType_name_8
+	default:
+		return "HandshakeType(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+	}
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[ExtServerName-0]
+	_ = x[ExtMaxFragmentLength-1]
+	_ = x[ExtStatusRequest-5]
+	_ = x[ExtSupportedGroups-10]
+	_ = x[ExtECPointFormats-11]
+	_ = x[ExtSignatureAlgorithms-13]
+	_ = x[ExtALPN-16]
+	_ = x[ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp-18]
+	_ = x[ExtPadding-21]
+	_ = x[ExtExtendedMasterSecret-23]
+	_ = x[ExtCompressCertificate-27]
+	_ = x[ExtRecordSizeLimit-28]
+	_ = x[ExtSessionTicket-35]
+	_ = x[ExtPreSharedKey-41]
+	_ = x[ExtEarlyData-42]
+	_ = x[ExtSupportedVersions-43]
+	_ = x[ExtCookie-44]
+	_ = x[ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes-45]
+	_ = x[ExtCertificateAuthorities-47]
+	_ = x[ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert-50]
+	_ = x[ExtKeyShare-51]
+	_ = x[ExtApplicationSettings-17513]
+	_ = x[ExtEncryptedClientHello-65037]
+	_ = x[ExtRenegotiationInfo-65281]
+}
+
+const _ExtensionType_name = "server_namemax_fragment_lengthstatus_requestsupported_groupsec_point_formatssignature_algorithmsapplication_layer_protocol_negotiationsigned_certificate_timestamppaddingextended_master_secretcompress_certificaterecord_size_limitsession_ticketpre_shared_keyearly_datasupported_versionscookiepsk_key_exchange_modescertificate_authoritiessignature_algorithms_certkey_shareapplication_settingsencrypted_client_hellorenegotiation_info"
+
+var _ExtensionType_map = map[ExtensionType]string{
+	0:     _ExtensionType_name[0:11],
+	1:     _ExtensionType_name[11:30],
+	5:     _ExtensionType_name[30:44],
+	10:    _ExtensionType_name[44:60],
+	11:    _ExtensionType_name[60:76],
+	13:    _ExtensionType_name[76:96],
+	16:    _ExtensionType_name[96:134],
+	18:    _ExtensionType_name[134:162],
+	21:    _ExtensionType_name[162:169],
+	23:    _ExtensionType_name[169:191],
+	27:    _ExtensionType_name[191:211],
+	28:    _ExtensionType_name[211:228],
+	35:    _ExtensionType_name[228:242],
+	41:    _ExtensionType_name[242:256],
+	42:    _ExtensionType_name[256:266],
+	43:    _ExtensionType_name[266:284],
+	44:    _ExtensionType_name[284:290],
+	45:    _ExtensionType_name[290:312],
+	47:    _ExtensionType_name[312:335],
+	50:    _ExtensionType_name[335:360],
+	51:    _ExtensionType_name[360:369],
+	17513: _ExtensionType_name[369:389],
+	65037: _ExtensionType_name[389:411],
+	65281: _ExtensionType_name[411:429],
+}
+
+func (i ExtensionType) String() string {
+	if str, ok := _ExtensionType_map[i]; ok {
+		return str
+	}
+	return "ExtensionType(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[AlertCloseNotify-0]
+	_ = x[AlertUnexpectedMessage-10]
+	_ = x[AlertBadRecordMAC-20]
+	_ = x[AlertRecordOverflow-22]
+	_ = x[AlertHandshakeFailure-40]
+	_ = x[AlertBadCertificate-42]
+	_ = x[AlertUnsupportedCertificate-43]
+	_ = x[AlertCertificateRevoked-44]
+	_ = x[AlertCertificateExpired-45]
+	_ = x[AlertCertificateUnknown-46]
+	_ = x[AlertIllegalParameter-47]
+	_ = x[AlertUnknownCA-48]
+	_ = x[AlertAccessDenied-49]
+	_ = x[AlertDecodeError-50]
+	_ = x[AlertDecryptError-51]
+	_ = x[AlertProtocolVersion-70]
+	_ = x[AlertInsufficientSecurity-71]
+	_ = x[AlertInternalError-80]
+	_ = x[AlertInappropriateFallback-86]
+	_ = x[AlertUserCanceled-90]
+	_ = x[AlertMissingExtension-109]
+	_ = x[AlertUnsupportedExtension-110]
+	_ = x[AlertUnrecognizedName-112]
+	_ = x[AlertBadCertificateStatusResponse-113]
+	_ = x[AlertUnknownPSKIdentity-115]
+	_ = x[AlertCertificateRequired-116]
+	_ = x[AlertNoApplicationProtocol-120]
+}
+
+const _AlertDescription_name = "close_notifyunexpected_messagebad_record_macrecord_overflowhandshake_failurebad_certificateunsupported_certificatecertificate_revokedcertificate_expiredcertificate_unknownillegal_parameterunknown_caaccess_denieddecode_errordecrypt_errorprotocol_versioninsufficient_securityinternal_errorinappropriate_fallbackuser_canceledmissing_extensionunsupported_extensionunrecognized_namebad_certificate_status_responseunknown_psk_identitycertificate_requiredno_application_protocol"
