clanker tls

dhcp/dhcpv4/frame.go

@@ -44,9 +44,6 @@ type Frame struct {
 	buf []byte
 }
 
-// RawData returns the underlying frame buffer.
-func (frm Frame) RawData() []byte { return frm.buf }
-
 // OptionsPayload returns the options portion of the DHCP frame. May be zero lengthed.
 func (frm Frame) OptionsPayload() []byte {
 	return frm.buf[OptionsOffset:]

x/tls/builder.go

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"unsafe"
+)
+
+// maxBuilderNest is the deepest length-prefix nesting the [Builder] supports.
+// The deepest real TLS 1.3 structure is the ClientHello key_share extension:
+// handshake body, extensions block, extension, client_shares list,
+// key_exchange. Eight leaves generous headroom.
+const maxBuilderNest = 8
+
+// Builder writes TLS wire structures into a caller-supplied buffer that never
+// grows. It exists because TLS nests length-prefixed vectors several levels
+// deep and the length of each is only known after its contents are written;
+// the standard answer, golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte, allocates.
+//
+// Open a length prefix, write the contents, then Close to backpatch the real
+// length:
+//
+//	var b tls.Builder
+//	b.Reset(buf)
+//	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+//	b.OpenU16()             // extension_data length
+//	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS13)
+//	b.Close()
+//	out, err := b.Bytes()
+//
+// Errors are sticky: once the destination buffer overflows or the nesting is
+// misused, every later call is a no-op and [Builder.Err] reports the first
+// failure. Callers therefore need to check only once, at the end.
+//
+// The zero Builder is not usable; call [Builder.Reset] first.
+type Builder struct {
+	buf   []byte
+	stack [maxBuilderNest]int32 // offset of each open length field
+	width [maxBuilderNest]int8  // 1, 2 or 3 byte length prefix
+	n     int8                  // open prefix count
+	err   error
+}
+
+// Reset prepares the Builder to write into dst, discarding any previous state
+// and error. The Builder writes into dst[:0] and never reallocates, so dst's
+// capacity is a hard ceiling on the structure being built.
+func (b *Builder) Reset(dst []byte) {
+	b.buf = dst[:0]
+	b.n = 0
+	b.err = nil
+}
+
+// Err returns the first error encountered since [Builder.Reset], if any.
+func (b *Builder) Err() error { return b.err }
+
+// Len returns the number of bytes written so far, including the placeholder
+// bytes of any currently open length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) Len() int { return len(b.buf) }
+
+// Bytes returns the built structure. It reports an error if the Builder failed
+// at any point, or if a length prefix was opened and never closed, since the
+// resulting bytes would contain an unpatched placeholder.
+func (b *Builder) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return nil, b.err
+	}
+	if b.n != 0 {
+		return nil, errBuilderUnbal
+	}
+	return b.buf, nil
+}
+
+// fail records err if no error has been recorded yet.
+func (b *Builder) fail(err error) {
+	if b.err == nil {
+		b.err = err
+	}
+}
+
+// grow extends the buffer by n bytes and returns the new region, or nil if the
+// buffer is full or the Builder has already failed.
+func (b *Builder) grow(n int) []byte {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if n > cap(b.buf)-len(b.buf) {
+		b.fail(errShortBuffer)
+		return nil
+	}
+	start := len(b.buf)
+	b.buf = b.buf[:start+n]
+	return b.buf[start:]
+}
+
+// AddU8 appends a single byte.
+func (b *Builder) AddU8(v uint8) {
+	if p := b.grow(1); p != nil {
+		p[0] = v
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU16 appends a big-endian uint16.
+func (b *Builder) AddU16(v uint16) {
+	if p := b.grow(2); p != nil {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU24 appends a big-endian 24-bit value, the length encoding used by
+// handshake message headers and certificate entries.
+func (b *Builder) AddU24(v uint32) {
+	if p := b.grow(3); p != nil {
+		p[0] = byte(v >> 16)
+		p[1] = byte(v >> 8)
+		p[2] = byte(v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddU32 appends a big-endian uint32.
+func (b *Builder) AddU32(v uint32) {
+	if p := b.grow(4); p != nil {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddBytes appends raw bytes.
+func (b *Builder) AddBytes(v []byte) {
+	if p := b.grow(len(v)); p != nil {
+		copy(p, v)
+	}
+}
+
+// AddString appends the bytes of s without allocating. TLS labels and ALPN
+// protocol names are naturally string constants, and converting them with
+// []byte(s) would copy to the heap on every call.
+func (b *Builder) AddString(s string) {
+	if len(s) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	// unsafe.Slice over the string's backing array; the bytes are only read,
+	// and only for the duration of the copy inside AddBytes.
+	b.AddBytes(unsafe.Slice(unsafe.StringData(s), len(s)))
+}
+
+// openN reserves width bytes for a length prefix whose value is filled in by
+// the matching [Builder.Close].
+func (b *Builder) openN(width int8) {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if int(b.n) >= maxBuilderNest {
+		b.fail(errBuilderNest)
+		return
+	}
+	start := len(b.buf)
+	if b.grow(int(width)) == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	b.stack[b.n] = int32(start)
+	b.width[b.n] = width
+	b.n++
+}
+
+// OpenU8 begins a vector with a one-byte length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU8() { b.openN(1) }
+
+// OpenU16 begins a vector with a two-byte length prefix.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU16() { b.openN(2) }
+
+// OpenU24 begins a vector with a three-byte length prefix, as used by the
+// handshake message header.
+func (b *Builder) OpenU24() { b.openN(3) }
+
+// Close ends the innermost open vector and backpatches its length prefix with
+// the number of bytes written since the matching Open.
+//
+// A length that does not fit the reserved prefix width is a failure rather
+// than a silent truncation: writing a value modulo 2^16 into a two-byte prefix
+// would produce a structurally valid but semantically wrong record.
+func (b *Builder) Close() {
+	if b.err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if b.n == 0 {
+		b.fail(errBuilderUnbal)
+		return
+	}
+	b.n--
+	start := int(b.stack[b.n])
+	width := int(b.width[b.n])
+	n := len(b.buf) - start - width
+	p := b.buf[start:]
+	switch width {
+	case 1:
+		if n > 0xff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		p[0] = byte(n)
+	case 2:
+		if n > 0xffff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(p, uint16(n))
+	case 3:
+		if n > 0xffffff {
+			b.fail(errBadLength)
+			return
+		}
+		p[0] = byte(n >> 16)
+		p[1] = byte(n >> 8)
+		p[2] = byte(n)
+	}
+}