+
+var _AlertDescription_map = map[AlertDescription]string{
+	0:   _AlertDescription_name[0:12],
+	10:  _AlertDescription_name[12:30],
+	20:  _AlertDescription_name[30:44],
+	22:  _AlertDescription_name[44:59],
+	40:  _AlertDescription_name[59:76],
+	42:  _AlertDescription_name[76:91],
+	43:  _AlertDescription_name[91:114],
+	44:  _AlertDescription_name[114:133],
+	45:  _AlertDescription_name[133:152],
+	46:  _AlertDescription_name[152:171],
+	47:  _AlertDescription_name[171:188],
+	48:  _AlertDescription_name[188:198],
+	49:  _AlertDescription_name[198:211],
+	50:  _AlertDescription_name[211:223],
+	51:  _AlertDescription_name[223:236],
+	70:  _AlertDescription_name[236:252],
+	71:  _AlertDescription_name[252:273],
+	80:  _AlertDescription_name[273:287],
+	86:  _AlertDescription_name[287:309],
+	90:  _AlertDescription_name[309:322],
+	109: _AlertDescription_name[322:339],
+	110: _AlertDescription_name[339:360],
+	112: _AlertDescription_name[360:377],
+	113: _AlertDescription_name[377:408],
+	115: _AlertDescription_name[408:428],
+	116: _AlertDescription_name[428:448],
+	120: _AlertDescription_name[448:471],
+}
+
+func (i AlertDescription) String() string {
+	if str, ok := _AlertDescription_map[i]; ok {
+		return str
+	}
+	return "AlertDescription(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[AlertLevelWarning-1]
+	_ = x[AlertLevelFatal-2]
+}
+
+const _AlertLevel_name = "warningfatal"
+
+var _AlertLevel_index = [...]uint8{0, 7, 12}
+
+func (i AlertLevel) String() string {
+	i -= 1
+	if i >= AlertLevel(len(_AlertLevel_index)-1) {
+		return "AlertLevel(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i+1), 10) + ")"
+	}
+	return _AlertLevel_name[_AlertLevel_index[i]:_AlertLevel_index[i+1]]
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[GroupSECP256R1-23]
+	_ = x[GroupSECP384R1-24]
+	_ = x[GroupSECP521R1-25]
+	_ = x[GroupX25519-29]
+	_ = x[GroupX448-30]
+	_ = x[GroupX25519MLKEM768-4588]
+}
+
+const (
+	_NamedGroup_name_0 = "secp256r1secp384r1secp521r1"
+	_NamedGroup_name_1 = "x25519x448"
+	_NamedGroup_name_2 = "x25519mlkem768"
+)
+
+var (
+	_NamedGroup_index_0 = [...]uint8{0, 9, 18, 27}
+	_NamedGroup_index_1 = [...]uint8{0, 6, 10}
+)
+
+func (i NamedGroup) String() string {
+	switch {
+	case 23 <= i && i <= 25:
+		i -= 23
+		return _NamedGroup_name_0[_NamedGroup_index_0[i]:_NamedGroup_index_0[i+1]]
+	case 29 <= i && i <= 30:
+		i -= 29
+		return _NamedGroup_name_1[_NamedGroup_index_1[i]:_NamedGroup_index_1[i+1]]
+	case i == 4588:
+		return _NamedGroup_name_2
+	default:
+		return "NamedGroup(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+	}
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[SigRSAPKCS1SHA256-1025]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPKCS1SHA384-1281]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPKCS1SHA512-1537]
+	_ = x[SigECDSAP256SHA256-1027]
+	_ = x[SigECDSAP384SHA384-1283]
+	_ = x[SigECDSAP521SHA512-1539]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPSSRSAESHA256-2052]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPSSRSAESHA384-2053]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPSSRSAESHA512-2054]
+	_ = x[SigEd25519-2055]
+	_ = x[SigRSAPSSPSSSHA256-2057]
+}
+
+const (
+	_SignatureScheme_name_0 = "rsa_pkcs1_sha256"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_1 = "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_2 = "rsa_pkcs1_sha384"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_3 = "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_4 = "rsa_pkcs1_sha512"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_5 = "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_6 = "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256rsa_pss_rsae_sha384rsa_pss_rsae_sha512ed25519"
+	_SignatureScheme_name_7 = "rsa_pss_pss_sha256"
+)
+
+var (
+	_SignatureScheme_index_6 = [...]uint8{0, 19, 38, 57, 64}
+)
+
+func (i SignatureScheme) String() string {
+	switch {
+	case i == 1025:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_0
+	case i == 1027:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_1