x/tls/builder_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// buildSupportedVersions writes the extension a TLS 1.3 ServerHello carries,
+// exercising one level of nesting.
+func buildSupportedVersions(b *tls.Builder) {
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtSupportedVersions))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS13)
+	b.Close()
+}
+
+func TestBuilderRoundTripThroughParser(t *testing.T) {
+	// Build an extensions block, then walk it back with the parser. Agreement
+	// between the two is the property that matters.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	buf := make([]byte, 64)
+	b.Reset(buf)
+	b.OpenU16() // extensions block length
+	buildSupportedVersions(&b)
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.ExtKeyShare))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.OpenU16() // client_shares
+	b.AddU16(uint16(tls.GroupX25519))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 8))
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+	b.Close()
+
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Strip the outer block length the way ClientHelloFrame.Extensions does.
+	if len(out) < 2 {
+		t.Fatal("output too short")
+	}
+	exts := out[2:]
+	if int(out[0])<<8|int(out[1]) != len(exts) {
+		t.Fatalf("outer length %d != %d", int(out[0])<<8|int(out[1]), len(exts))
+	}
+
+	var seen []tls.ExtensionType
+	err = tls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(ext tls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+		seen = append(seen, ext)
+		if ext == tls.ExtKeyShare {
+			return tls.ForEachKeyShare(data, func(g tls.NamedGroup, key []byte) error {
+				if g != tls.GroupX25519 || len(key) != 8 {
+					t.Errorf("key share got %v len %d", g, len(key))
+				}
+				return nil
+			})
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(seen) != 2 || seen[0] != tls.ExtSupportedVersions || seen[1] != tls.ExtKeyShare {
+		t.Errorf("walked %v", seen)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderStickyShortBuffer(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 4))
+	b.AddU32(0x01020304) // exactly fills
+	if b.Err() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error filling buffer: %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	b.AddU8(0xff) // overflows
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v want ErrShortBuffer", b.Err())
+	}
+	// Once failed, later writes must not panic, must not write, and must not
+	// replace the original error.
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 100))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.Close()
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("error changed to %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	if _, err := b.Bytes(); !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrShortBuffer) {
+		t.Fatalf("Bytes returned %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderUnclosedPrefixIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	// Returning bytes with an unpatched placeholder would emit a structurally
+	// wrong record that looks valid.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 16))
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddU8(1)
+	if _, err := b.Bytes(); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Bytes accepted an unclosed length prefix")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderUnbalancedClose(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 16))
+	b.Close()
+	if b.Err() == nil {
+		t.Error("Close without Open accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderNestingLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 64))
+	for range 8 {
+		b.OpenU8()
+	}
+	if b.Err() != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("8 levels rejected: %v", b.Err())
+	}
+	b.OpenU8()
+	if b.Err() == nil {
+		t.Error("9th nesting level accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderLengthOverflowRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	// 300 bytes cannot be described by a one-byte prefix. Truncating modulo 256
+	// would produce a valid-looking but wrong structure, so this must fail.
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 512))
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 300))
+	b.Close()
+	if !errors.Is(b.Err(), lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", b.Err())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderU24RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	var b tls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 8))
+	b.AddU8(byte(tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello))
+	b.OpenU24()
+	b.AddBytes([]byte{1, 2, 3})
+	b.Close()
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(out)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hf.MsgType() != tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello {
+		t.Errorf("type got %v", hf.MsgType())
+	}
+	if hf.Length() != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %d want 3", hf.Length())
+	}
+	if !hf.Complete() || len(hf.Body()) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("body got % x", hf.Body())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderAddStringMatchesAddBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	const label = "tls13 derived"
+	var b1, b2 tls.Builder
+	buf1, buf2 := make([]byte, 32), make([]byte, 32)
+	b1.Reset(buf1)
+	b1.AddString(label)
+	b2.Reset(buf2)
+	b2.AddBytes([]byte(label))
+	out1, err1 := b1.Bytes()
+	out2, err2 := b2.Bytes()
+	if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("%v %v", err1, err2)
+	}
+	if string(out1) != string(out2) {
+		t.Errorf("AddString %q != AddBytes %q", out1, out2)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuilderZeroAlloc(t *testing.T) {
+	// The whole point of not using cryptobyte. A regression here means the
+	// outbound handshake path started allocating per connection.
+	buf := make([]byte, 256)
+	var b tls.Builder
+	n := testing.AllocsPerRun(100, func() {
+		b.Reset(buf)
+		b.AddU8(byte(tls.HandshakeTypeServerHello))
+		b.OpenU24()
+		b.AddU16(tls.VersionTLS12)
+		b.AddBytes(make([]byte, 0, 0)) // no-op, must not allocate
+		b.OpenU16()
+		buildSupportedVersions(&b)
+		b.Close()
+		b.AddString("x")
+		b.Close()
+		_, _ = b.Bytes()
+	})
+	if n != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("Builder allocated %v times per run, want 0", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzBuilderNeverEscapesBuffer(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 3}, uint8(16))
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, payload []byte, size uint8) {
+		buf := make([]byte, size)
+		canary := make([]byte, len(buf))
+		var b tls.Builder
+		b.Reset(buf)
+		b.OpenU16()
+		b.AddBytes(payload)
+		b.OpenU8()
+		b.AddBytes(payload)
+		b.Close()
+		b.Close()
+		out, err := b.Bytes()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(out) > len(buf) {
+			t.Fatalf("wrote %d bytes into a %d byte buffer", len(out), len(buf))
+		}
+		// Whatever was produced must parse back as a well-formed vector.
+		if len(out) < 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("output %d bytes is too short to hold its own prefix", len(out))
+		}
+		if declared := int(out[0])<<8 | int(out[1]); declared != len(out)-2 {
+			t.Fatalf("declared %d != actual %d", declared, len(out)-2)
+		}
+		_ = canary
+	})
+}

x/tls/definitions.go

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+// Package tls implements a heapless, preallocated TLS 1.3 server (RFC 8446).
+//
+// All buffers are supplied by the caller and never grow. There is no
+// allocation in the steady-state record datapath, no goroutines, and no
+// dependency on an operating system. A [Conn] wraps any [io.ReadWriter], so it
+// works over a lneto tcp.Conn, over net.Pipe, or over a bytes.Buffer in tests.
+//
+// # Scope
+//
+// TLS 1.3 only. There is deliberately no TLS 1.2 fallback, no renegotiation,
+// no 0-RTT/early data, and no client certificate support. Each omission
+// removes a whole class of attack surface.
+//
+// # Cryptographic primitives
+//
+// This package implements the record layer, the key schedule and the handshake
+// state machine, but ships no cryptographic primitives of its own. Concrete
+// hashes, AEADs, key agreements and signers cross the [Hasher], [AEADSuite],
+// [KeyAgreement] and [Signer] interfaces. Standard library implementations
+// live in the tlsstd subpackage; a hardware AEAD or a secure-element signer
+// slots in at the same seam without protocol code changing.
+//
+// Note that on embedded targets the Signer is expected to be supplied by the
+// integrator: Go's crypto/ecdsa carries an 88kB precomputed P-256 basepoint
+// table that lands in RAM, which is a third of an RP2040's SRAM.
+//
+// # Randomness
+//
+// Config.Rand is required and has no default. Embedded targets frequently have
+// a weak or stubbed entropy source, and a biased ECDSA nonce recovers the
+// signing key from two signatures, so the choice is made explicit rather than
+// silently defaulted. Never seed anything here from internal.Prand32/64; those
+// are for TCP initial sequence numbers and DNS IDs, not for key material.
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// Sizes of fixed length headers and the record size limits of RFC 8446 5.2.
+const (
+	// SizeHeaderRecord is the size of a TLSPlaintext/TLSCiphertext header:
+	// content type(1) + legacy record version(2) + length(2).
+	SizeHeaderRecord = 5
+	// SizeHeaderHandshake is the size of a Handshake header:
+	// message type(1) + 24-bit length(3).
+	SizeHeaderHandshake = 4
+
+	// MaxPlaintext is the largest legal TLSPlaintext.fragment.
+	MaxPlaintext = 1 << 14 // 16384
+	// MaxCiphertext is the largest legal TLSCiphertext.encrypted_record.
+	// The extra 256 bytes cover the content type byte, padding and the AEAD tag.
+	MaxCiphertext = 1<<14 + 256 // 16640
+	// MaxRecord is the largest legal record as it appears on the wire.
+	MaxRecord = SizeHeaderRecord + MaxCiphertext // 16645
+
+	// MinRecordSizeLimit is the smallest value a peer may advertise in the
+	// record_size_limit extension of RFC 8449 4.
+	MinRecordSizeLimit = 64
+)
+
+//go:generate stringer -type=ContentType,HandshakeType,ExtensionType,AlertDescription,AlertLevel,NamedGroup,SignatureScheme,CipherSuite -linecomment -output stringers.go .
+
+// ContentType is the outermost record demultiplexing tag of RFC 8446 5.1.
+type ContentType uint8
+
+// Record content types. Values below are the only ones TLS 1.3 defines;
+// everything else must be rejected with an unexpected_message alert.
+const (
+	ContentTypeInvalid          ContentType = 0  // invalid
+	ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec ContentType = 20 // change_cipher_spec
+	ContentTypeAlert            ContentType = 21 // alert
+	ContentTypeHandshake        ContentType = 22 // handshake
+	ContentTypeApplicationData  ContentType = 23 // application_data
+)
+
+// HandshakeType identifies a handshake message, RFC 8446 4.
+type HandshakeType uint8
+
+// Handshake message types. Types this server never sends or accepts are still
+// listed so that a peer sending one can be logged and rejected precisely.
+const (
+	HandshakeTypeClientHello         HandshakeType = 1   // client_hello
+	HandshakeTypeServerHello         HandshakeType = 2   // server_hello
+	HandshakeTypeNewSessionTicket    HandshakeType = 4   // new_session_ticket
+	HandshakeTypeEndOfEarlyData      HandshakeType = 5   // end_of_early_data
+	HandshakeTypeEncryptedExtensions HandshakeType = 8   // encrypted_extensions
+	HandshakeTypeCertificate         HandshakeType = 11  // certificate
+	HandshakeTypeCertificateRequest  HandshakeType = 13  // certificate_request
+	HandshakeTypeCertificateVerify   HandshakeType = 15  // certificate_verify
+	HandshakeTypeFinished            HandshakeType = 20  // finished
+	HandshakeTypeKeyUpdate           HandshakeType = 24  // key_update
+	HandshakeTypeMessageHash         HandshakeType = 254 // message_hash
+)
+
+// ExtensionType identifies a hello extension, RFC 8446 4.2.
+type ExtensionType uint16
+
+// Extension types. Those marked "ignored" are ones a browser sends and this
+// server parses past without erroring; being strict about unknown extensions
+// breaks real clients.
+const (
+	ExtServerName                 ExtensionType = 0     // server_name
+	ExtMaxFragmentLength          ExtensionType = 1     // max_fragment_length
+	ExtStatusRequest              ExtensionType = 5     // status_request
+	ExtSupportedGroups            ExtensionType = 10    // supported_groups
+	ExtSignatureAlgorithms        ExtensionType = 13    // signature_algorithms
+	ExtALPN                       ExtensionType = 16    // application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+	ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp ExtensionType = 18    // signed_certificate_timestamp
+	ExtPadding                    ExtensionType = 21    // padding
+	ExtExtendedMasterSecret       ExtensionType = 23    // extended_master_secret
+	ExtCompressCertificate        ExtensionType = 27    // compress_certificate
+	ExtRecordSizeLimit            ExtensionType = 28    // record_size_limit
+	ExtSessionTicket              ExtensionType = 35    // session_ticket
+	ExtPreSharedKey               ExtensionType = 41    // pre_shared_key
+	ExtEarlyData                  ExtensionType = 42    // early_data
+	ExtSupportedVersions          ExtensionType = 43    // supported_versions
+	ExtCookie                     ExtensionType = 44    // cookie
+	ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes        ExtensionType = 45    // psk_key_exchange_modes
+	ExtCertificateAuthorities     ExtensionType = 47    // certificate_authorities
+	ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert    ExtensionType = 50    // signature_algorithms_cert
+	ExtKeyShare                   ExtensionType = 51    // key_share
+	ExtApplicationSettings        ExtensionType = 17513 // application_settings
+	ExtEncryptedClientHello       ExtensionType = 65037 // encrypted_client_hello
+	ExtRenegotiationInfo          ExtensionType = 65281 // renegotiation_info
+)
+
+// AlertLevel is the legacy severity byte of an alert. In TLS 1.3 every alert
+// except close_notify and user_canceled is fatal regardless of this field
+// (RFC 8446 6.1), so it is carried for wire compatibility only and must never
+// be used to decide whether to continue.
+type AlertLevel uint8
+
+// Alert levels.
+const (
+	AlertLevelWarning AlertLevel = 1 // warning
+	AlertLevelFatal   AlertLevel = 2 // fatal
+)
+
+// AlertDescription is the alert code of RFC 8446 6.
+type AlertDescription uint8
+
+// Alert descriptions. Only the subset a TLS 1.3 server can legitimately send
+// or receive is listed.
+const (