+	case i == 1281:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_2
+	case i == 1283:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_3
+	case i == 1537:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_4
+	case i == 1539:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_5
+	case 2052 <= i && i <= 2055:
+		i -= 2052
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_6[_SignatureScheme_index_6[i]:_SignatureScheme_index_6[i+1]]
+	case i == 2057:
+		return _SignatureScheme_name_7
+	default:
+		return "SignatureScheme(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 10) + ")"
+	}
+}
+func _() {
+	// An "invalid array index" compiler error signifies that the constant values have changed.
+	// Re-run the stringer command to generate them again.
+	var x [1]struct{}
+	_ = x[SuiteAES128GCMSHA256-4865]
+	_ = x[SuiteAES256GCMSHA384-4866]
+	_ = x[SuiteChaCha20Poly1305SHA256-4867]
+	_ = x[SuiteAES128CCMSHA256-4868]
+	_ = x[SuiteAES128CCM8SHA256-4869]
+}
+
+const _CipherSuite_name = "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256"
+
+var _CipherSuite_index = [...]uint8{0, 22, 44, 72, 94, 118}
+
+func (i CipherSuite) String() string {
+	i -= 4865
+	if i >= CipherSuite(len(_CipherSuite_index)-1) {
+		return "CipherSuite(" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(i+4865), 10) + ")"
+	}
+	return _CipherSuite_name[_CipherSuite_index[i]:_CipherSuite_index[i+1]]
+}

x/tls/stringers_const.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package tls
+
+// StringConst methods name values as String does but always return a
+// compile-time constant, unlike String which formats an unrecognized value with
+// strconv. Wire values are attacker controlled, so decoders and logs on
+// embedded targets use StringConst and print the number alongside it.
+
+const (
+	// nameGREASE names the reserved values of RFC 8701, which carry no meaning.
+	nameGREASE = "GREASE"
+	// nameUnknown names a value this package does not recognize. Other RFCs may
+	// well define it: this is TLS 1.3 only.
+	nameUnknown = "unknown"
+)
+
+// StringConst returns the content type's name, or "unknown".
+func (v ContentType) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case ContentTypeInvalid, ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec, ContentTypeAlert,
+		ContentTypeHandshake, ContentTypeApplicationData:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the handshake message type's name, or "unknown".
+func (v HandshakeType) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case HandshakeTypeClientHello, HandshakeTypeServerHello, HandshakeTypeNewSessionTicket,
+		HandshakeTypeEndOfEarlyData, HandshakeTypeEncryptedExtensions, HandshakeTypeCertificate,
+		HandshakeTypeCertificateRequest, HandshakeTypeCertificateVerify, HandshakeTypeFinished,
+		HandshakeTypeKeyUpdate, HandshakeTypeMessageHash:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the extension type's name, "GREASE" or "unknown".
+func (v ExtensionType) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case ExtServerName, ExtMaxFragmentLength, ExtStatusRequest, ExtSupportedGroups,
+		ExtECPointFormats, ExtSignatureAlgorithms, ExtALPN, ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp,
+		ExtPadding, ExtExtendedMasterSecret, ExtCompressCertificate, ExtRecordSizeLimit,
+		ExtSessionTicket, ExtPreSharedKey, ExtEarlyData, ExtSupportedVersions, ExtCookie,
+		ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes, ExtCertificateAuthorities, ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert,
+		ExtKeyShare, ExtApplicationSettings, ExtEncryptedClientHello, ExtRenegotiationInfo:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	if IsGREASE(uint16(v)) {
+		return nameGREASE
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the alert level's name, or "unknown".
+func (v AlertLevel) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case AlertLevelWarning, AlertLevelFatal:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the alert description's name, or "unknown".