+	AlertCloseNotify                  AlertDescription = 0   // close_notify
+	AlertUnexpectedMessage            AlertDescription = 10  // unexpected_message
+	AlertBadRecordMAC                 AlertDescription = 20  // bad_record_mac
+	AlertRecordOverflow               AlertDescription = 22  // record_overflow
+	AlertHandshakeFailure             AlertDescription = 40  // handshake_failure
+	AlertBadCertificate               AlertDescription = 42  // bad_certificate
+	AlertUnsupportedCertificate       AlertDescription = 43  // unsupported_certificate
+	AlertCertificateRevoked           AlertDescription = 44  // certificate_revoked
+	AlertCertificateExpired           AlertDescription = 45  // certificate_expired
+	AlertCertificateUnknown           AlertDescription = 46  // certificate_unknown
+	AlertIllegalParameter             AlertDescription = 47  // illegal_parameter
+	AlertUnknownCA                    AlertDescription = 48  // unknown_ca
+	AlertAccessDenied                 AlertDescription = 49  // access_denied
+	AlertDecodeError                  AlertDescription = 50  // decode_error
+	AlertDecryptError                 AlertDescription = 51  // decrypt_error
+	AlertProtocolVersion              AlertDescription = 70  // protocol_version
+	AlertInsufficientSecurity         AlertDescription = 71  // insufficient_security
+	AlertInternalError                AlertDescription = 80  // internal_error
+	AlertInappropriateFallback        AlertDescription = 86  // inappropriate_fallback
+	AlertUserCanceled                 AlertDescription = 90  // user_canceled
+	AlertMissingExtension             AlertDescription = 109 // missing_extension
+	AlertUnsupportedExtension         AlertDescription = 110 // unsupported_extension
+	AlertUnrecognizedName             AlertDescription = 112 // unrecognized_name
+	AlertBadCertificateStatusResponse AlertDescription = 113 // bad_certificate_status_response
+	AlertUnknownPSKIdentity           AlertDescription = 115 // unknown_psk_identity
+	AlertCertificateRequired          AlertDescription = 116 // certificate_required
+	AlertNoApplicationProtocol        AlertDescription = 120 // no_application_protocol
+)
+
+// Protocol versions as they appear on the wire.
+const (
+	// VersionTLS12 is the value TLS 1.3 requires in ClientHello.legacy_version
+	// and in ServerHello.legacy_version for middlebox compatibility.
+	VersionTLS12 uint16 = 0x0303
+	// VersionTLS13 is the real negotiated version, carried only in the
+	// supported_versions extension.
+	VersionTLS13 uint16 = 0x0304
+	// VersionTLS10 appears in the legacy_record_version of an initial
+	// ClientHello record. The field is ignored entirely on receipt.
+	VersionTLS10 uint16 = 0x0301
+)
+
+// NamedGroup identifies a key exchange group, RFC 8446 4.2.7.
+type NamedGroup uint16
+
+// Named groups. Only X25519 is implemented; the rest are recognized so that
+// group selection and HelloRetryRequest can report precisely what was offered.
+const (
+	GroupSECP256R1      NamedGroup = 0x0017 // secp256r1
+	GroupSECP384R1      NamedGroup = 0x0018 // secp384r1
+	GroupSECP521R1      NamedGroup = 0x0019 // secp521r1
+	GroupX25519         NamedGroup = 0x001d // x25519
+	GroupX448           NamedGroup = 0x001e // x448
+	GroupX25519MLKEM768 NamedGroup = 0x11ec // x25519mlkem768
+)
+
+// SignatureScheme identifies a signature algorithm, RFC 8446 4.2.3.
+type SignatureScheme uint16
+
+// Signature schemes. Browsers do not accept Ed25519 certificates, so
+// [SigECDSAP256SHA256] is the practical minimum for a public-facing server.
+const (
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA256   SignatureScheme = 0x0401 // rsa_pkcs1_sha256
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA384   SignatureScheme = 0x0501 // rsa_pkcs1_sha384
+	SigRSAPKCS1SHA512   SignatureScheme = 0x0601 // rsa_pkcs1_sha512
+	SigECDSAP256SHA256  SignatureScheme = 0x0403 // ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
+	SigECDSAP384SHA384  SignatureScheme = 0x0503 // ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
+	SigECDSAP521SHA512  SignatureScheme = 0x0603 // ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
+	SigRSAPSSRSAESHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806 // rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
+	SigEd25519          SignatureScheme = 0x0807 // ed25519
+	SigRSAPSSPSSSHA256  SignatureScheme = 0x0809 // rsa_pss_pss_sha256
+)
+
+// CipherSuite identifies an AEAD plus hash pair, RFC 8446 B.4.
+type CipherSuite uint16
+
+// TLS 1.3 cipher suites. Only [SuiteAES128GCMSHA256] is implemented; it is the
+// one suite RFC 8446 9.1 makes mandatory to implement.
+const (
+	SuiteAES128GCMSHA256        CipherSuite = 0x1301 // TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+	SuiteAES256GCMSHA384        CipherSuite = 0x1302 // TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+	SuiteChaCha20Poly1305SHA256 CipherSuite = 0x1303 // TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+	SuiteAES128CCMSHA256        CipherSuite = 0x1304 // TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+	SuiteAES128CCM8SHA256       CipherSuite = 0x1305 // TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256
+)
+
+// IsGREASE reports whether v is one of the 16 reserved GREASE values of
+// RFC 8701. Chrome injects GREASE values into its offered cipher suites,
+// supported groups, extensions, ALPN protocol list and key shares. They carry
+// no meaning and must be skipped wherever they appear; rejecting them breaks
+// Chrome outright.
+//
+// GREASE values have both bytes equal and of the form 0x?a.
+func IsGREASE(v uint16) bool {
+	return v&0x0f0f == 0x0a0a && v>>8 == v&0xff
+}
+
+// ErrNeedMore is returned by incremental parsers and by the record layer when
+// the input available so far is a valid prefix but not yet a complete unit. It
+// is not a failure: the caller should retry once more data has arrived.
+//
+// It is deliberately distinct from [lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame], which means the
+// data is complete but malformed.
+var ErrNeedMore = errors.New("tls: need more data")
+
+// ErrUnexpectedClose is returned by Conn.Read when the underlying transport
+// reached EOF before a close_notify alert was received. Returning io.EOF here
+// instead would let an attacker who can inject a TCP FIN or RST silently
+// truncate a response or a request body. Callers must treat this as a failure
+// unless the application layer has independently confirmed the message was
+// complete, for example by satisfying a Content-Length.
+var ErrUnexpectedClose = errors.New("tls: connection closed without close_notify")
+
+// Errors reported by frame constructors and walkers. These reuse the generic
+// lneto error set so that callers can compare against a single vocabulary.
+var (
+	errTruncated        error = lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	errShortBuffer      error = lneto.ErrShortBuffer
+	errBadLength        error = lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	errBadField         error = lneto.ErrInvalidField
+	errUnsupported      error = lneto.ErrUnsupported
+	errTrailingBytes          = errors.New("tls: trailing bytes after structure")
+	errBuilderNest            = errors.New("tls: builder nesting depth exceeded")
+	errBuilderUnbal           = errors.New("tls: builder length prefix unbalanced")
+	errAllZeroPlaintext       = errors.New("tls: inner plaintext is all padding")
+)

x/tls/frame.go

@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// RecordFrame provides zero-copy access to a TLS record (RFC 8446 5.1).
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ContentType type;                   // 1 byte
+//	    ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version; // 2 bytes
+//	    uint16 length;                      // 2 bytes
+//	    opaque fragment[length];
+//	} TLSPlaintext;
+//
+// A RecordFrame may be constructed over a buffer holding only the header, so
+// that [RecordFrame.Length] can be consulted to decide how many more bytes to
+// read. Accessors that reach into the fragment return nil until the whole
+// record is present; call [RecordFrame.Complete] to test for that explicitly.
+type RecordFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewRecordFrame wraps buf as a [RecordFrame]. It validates only that the
+// 5-byte header is present, since the fragment commonly arrives later.
+func NewRecordFrame(buf []byte) (RecordFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < SizeHeaderRecord {
+		return RecordFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return RecordFrame{buf: buf}, nil
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the record's outer content type. For a protected record
+// this is always [ContentTypeApplicationData]; the real type lives in the
+// encrypted [InnerPlaintext].
+func (rf RecordFrame) ContentType() ContentType { return ContentType(rf.buf[0]) }
+
+// SetContentType sets the outer content type.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetContentType(ct ContentType) { rf.buf[0] = byte(ct) }
+
+// LegacyVersion returns the legacy_record_version field. TLS 1.3 requires
+// receivers to ignore this field entirely; it is exposed for logging only.
+func (rf RecordFrame) LegacyVersion() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rf.buf[1:3])
+}
+
+// SetLegacyVersion sets the legacy_record_version field.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetLegacyVersion(v uint16) {
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(rf.buf[1:3], v)
+}
+
+// Length returns the declared fragment length. It is attacker controlled and
+// must be checked against [MaxCiphertext] before being used to size a read;
+// [RecordFrame.ValidateSize] does this.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Length() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(rf.buf[3:5])
+}
+
+// SetLength sets the declared fragment length.
+func (rf RecordFrame) SetLength(n uint16) {
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(rf.buf[3:5], n)
+}
+
+// RecordLength returns the total wire size of this record, header included.
+func (rf RecordFrame) RecordLength() int {
+	return SizeHeaderRecord + int(rf.Length())
+}
+
+// Complete reports whether the whole record, header and fragment, is present
+// in the underlying buffer.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Complete() bool {
+	return len(rf.buf) >= rf.RecordLength()
+}
+
+// Payload returns the record fragment, or nil if the whole record has not
+// arrived yet. The result aliases the underlying buffer.
+func (rf RecordFrame) Payload() []byte {
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return rf.buf[SizeHeaderRecord:rf.RecordLength()]
+}
+
+// RawData returns the record bytes, header included, truncated to the declared
+// length when the full record is present.
+func (rf RecordFrame) RawData() []byte {
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		return rf.buf
+	}
+	return rf.buf[:rf.RecordLength()]
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the record is structurally invalid.
+// It does not require the fragment to have arrived; it only rejects a declared
+// length that could never be legal.
+func (rf RecordFrame) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if len(rf.buf) < SizeHeaderRecord {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+		return
+	}
+	if rf.Length() > MaxCiphertext {
+		// Checked before the length is ever used to size a read.
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField)
+	}
+}
+
+// InnerPlaintext provides access to a decrypted TLSInnerPlaintext
+// (RFC 8446 5.2):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    opaque content[length];
+//	    ContentType type;
+//	    uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
+//	} TLSInnerPlaintext;
+//
+// The real content type is the last non-zero byte, and everything after the
+// content is padding that must be stripped before use.
+type InnerPlaintext struct {
+	buf     []byte // content only, padding and type byte already stripped
+	ctype   ContentType
+	padding int
+}
+
+// NewInnerPlaintext scans decrypted for its trailing content type byte,
+// stripping any zero padding that follows it.
+//
+// A record whose plaintext is entirely zeros carries no content type and is a
+// protocol violation; it is reported so the caller can send an
+// unexpected_message alert rather than silently treating it as empty.
+func NewInnerPlaintext(decrypted []byte) (InnerPlaintext, error) {
+	i := len(decrypted) - 1
+	for i >= 0 && decrypted[i] == 0 {
+		i--
+	}
+	if i < 0 {
+		return InnerPlaintext{}, errAllZeroPlaintext
+	}
+	return InnerPlaintext{
+		buf:     decrypted[:i],
+		ctype:   ContentType(decrypted[i]),
+		padding: len(decrypted) - i - 1,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the true content type recovered from the inner plaintext.
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) ContentType() ContentType { return ip.ctype }
+
+// Content returns the plaintext with the content type byte and padding removed.
+// The result aliases the buffer passed to [NewInnerPlaintext].
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) Content() []byte { return ip.buf }
+
+// PaddingLen returns how many padding bytes followed the content type byte.
+func (ip InnerPlaintext) PaddingLen() int { return ip.padding }
+
+// HandshakeFrame provides zero-copy access to a handshake message
+// (RFC 8446 4):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    HandshakeType msg_type;  // 1 byte
+//	    uint24 length;           // 3 bytes
+//	    opaque body[length];
+//	} Handshake;
+//
+// As with [RecordFrame], a HandshakeFrame may be constructed over a buffer
+// holding only the 4-byte header so that the body length can be consulted
+// before the rest has arrived.
+type HandshakeFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewHandshakeFrame wraps buf as a [HandshakeFrame], validating that the
+// 4-byte header is present.
+func NewHandshakeFrame(buf []byte) (HandshakeFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < SizeHeaderHandshake {
+		return HandshakeFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return HandshakeFrame{buf: buf}, nil
+}
+
+// MsgType returns the handshake message type.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) MsgType() HandshakeType { return HandshakeType(hf.buf[0]) }
+
+// SetMsgType sets the handshake message type.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) SetMsgType(t HandshakeType) { hf.buf[0] = byte(t) }
+
+// Length returns the declared 24-bit body length. It is attacker controlled;
+// the value is returned as an int32 rather than an int so that behaviour is
+// identical on 32- and 64-bit targets.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Length() int32 {
+	return int32(hf.buf[1])<<16 | int32(hf.buf[2])<<8 | int32(hf.buf[3])
+}
+
+// SetLength sets the declared 24-bit body length. Values outside the 24-bit
+// range are silently masked; callers building messages should ensure the body
+// fits first.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) SetLength(n int32) {
+	hf.buf[1] = byte(n >> 16)
+	hf.buf[2] = byte(n >> 8)
+	hf.buf[3] = byte(n)
+}
+
+// MessageLength returns the total size of this handshake message, header
+// included.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) MessageLength() int {
+	return SizeHeaderHandshake + int(hf.Length())
+}
+
+// Complete reports whether the entire handshake message is present.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Complete() bool {
+	return len(hf.buf) >= hf.MessageLength()
+}
+
+// Body returns the handshake message body, or nil if the whole message has not
+// arrived. The result aliases the underlying buffer.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) Body() []byte {
+	if !hf.Complete() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return hf.buf[SizeHeaderHandshake:hf.MessageLength()]
+}
+
+// RawData returns the handshake message bytes, header included. This is what
+// must be fed to the transcript hash: the header is hashed along with the body,
+// exactly once per message, even when the message spanned several records.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) RawData() []byte {
+	if !hf.Complete() {
+		return hf.buf
+	}
+	return hf.buf[:hf.MessageLength()]
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the handshake header is malformed.
+func (hf HandshakeFrame) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if len(hf.buf) < SizeHeaderHandshake {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+		return
+	}
+	if hf.Length() > MaxPlaintext {
+		// No handshake message this server accepts approaches 2^14 bytes.
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField)
+	}
+}
+
+// ExtensionFrame provides access to a single hello extension (RFC 8446 4.2):
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ExtensionType extension_type; // 2 bytes
+//	    opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+//	} Extension;
+type ExtensionFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+}
+
+// NewExtensionFrame wraps buf as an [ExtensionFrame]. Unlike the record and
+// handshake frames, an extension is only ever parsed out of a fully buffered
+// hello, so the whole extension must be present.
+func NewExtensionFrame(buf []byte) (ExtensionFrame, error) {
+	if len(buf) < 4 {
+		return ExtensionFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[2:4]))
+	if 4+n > len(buf) {
+		return ExtensionFrame{}, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	return ExtensionFrame{buf: buf[:4+n]}, nil
+}
+
+// Type returns the extension type.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Type() ExtensionType {
+	return ExtensionType(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ef.buf[0:2]))
+}
+
+// Length returns the declared extension_data length.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Length() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ef.buf[2:4])
+}
+
+// Data returns the extension_data bytes.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) Data() []byte { return ef.buf[4:] }
+
+// RawData returns the extension bytes, type and length included.
+func (ef ExtensionFrame) RawData() []byte { return ef.buf }
+
+// ForEachExtension walks an extension list, calling fn for each extension in
+// wire order. exts is the contents of the extensions block, with the outer
+// two-byte list length already stripped; [ClientHelloFrame.Extensions] returns
+// it in that form.
+//
+// The walker is deliberately permissive about extension types: unknown types,
+// including every GREASE value Chrome injects, are passed to fn like any other.
+// It is the caller's switch that skips them. The walker is strict about
+// framing: a length field that overruns the list aborts with
+// [lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame].
+//
+// Modelled on tcp.OptionCodec.ForEachOption.
+func ForEachExtension(exts []byte, fn func(ExtensionType, []byte) error) error {
+	for off := 0; off < len(exts); {
+		ef, err := NewExtensionFrame(exts[off:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		err = fn(ef.Type(), ef.Data())
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		off += len(ef.RawData())
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ForEachU16 walks a bare list of big-endian uint16 values, such as the
+// cipher_suites vector of a ClientHello. b must have even length.
+func ForEachU16(b []byte, fn func(uint16) error) error {
+	if len(b)%2 != 0 {
+		return lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(b); off += 2 {
+		err := fn(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[off : off+2]))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ForEachSupportedGroup walks the contents of a supported_groups extension,
+// whose payload is a uint16-length-prefixed list of [NamedGroup] values.
+func ForEachSupportedGroup(extData []byte, fn func(NamedGroup) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return ForEachU16(body, func(v uint16) error { return fn(NamedGroup(v)) })
+}
+
+// ForEachSignatureScheme walks the contents of a signature_algorithms (or
+// signature_algorithms_cert) extension.
+func ForEachSignatureScheme(extData []byte, fn func(SignatureScheme) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return ForEachU16(body, func(v uint16) error { return fn(SignatureScheme(v)) })
+}
+
+// ForEachSupportedVersion walks the contents of a supported_versions extension
+// as it appears in a ClientHello. Note the prefix here is a single byte, unlike
+// every other list in the hello; the ServerHello form carries a bare uint16
+// instead and is not parsed by this function.
+func ForEachSupportedVersion(extData []byte, fn func(uint16) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU8(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return ForEachU16(body, fn)
+}
+
+// ForEachKeyShare walks the client_shares list of a key_share extension:
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    NamedGroup group;
+//	    opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+//	} KeyShareEntry;
+//
+// GREASE key shares carry a deliberately absurd body, commonly a single byte,
+// and must not be treated as malformed. The walker therefore places no
+// constraint on key_exchange length beyond it fitting inside the list; group
+// selection is the caller's job.
+func ForEachKeyShare(extData []byte, fn func(NamedGroup, []byte) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		if len(body)-off < 4 {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		group := NamedGroup(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off+2 : off+4]))
+		off += 4
+		if n > len(body)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		err = fn(group, body[off:off+n])
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ForEachALPNProto walks the protocol name list of an ALPN extension. Each
+// name is a single-byte-length-prefixed string. Chrome includes a GREASE entry
+// here too, so callers must match against their own offer list rather than
+// assuming the first entry is meaningful.
+//
+// A zero-length protocol name is a protocol violation and aborts the walk.
+func ForEachALPNProto(extData []byte, fn func([]byte) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		n := int(body[off])
+		off++
+		if n == 0 {
+			return lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+		} else if n > len(body)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		err = fn(body[off : off+n])
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ForEachServerName walks the server_name_list of an SNI extension:
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    NameType name_type;          // 1 byte, 0 = host_name
+//	    opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
+//	} ServerName;
+func ForEachServerName(extData []byte, fn func(nameType uint8, name []byte) error) error {
+	body, err := vectorU16(extData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for off := 0; off < len(body); {
+		if len(body)-off < 3 {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		nameType := body[off]
+		n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off+1 : off+3]))
+		off += 3
+		if n > len(body)-off {
+			return lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		err = fn(nameType, body[off:off+n])
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		off += n
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// vectorU16 strips a two-byte length prefix and returns the vector contents.
+// It requires the prefix to describe the buffer exactly: trailing bytes mean
+// the sender and this parser disagree on the structure, which is precisely the
+// ambiguity parser-differential attacks exploit.
+func vectorU16(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(b) < 2 {
+		return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(b[0:2]))
+	if n != len(b)-2 {
+		if n > len(b)-2 {
+			return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		return nil, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	return b[2:], nil
+}
+
+// vectorU8 strips a one-byte length prefix. See [vectorU16] for why trailing
+// bytes are rejected.
+func vectorU8(b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(b) < 1 {
+		return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	n := int(b[0])
+	if n != len(b)-1 {
+		if n > len(b)-1 {
+			return nil, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+		}
+		return nil, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	return b[1:], nil
+}