+func (v AlertDescription) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case AlertCloseNotify, AlertUnexpectedMessage, AlertBadRecordMAC, AlertRecordOverflow,
+		AlertHandshakeFailure, AlertBadCertificate, AlertUnsupportedCertificate,
+		AlertCertificateRevoked, AlertCertificateExpired, AlertCertificateUnknown,
+		AlertIllegalParameter, AlertUnknownCA, AlertAccessDenied, AlertDecodeError,
+		AlertDecryptError, AlertProtocolVersion, AlertInsufficientSecurity,
+		AlertInternalError, AlertInappropriateFallback, AlertUserCanceled,
+		AlertMissingExtension, AlertUnsupportedExtension, AlertUnrecognizedName,
+		AlertBadCertificateStatusResponse, AlertUnknownPSKIdentity,
+		AlertCertificateRequired, AlertNoApplicationProtocol:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the named group's name, "GREASE" or "unknown".
+func (v NamedGroup) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case GroupSECP256R1, GroupSECP384R1, GroupSECP521R1,
+		GroupX25519, GroupX448, GroupX25519MLKEM768:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	if IsGREASE(uint16(v)) {
+		return nameGREASE
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the signature scheme's name, "GREASE" or "unknown".
+func (v SignatureScheme) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case SigRSAPKCS1SHA256, SigRSAPKCS1SHA384, SigRSAPKCS1SHA512,
+		SigECDSAP256SHA256, SigECDSAP384SHA384, SigECDSAP521SHA512,
+		SigRSAPSSRSAESHA256, SigRSAPSSRSAESHA384, SigRSAPSSRSAESHA512,
+		SigEd25519, SigRSAPSSPSSSHA256:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	if IsGREASE(uint16(v)) {
+		return nameGREASE
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}
+
+// StringConst returns the cipher suite's name, "GREASE" or "unknown".
+// Every TLS 1.2 suite a browser still offers is undefined here: this package
+// implements TLS 1.3 only.
+func (v CipherSuite) StringConst() string {
+	switch v {
+	case SuiteAES128GCMSHA256, SuiteAES256GCMSHA384, SuiteChaCha20Poly1305SHA256,
+		SuiteAES128CCMSHA256, SuiteAES128CCM8SHA256:
+		return v.String()
+	}
+	if IsGREASE(uint16(v)) {
+		return nameGREASE
+	}
+	return nameUnknown
+}

x/tls/stringers_const_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// StringConst must name defined values as String does, GREASE values "GREASE"
+// and everything else "unknown", over the whole range and without allocating.
+// A constant added without extending a StringConst switch fails here.
+func TestStringConst(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		n      int
+		grease bool // type carries GREASE values
+		str    func(int) string
+		cst    func(int) string
+	}{
+		{"ContentType", 1 << 8, false,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.ContentType(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.ContentType(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"HandshakeType", 1 << 8, false,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.HandshakeType(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.HandshakeType(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"AlertLevel", 1 << 8, false,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.AlertLevel(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.AlertLevel(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"AlertDescription", 1 << 8, false,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.AlertDescription(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.AlertDescription(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"ExtensionType", 1 << 16, true,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.ExtensionType(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.ExtensionType(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"NamedGroup", 1 << 16, true,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.NamedGroup(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.NamedGroup(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"SignatureScheme", 1 << 16, true,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.SignatureScheme(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.SignatureScheme(i).StringConst() }},
+		{"CipherSuite", 1 << 16, true,
+			func(i int) string { return tls.CipherSuite(i).String() },
+			func(i int) string { return tls.CipherSuite(i).StringConst() }},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			for i := range tc.n {
+				str, cst := tc.str(i), tc.cst(i)
+				if !strings.ContainsRune(str, '(') { // stringer names undefined values "Type(9)".
+					if cst != str {
+						t.Fatalf("%s(%d)=%q want %q", tc.name, i, cst, str)
+					}
+					continue
+				}
+				want := "unknown"
+				if tc.grease && tls.IsGREASE(uint16(i)) {
+					want = "GREASE"
+				}
+				if cst != want {
+					t.Fatalf("%s(%d)=%q want %q", tc.name, i, cst, want)
+				}
+			}
+			allocs := testing.AllocsPerRun(1, func() {
+				for i := range tc.n {
+					_ = tc.cst(i)
+				}
+			})
+			if allocs != 0 {
+				t.Errorf("%s allocated %v times", tc.name, allocs)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}