x/tls/frame_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+func TestRecordFrameHeaderBeforeBody(t *testing.T) {
+	// A record layer sees the 5 byte header first and must be able to consult
+	// the length to know how much more to read.
+	hdr := []byte{22, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10}
+	rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if rf.ContentType() != tls.ContentTypeHandshake {
+		t.Errorf("content type got %v want handshake", rf.ContentType())
+	}
+	if rf.Length() != 16 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %d want 16", rf.Length())
+	}
+	if rf.RecordLength() != 21 {
+		t.Errorf("record length got %d want 21", rf.RecordLength())
+	}
+	if rf.Complete() {
+		t.Error("record with header only reported complete")
+	}
+	if rf.Payload() != nil {
+		t.Error("payload of incomplete record must be nil, not a short slice")
+	}
+
+	full := append(hdr, make([]byte, 16)...)
+	rf, err = tls.NewRecordFrame(full)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !rf.Complete() {
+		t.Fatal("full record reported incomplete")
+	}
+	if len(rf.Payload()) != 16 {
+		t.Errorf("payload len got %d want 16", len(rf.Payload()))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecordFrameShortHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	for n := range tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
+		_, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(make([]byte, n))
+		if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
+			t.Errorf("len=%d got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", n, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecordFrameRejectsOversizeLength(t *testing.T) {
+	// The length field is attacker controlled and must be refused before it is
+	// ever used to size a read.
+	hdr := []byte{23, 0x03, 0x03, 0xff, 0xff} // 65535 > MaxCiphertext
+	rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var v lneto.Validator
+	rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+	if err := v.ErrPop(); !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+
+	// Exactly at the limit is legal.
+	maxCT := uint16(tls.MaxCiphertext)
+	hdr[3], hdr[4] = byte(maxCT>>8), byte(maxCT)
+	rf, _ = tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
+	rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+	if err := v.ErrPop(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("MaxCiphertext rejected: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInnerPlaintextStripsPadding(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		in      []byte
+		content string
+		ctype   tls.ContentType
+		padding int
+	}{
+		{"no padding", []byte{'h', 'i', 23}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 0},
+		{"padded", []byte{'h', 'i', 23, 0, 0, 0}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 3},
+		{"empty content", []byte{22}, "", tls.ContentTypeHandshake, 0},
+		{"content ends in zero", []byte{'a', 0, 'b', 21, 0}, "a\x00b", tls.ContentTypeAlert, 1},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(tc.in)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if string(ip.Content()) != tc.content {
+				t.Errorf("content got %q want %q", ip.Content(), tc.content)
+			}
+			if ip.ContentType() != tc.ctype {
+				t.Errorf("type got %v want %v", ip.ContentType(), tc.ctype)
+			}
+			if ip.PaddingLen() != tc.padding {
+				t.Errorf("padding got %d want %d", ip.PaddingLen(), tc.padding)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInnerPlaintextAllZeroRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	// An all-zero inner plaintext carries no content type. Silently treating it
+	// as empty would let a peer inject records the state machine cannot
+	// classify; RFC 8446 5.4 requires unexpected_message.
+	for _, n := range []int{0, 1, 8} {
+		_, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(make([]byte, n))
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("len=%d: all-zero plaintext accepted", n)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrame24BitLength(t *testing.T) {
+	hdr := []byte{1, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03} // ClientHello, length 0x010203
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(hdr)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hf.MsgType() != tls.HandshakeTypeClientHello {
+		t.Errorf("type got %v", hf.MsgType())
+	}
+	if hf.Length() != 0x010203 {
+		t.Errorf("length got %#x want 0x010203", hf.Length())
+	}
+	if hf.Complete() {
+		t.Error("header-only message reported complete")
+	}
+	if hf.Body() != nil {
+		t.Error("body of incomplete message must be nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrameRoundTripLength(t *testing.T) {
+	buf := make([]byte, tls.SizeHeaderHandshake)
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, n := range []int32{0, 1, 255, 256, 65535, 65536, 0xffffff} {
+		hf.SetLength(n)
+		if got := hf.Length(); got != n {
+			t.Errorf("SetLength(%d) round-tripped to %d", n, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeFrameRawDataIncludesHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	// The transcript hash covers the header plus body, exactly once per
+	// message. Getting this wrong breaks Finished verification.
+	msg := []byte{20, 0, 0, 2, 0xaa, 0xbb}
+	hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(msg)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if got := hf.RawData(); len(got) != 6 {
+		t.Errorf("RawData len got %d want 6", len(got))
+	}
+	if got := hf.Body(); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != 0xaa {
+		t.Errorf("Body got % x", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachExtensionWalksAndToleratesGREASE(t *testing.T) {
+	// Two extensions: a GREASE type with empty data, then supported_versions.
+	exts := []byte{
+		0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00, // GREASE, len 0
+		0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, // supported_versions
+	}
+	var types []tls.ExtensionType
+	err := tls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(ext tls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+		types = append(types, ext)
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(types) != 2 || types[1] != tls.ExtSupportedVersions {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v", types)
+	}
+	if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(types[0])) {
+		t.Errorf("first extension %#x not recognized as GREASE", types[0])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachExtensionTruncated(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range [][]byte{
+		{0x00},                               // partial type
+		{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00},                   // partial length
+		{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03}, // length overruns
+	} {
+		err := tls.ForEachExtension(tc, func(tls.ExtensionType, []byte) error { return nil })
+		if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
+			t.Errorf("% x: got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", tc, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachExtensionPropagatesCallbackError(t *testing.T) {
+	sentinel := errors.New("stop")
+	exts := []byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00}
+	n := 0
+	err := tls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(tls.ExtensionType, []byte) error {
+		n++
+		return sentinel
+	})
+	if !errors.Is(err, sentinel) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want sentinel", err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("walk continued after callback error: %d calls", n)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachKeyShareAcceptsGREASEEntry(t *testing.T) {
+	// Chrome sends a GREASE key share whose key_exchange is a single byte.
+	// Rejecting it as malformed breaks Chrome outright.
+	extData := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x0b, // client_shares length 11
+		0x1a, 0x1a, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, // GREASE group, 1 byte body
+		0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x02, 0xab, 0xcd, // x25519, 2 byte body
+	}
+	type share struct {
+		g tls.NamedGroup
+		n int
+	}
+	var got []share
+	err := tls.ForEachKeyShare(extData, func(g tls.NamedGroup, key []byte) error {
+		got = append(got, share{g, len(key)})
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d shares want 2", len(got))
+	}
+	if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(got[0].g)) || got[0].n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("GREASE share mishandled: %+v", got[0])
+	}
+	if got[1].g != tls.GroupX25519 || got[1].n != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("x25519 share mishandled: %+v", got[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachALPNProtoRejectsEmptyName(t *testing.T) {
+	// A zero-length protocol name would make the walk unable to advance.
+	extData := []byte{0x00, 0x01, 0x00}
+	err := tls.ForEachALPNProto(extData, func([]byte) error { return nil })
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachALPNProto(t *testing.T) {
+	extData := []byte{
+		0x00, 0x0c,
+		0x02, 'h', '2',
+		0x08, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1',
+	}
+	var names []string
+	err := tls.ForEachALPNProto(extData, func(b []byte) error {
+		names = append(names, string(b))
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(names) != 2 || names[0] != "h2" || names[1] != "http/1.1" {
+		t.Errorf("got %q", names)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachSupportedVersionUsesU8Prefix(t *testing.T) {
+	// supported_versions is the one hello list with a single byte prefix.
+	extData := []byte{0x04, 0x1a, 0x1a, 0x03, 0x04}
+	var vers []uint16
+	err := tls.ForEachSupportedVersion(extData, func(v uint16) error {
+		vers = append(vers, v)
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(vers) != 2 || vers[1] != tls.VersionTLS13 {
+		t.Errorf("got %#x", vers)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVectorRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	// A prefix that under-describes its buffer leaves bytes whose meaning this
+	// parser and a middlebox could disagree about.
+	err := tls.ForEachSupportedGroup([]byte{0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d, 0xff}, func(tls.NamedGroup) error { return nil })
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("trailing bytes after vector accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestForEachU16RejectsOddLength(t *testing.T) {
+	err := tls.ForEachU16([]byte{0x00, 0x1d, 0x00}, func(uint16) error { return nil })
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsGREASE(t *testing.T) {
+	// The 16 reserved values of RFC 8701.
+	for i := range 16 {
+		v := uint16(i)<<12 | 0x0a00 | uint16(i)<<4 | 0x0a
+		if !tls.IsGREASE(v) {
+			t.Errorf("%#04x not detected as GREASE", v)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, v := range []uint16{
+		0x0000, 0x1301, 0x001d, 0x0403, 0x0a0b, 0x0b0a, 0x1a2a, 0xffff,
+	} {
+		if tls.IsGREASE(v) {
+			t.Errorf("%#04x falsely detected as GREASE", v)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzNewRecordFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{22, 3, 1, 0, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
+	f.Add([]byte{23, 3, 3, 0xff, 0xff})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		var v lneto.Validator
+		rf.ValidateSize(&v)
+		// Accessors must stay in bounds regardless of validation outcome.
+		_ = rf.ContentType()
+		_ = rf.LegacyVersion()
+		_ = rf.Length()
+		if p := rf.Payload(); p != nil && len(p) != int(rf.Length()) {
+			t.Fatalf("payload len %d != declared %d", len(p), rf.Length())
+		}
+		if raw := rf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func FuzzNewHandshakeFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4})
+	f.Add([]byte{20, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		var v lneto.Validator
+		hf.ValidateSize(&v)
+		if hf.Length() < 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("negative 24-bit length %d", hf.Length())
+		}
+		if body := hf.Body(); body != nil && len(body) != int(hf.Length()) {
+			t.Fatalf("body len %d != declared %d", len(body), hf.Length())
+		}
+		if raw := hf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func FuzzNewInnerPlaintext(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 23, 0, 0})
+	f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if ip.ContentType() == 0 {
+			t.Fatal("accepted a zero content type")
+		}
+		if len(ip.Content())+ip.PaddingLen()+1 != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("content %d + padding %d + 1 != input %d",
+				len(ip.Content()), ip.PaddingLen(), len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func FuzzForEachExtension(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04})
+	f.Add([]byte{0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		total := 0
+		err := tls.ForEachExtension(b, func(ext tls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+			total += 4 + len(data)
+			if total > len(b) {
+				t.Fatalf("walked %d bytes past input length %d", total, len(b))
+			}
+			// Sub-walkers must also never escape their slice.
+			_ = tls.ForEachKeyShare(data, func(tls.NamedGroup, []byte) error { return nil })
+			_ = tls.ForEachALPNProto(data, func([]byte) error { return nil })
+			_ = tls.ForEachSupportedGroup(data, func(tls.NamedGroup) error { return nil })
+			_ = tls.ForEachSupportedVersion(data, func(uint16) error { return nil })
+			_ = tls.ForEachServerName(data, func(uint8, []byte) error { return nil })
+			return nil
+		})
+		if err == nil && total != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("clean walk consumed %d of %d bytes", total, len(b))
+		}
+	})
+}

x/tls/hello.go

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+package tls
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+)
+
+// SizeRandom is the length of the client_random and server_random fields.
+const SizeRandom = 32
+
+// MaxSessionIDLen is the largest legal legacy_session_id. TLS 1.3 does not use
+// session IDs, but a client sends a 32-byte one to trigger middlebox
+// compatibility mode and the server must echo it verbatim.
+const MaxSessionIDLen = 32
+
+// ClientHelloFrame provides zero-copy access to a ClientHello body
+// (RFC 8446 4.1.2). The frame wraps the handshake message *body*, that is the
+// bytes returned by [HandshakeFrame.Body], not the handshake header.
+//
+//	struct {
+//	    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
+//	    Random random;                              // 32 bytes
+//	    opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>;
+//	    CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
+//	    opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
+//	    Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>;
+//	} ClientHello;
+//
+// Every variable-length field is bounds-checked once by
+// [NewClientHelloFrame], so the accessors cannot slice out of range.
+type ClientHelloFrame struct {
+	buf []byte
+	// Offsets of each variable-length field's contents, resolved once at
+	// construction so accessors stay branch-free.
+	sessionIDOff, sessionIDLen int
+	suitesOff, suitesLen       int
+	compOff, compLen           int
+	extsOff, extsLen           int
+}
+
+// NewClientHelloFrame parses the structure of a ClientHello body, validating
+// that every length prefix is consistent with the buffer. It performs no
+// policy checks: version negotiation, cipher suite selection and extension
+// validation are the handshake state machine's job.
+//
+// Trailing bytes after the extensions block are rejected. A sender and parser
+// that disagree about where a structure ends is the ambiguity that
+// parser-differential attacks are built on.
+func NewClientHelloFrame(body []byte) (ClientHelloFrame, error) {
+	var ch ClientHelloFrame
+	// legacy_version(2) + random(32) + session_id length(1)
+	const fixed = 2 + SizeRandom + 1
+	if len(body) < fixed {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	off := 2 + SizeRandom
+
+	sidLen := int(body[off])
+	off++
+	if sidLen > MaxSessionIDLen {
+		// Bounds-checked before it can reach a fixed [32]byte echo buffer.
+		return ch, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	} else if sidLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	ch.sessionIDOff, ch.sessionIDLen = off, sidLen
+	off += sidLen
+
+	if len(body)-off < 2 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	suitesLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+	off += 2
+	if suitesLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	} else if suitesLen%2 != 0 || suitesLen == 0 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField
+	}
+	ch.suitesOff, ch.suitesLen = off, suitesLen
+	off += suitesLen
+
+	if len(body)-off < 1 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	compLen := int(body[off])
+	off++
+	if compLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	ch.compOff, ch.compLen = off, compLen
+	off += compLen
+
+	// TLS 1.3 requires extensions; a ClientHello without them cannot possibly
+	// carry supported_versions and so cannot be a 1.3 hello.
+	if len(body)-off < 2 {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	}
+	extsLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(body[off : off+2]))
+	off += 2
+	if extsLen > len(body)-off {
+		return ch, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame
+	} else if extsLen != len(body)-off {
+		return ch, errTrailingBytes
+	}
+	ch.extsOff, ch.extsLen = off, extsLen
+
+	ch.buf = body
+	return ch, nil
+}
+
+// LegacyVersion returns the legacy_version field, which TLS 1.3 pins to
+// 0x0303 regardless of the version actually negotiated.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) LegacyVersion() uint16 {
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ch.buf[0:2])
+}
+
+// Random returns the 32-byte client_random.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) Random() *[SizeRandom]byte {
+	return (*[SizeRandom]byte)(ch.buf[2 : 2+SizeRandom])
+}
+
+// LegacySessionID returns the legacy_session_id, at most 32 bytes. A TLS 1.3
+// server must echo this verbatim in its ServerHello; a non-empty value means
+// the client is using middlebox compatibility mode and expects a dummy
+// ChangeCipherSpec record.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) LegacySessionID() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.sessionIDOff : ch.sessionIDOff+ch.sessionIDLen]
+}
+
+// CipherSuites returns the cipher_suites vector with its length prefix
+// stripped, ready for [ForEachU16]. The list includes GREASE values.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) CipherSuites() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.suitesOff : ch.suitesOff+ch.suitesLen]
+}
+
+// LegacyCompressionMethods returns the legacy_compression_methods vector
+// contents. For a TLS 1.3 hello this must be exactly one zero byte; see
+// [ClientHelloFrame.ValidateCompression].
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) LegacyCompressionMethods() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.compOff : ch.compOff+ch.compLen]
+}
+
+// Extensions returns the extensions block contents with the outer length
+// prefix stripped, ready for [ForEachExtension].
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) Extensions() []byte {
+	return ch.buf[ch.extsOff : ch.extsOff+ch.extsLen]
+}
+
+// RawData returns the whole ClientHello body.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) RawData() []byte { return ch.buf }
+
+// ForEachExtension walks this hello's extensions, rejecting a repeated known
+// extension type with [lneto.ErrInvalidField]. RFC 8446 4.2 forbids duplicates,
+// and tolerating them invites parser-differential attacks in which this parser
+// and a middlebox act on different copies of the same extension.
+//
+// Unknown and GREASE extension types are passed through without duplicate
+// checking, since they are skipped rather than acted upon. Prefer this over
+// the bare [ForEachExtension] when parsing an untrusted hello.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) ForEachExtension(fn func(ExtensionType, []byte) error) error {
+	var seen extSeen
+	return ForEachExtension(ch.Extensions(), func(ext ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+		if seen.mark(ext) {
+			return lneto.ErrInvalidField
+		}
+		return fn(ext, data)
+	})
+}
+
+// ValidateSize adds an error to v if the ClientHello is structurally invalid.
+// Since [NewClientHelloFrame] already rejects every inconsistent length, this
+// only re-checks that the frame was successfully constructed.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) ValidateSize(v *lneto.Validator) {
+	if ch.buf == nil {
+		v.AddError(lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame)
+	}
+}
+
+// ValidateCompression reports whether legacy_compression_methods is exactly
+// the single null method TLS 1.3 mandates (RFC 8446 4.1.2). Anything else must
+// be rejected with an illegal_parameter alert: a client offering real
+// compression methods is either pre-1.3 or attempting a downgrade.
+func (ch ClientHelloFrame) ValidateCompression() bool {
+	return ch.compLen == 1 && ch.buf[ch.compOff] == 0
+}
+
+// extSeen tracks which known extension types have already been encountered in
+// a single hello. RFC 8446 4.2 forbids a duplicate extension type, and
+// tolerating duplicates invites parser-differential attacks where this parser
+// and a middlebox act on different copies.
+//
+// Only known types are tracked; unknown and GREASE types are exempt because
+// they are skipped without being acted upon.
+type extSeen uint64
+
+// mark records ext and reports whether it had already been seen. Extension
+// types with no assigned bit are never reported as duplicates.
+func (s *extSeen) mark(ext ExtensionType) (duplicate bool) {
+	bit, ok := extBit(ext)
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	if *s&bit != 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+	*s |= bit
+	return false
+}
+
+// extBit maps an extension type to its bit in [extSeen]. The mapping covers
+// every extension this server reads or must reject a duplicate of.
+func extBit(ext ExtensionType) (extSeen, bool) {
+	var i uint
+	switch ext {
+	case ExtServerName:
+		i = 0
+	case ExtMaxFragmentLength:
+		i = 1
+	case ExtStatusRequest:
+		i = 2
+	case ExtSupportedGroups:
+		i = 3
+	case ExtSignatureAlgorithms:
+		i = 4
+	case ExtALPN:
+		i = 5
+	case ExtSignedCertificateTimestamp:
+		i = 6
+	case ExtPadding:
+		i = 7
+	case ExtExtendedMasterSecret:
+		i = 8
+	case ExtCompressCertificate:
+		i = 9
+	case ExtRecordSizeLimit:
+		i = 10
+	case ExtSessionTicket:
+		i = 11
+	case ExtPreSharedKey:
+		i = 12
+	case ExtEarlyData:
+		i = 13
+	case ExtSupportedVersions:
+		i = 14
+	case ExtCookie:
+		i = 15
+	case ExtPSKKeyExchangeModes:
+		i = 16
+	case ExtCertificateAuthorities:
+		i = 17
+	case ExtSignatureAlgorithmsCert:
+		i = 18
+	case ExtKeyShare:
+		i = 19
+	case ExtApplicationSettings:
+		i = 20
+	case ExtEncryptedClientHello:
+		i = 21
+	case ExtRenegotiationInfo:
+		i = 22
+	default:
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return 1 << i, true
+}

x/tls/hello_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+package tls_test
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/soypat/lneto"
+	ltls "github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
+)
+
+// captureClientHello drives a standard library TLS client far enough to emit
+// its first flight and returns the ClientHello handshake message body.
+//
+// Using a real client rather than a hand-written fixture means the parser is
+// exercised against genuine extension ordering, a 32-byte compatibility
+// session ID and GREASE-free but otherwise realistic content. Browser captures
+// arrive at Stage 6; this covers the structure in the meantime.
+func captureClientHello(t *testing.T) ltls.ClientHelloFrame {
+	t.Helper()
+	client, server := net.Pipe()
+	defer client.Close()
+	defer server.Close()
+
+	go func() {
+		c := tls.Client(client, &tls.Config{
+			ServerName: "example.com",
+			MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+			MaxVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
+			NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"},
+		})
+		_ = c.Handshake() // will fail; we only need the first flight
+	}()
+
+	server.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
+	var buf [4096]byte
+	n, err := server.Read(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading ClientHello: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec, err := ltls.NewRecordFrame(buf[:n])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("record: %v", err)
+	}
+	if rec.ContentType() != ltls.ContentTypeHandshake {
+		t.Fatalf("first record is %v, want handshake", rec.ContentType())
+	}
+	if !rec.Complete() {
+		t.Fatalf("ClientHello record split across reads: have %d want %d",
+			n, rec.RecordLength())
+	}
+	hs, err := ltls.NewHandshakeFrame(rec.Payload())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("handshake: %v", err)
+	}
+	if hs.MsgType() != ltls.HandshakeTypeClientHello {
+		t.Fatalf("first message is %v, want client_hello", hs.MsgType())
+	}
+	if !hs.Complete() {
+		t.Fatal("ClientHello spans multiple records")
+	}
+	ch, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(hs.Body())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("client hello: %v", err)
+	}
+	return ch
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloParseRealHello(t *testing.T) {
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+
+	if ch.LegacyVersion() != ltls.VersionTLS12 {
+		t.Errorf("legacy_version %#04x want 0x0303", ch.LegacyVersion())
+	}
+	if !ch.ValidateCompression() {
+		t.Errorf("legacy_compression_methods % x, want exactly {0}",
+			ch.LegacyCompressionMethods())
+	}
+	if n := len(ch.LegacySessionID()); n != 32 {
+		// A TLS 1.3 client sends a fake 32-byte session ID to trigger
+		// middlebox compatibility mode. The server must echo it.
+		t.Errorf("session id len %d, want 32 for middlebox compat", n)
+	}
+
+	var sawTLS13, sawX25519, sawSNI, sawALPN bool
+	var suites []ltls.CipherSuite
+	err := ch.ForEachExtension(func(ext ltls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+		switch ext {
+		case ltls.ExtSupportedVersions:
+			return ltls.ForEachSupportedVersion(data, func(v uint16) error {
+				if v == ltls.VersionTLS13 {
+					sawTLS13 = true
+				}
+				return nil
+			})
+		case ltls.ExtKeyShare:
+			return ltls.ForEachKeyShare(data, func(g ltls.NamedGroup, key []byte) error {
+				if g == ltls.GroupX25519 && len(key) == 32 {
+					sawX25519 = true
+				}
+				return nil
+			})
+		case ltls.ExtServerName:
+			return ltls.ForEachServerName(data, func(nameType uint8, name []byte) error {
+				if nameType == 0 && string(name) == "example.com" {
+					sawSNI = true
+				}
+				return nil
+			})
+		case ltls.ExtALPN:
+			return ltls.ForEachALPNProto(data, func(p []byte) error {
+				if string(p) == "http/1.1" {
+					sawALPN = true
+				}
+				return nil
+			})
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("walking extensions: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := ltls.ForEachU16(ch.CipherSuites(), func(v uint16) error {
+		suites = append(suites, ltls.CipherSuite(v))
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("walking cipher suites: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if !sawTLS13 {
+		t.Error("supported_versions did not offer TLS 1.3")
+	}
+	if !sawX25519 {
+		t.Error("no 32-byte x25519 key share found")
+	}
+	if !sawSNI {
+		t.Error("SNI host not recovered")
+	}
+	if !sawALPN {
+		t.Error("ALPN http/1.1 not recovered")
+	}
+	var mandatory bool
+	for _, s := range suites {
+		if s == ltls.SuiteAES128GCMSHA256 {
+			mandatory = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !mandatory {
+		t.Errorf("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 not offered; got %v", suites)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloRejectsDuplicateExtension(t *testing.T) {
+	// Duplicating supported_versions must be caught. Tolerating it lets this
+	// parser and a middlebox act on different copies.
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+	exts := ch.Extensions()
+
+	// Find the first extension and append a verbatim copy of it.
+	var first []byte
+	err := ltls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(ext ltls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
+		if first == nil {
+			first = make([]byte, 4+len(data))
+			copy(first, exts)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil || first == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("could not isolate first extension: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	dup := make([]byte, 0, len(exts)+len(first))
+	dup = append(dup, exts...)
+	dup = append(dup, first...)
+
+	body := rebuildHelloWithExtensions(t, ch, dup)
+	ch2, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(body)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rebuilt hello did not parse: %v", err)
+	}
+	err = ch2.ForEachExtension(func(ltls.ExtensionType, []byte) error { return nil })
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidField) {
+		t.Errorf("duplicate extension got %v, want ErrInvalidField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// rebuildHelloWithExtensions re-encodes ch with a replacement extensions block,
+// exercising Builder against a structure produced by a real client.
+func rebuildHelloWithExtensions(t *testing.T, ch ltls.ClientHelloFrame, exts []byte) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var b ltls.Builder
+	b.Reset(make([]byte, 0, len(ch.RawData())+len(exts)+64))
+	b.AddU16(ch.LegacyVersion())
+	b.AddBytes(ch.Random()[:])
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.LegacySessionID())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.CipherSuites())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU8()
+	b.AddBytes(ch.LegacyCompressionMethods())
+	b.Close()
+	b.OpenU16()
+	b.AddBytes(exts)
+	b.Close()
+	out, err := b.Bytes()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rebuilding hello: %v", err)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloRejectsOversizeSessionID(t *testing.T) {
+	// legacy_session_id feeds a fixed [32]byte echo buffer in the server, so
+	// the bound must be enforced at parse time.
+	body := make([]byte, 0, 128)
+	body = append(body, 0x03, 0x03)
+	body = append(body, make([]byte, ltls.SizeRandom)...)
+	body = append(body, 33)                     // session id length, one over
+	body = append(body, make([]byte, 33)...)    //
+	body = append(body, 0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01) // cipher suites
+	body = append(body, 0x01, 0x00)             // compression
+	body = append(body, 0x00, 0x00)             // extensions, empty
+	_, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(body)
+	if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+	body := append(append([]byte{}, ch.RawData()...), 0xff)
+	if _, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(body); err == nil {
+		t.Error("trailing byte after extensions block accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientHelloTruncatedAtEveryOffset(t *testing.T) {
+	// Truncating a valid hello anywhere must produce an error, never a panic
+	// and never a frame whose accessors read out of bounds.
+	ch := captureClientHello(t)
+	full := ch.RawData()
+	for n := range len(full) {
+		frame, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(full[:n])
+		if err == nil {
+			// A shorter prefix must never parse as a complete hello.
+			t.Errorf("truncation to %d/%d bytes parsed clean", n, len(full))
+			_ = frame.Extensions()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func FuzzNewClientHelloFrame(f *testing.F) {
+	f.Add([]byte{
+		0x03, 0x03,
+		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+		0x00,                   // no session id
+		0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01, // one cipher suite
+		0x01, 0x00, // null compression
+		0x00, 0x00, // no extensions
+	})
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
+		ch, err := ltls.NewClientHelloFrame(b)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		// Every accessor must stay inside the input.
+		if len(ch.LegacySessionID()) > ltls.MaxSessionIDLen {
+			t.Fatalf("session id %d bytes exceeds max", len(ch.LegacySessionID()))
+		}
+		if len(ch.CipherSuites())%2 != 0 {
+			t.Fatal("cipher suites vector has odd length")
+		}
+		total := 2 + ltls.SizeRandom + 1 + len(ch.LegacySessionID()) +
+			2 + len(ch.CipherSuites()) +
+			1 + len(ch.LegacyCompressionMethods()) +
+			2 + len(ch.Extensions())
+		if total != len(b) {
+			t.Fatalf("fields sum to %d but input is %d bytes", total, len(b))
+		}
+		_ = ch.ValidateCompression()
+		_ = ch.ForEachExtension(func(ltls.ExtensionType, []byte) error { return nil })
+	})
+}

x/xnet/stack-async.go

@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ type StackAsync struct {
 
 	ipv6enabled bool
 	stack6      Stack6
-
-	log *slog.Logger
 }
 
 type StackConfig struct {
@@ -107,9 +105,6 @@ type StackConfig struct {
 	AcceptMulticast bool
 	// Accept broadcast IPv4 packets. Needed for managing access points and DHCPv4 servers.
 	AcceptIPv4Broadcast bool
-	// Logger receives the stack's Debug and DebugErr output. A nil Logger silences
-	// them; the heap allocation probe still runs so allocation bisection keeps working.
-	Logger *slog.Logger
 }
 
 func (cfg *StackConfig) id() uint16 {
@@ -207,7 +202,6 @@ func (s *StackAsync) Reset(cfg StackConfig) (err error) {
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.prng = uint32(cfg.RandSeed)
 	s.hostname = cfg.Hostname
-	s.log = cfg.Logger
 	// Treat last character of hostname as number.
 	id := cfg.id()
 	linkNodes := 2 // ARP and IPv4 nodes
@@ -849,39 +843,20 @@ func addr4(addr [4]byte, ok bool) netip.Addr {
 }
 
 // Debug prints debugging and heap information.
-//
-// The heap allocation probe runs unconditionally; only the log line is gated on
-// the configured Logger's level. Building the slog.Attr list allocates, so the
-// gate must come first or the allocation happens even when nothing is logged.
 func (s *StackAsync) Debug(msg string) {
-	internal.LogAllocs(msg)
-	if !internal.LogEnabled(s.log, slog.LevelDebug) {
-		return
-	}
-	internal.LogAttrsAndAllocs(msg, s.log, slog.LevelDebug, "stackasync",
+	internal.LogAttrsAndAllocs(msg, slog.Default(), slog.LevelDebug, "stackasync",
 		slog.String("umsg", msg),
 		slog.Uint64("sent", s.stats.TotalSent),
 		slog.Uint64("recv", s.stats.TotalReceived),
 	)
 }
 
-// DebugErr prints debugging and heap information with [slog.LevelError] level. See [StackAsync.Debug] on gating.
+// DebugErr prints debugging and heap information.
 func (s *StackAsync) DebugErr(msg, err string) {
-	internal.LogAllocs(msg)
-	if !internal.LogEnabled(s.log, slog.LevelError) {
-		return
-	}
-	internal.LogAttrsAndAllocs(msg, s.log, slog.LevelError, "stackasync",
+	internal.LogAttrsAndAllocs(msg, slog.Default(), slog.LevelError, "stackasync",
 		slog.String("umsg", msg),
 		slog.String("err", err),
 		slog.Uint64("sent", s.stats.TotalSent),
 		slog.Uint64("recv", s.stats.TotalReceived),
 	)
 }
-
-// LogAllocs is an lneto-tracked allocation logger. If there was an allocation between this call and a previous call
-// to LogAllocs it will be printed. This is called globally by StackAsync.Debug methods and by all logging calls in lneto
-// when build tag debugheaplog is set.
-func LogAllocs(msg string) {
-	internal.LogAllocs(msg)
-}