Files
lneto/x/tls/frame_test.go
T
Patricio Whittingslow 9758d48696 clanker tls
2026-07-24 20:56:52 -03:00

419 lines
12 KiB
Go

package tls_test
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/soypat/lneto"
"github.com/soypat/lneto/x/tls"
)
func TestRecordFrameHeaderBeforeBody(t *testing.T) {
// A record layer sees the 5 byte header first and must be able to consult
// the length to know how much more to read.
hdr := []byte{22, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10}
rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if rf.ContentType() != tls.ContentTypeHandshake {
t.Errorf("content type got %v want handshake", rf.ContentType())
}
if rf.Length() != 16 {
t.Errorf("length got %d want 16", rf.Length())
}
if rf.RecordLength() != 21 {
t.Errorf("record length got %d want 21", rf.RecordLength())
}
if rf.Complete() {
t.Error("record with header only reported complete")
}
if rf.Payload() != nil {
t.Error("payload of incomplete record must be nil, not a short slice")
}
full := append(hdr, make([]byte, 16)...)
rf, err = tls.NewRecordFrame(full)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !rf.Complete() {
t.Fatal("full record reported incomplete")
}
if len(rf.Payload()) != 16 {
t.Errorf("payload len got %d want 16", len(rf.Payload()))
}
}
func TestRecordFrameShortHeader(t *testing.T) {
for n := range tls.SizeHeaderRecord {
_, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(make([]byte, n))
if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
t.Errorf("len=%d got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", n, err)
}
}
}
func TestRecordFrameRejectsOversizeLength(t *testing.T) {
// The length field is attacker controlled and must be refused before it is
// ever used to size a read.
hdr := []byte{23, 0x03, 0x03, 0xff, 0xff} // 65535 > MaxCiphertext
rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var v lneto.Validator
rf.ValidateSize(&v)
if err := v.ErrPop(); !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
}
// Exactly at the limit is legal.
maxCT := uint16(tls.MaxCiphertext)
hdr[3], hdr[4] = byte(maxCT>>8), byte(maxCT)
rf, _ = tls.NewRecordFrame(hdr)
rf.ValidateSize(&v)
if err := v.ErrPop(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("MaxCiphertext rejected: %v", err)
}
}
func TestInnerPlaintextStripsPadding(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
in []byte
content string
ctype tls.ContentType
padding int
}{
{"no padding", []byte{'h', 'i', 23}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 0},
{"padded", []byte{'h', 'i', 23, 0, 0, 0}, "hi", tls.ContentTypeApplicationData, 3},
{"empty content", []byte{22}, "", tls.ContentTypeHandshake, 0},
{"content ends in zero", []byte{'a', 0, 'b', 21, 0}, "a\x00b", tls.ContentTypeAlert, 1},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(tc.in)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(ip.Content()) != tc.content {
t.Errorf("content got %q want %q", ip.Content(), tc.content)
}
if ip.ContentType() != tc.ctype {
t.Errorf("type got %v want %v", ip.ContentType(), tc.ctype)
}
if ip.PaddingLen() != tc.padding {
t.Errorf("padding got %d want %d", ip.PaddingLen(), tc.padding)
}
})
}
}
func TestInnerPlaintextAllZeroRejected(t *testing.T) {
// An all-zero inner plaintext carries no content type. Silently treating it
// as empty would let a peer inject records the state machine cannot
// classify; RFC 8446 5.4 requires unexpected_message.
for _, n := range []int{0, 1, 8} {
_, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(make([]byte, n))
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("len=%d: all-zero plaintext accepted", n)
}
}
}
func TestHandshakeFrame24BitLength(t *testing.T) {
hdr := []byte{1, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03} // ClientHello, length 0x010203
hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(hdr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if hf.MsgType() != tls.HandshakeTypeClientHello {
t.Errorf("type got %v", hf.MsgType())
}
if hf.Length() != 0x010203 {
t.Errorf("length got %#x want 0x010203", hf.Length())
}
if hf.Complete() {
t.Error("header-only message reported complete")
}
if hf.Body() != nil {
t.Error("body of incomplete message must be nil")
}
}
func TestHandshakeFrameRoundTripLength(t *testing.T) {
buf := make([]byte, tls.SizeHeaderHandshake)
hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(buf)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, n := range []int32{0, 1, 255, 256, 65535, 65536, 0xffffff} {
hf.SetLength(n)
if got := hf.Length(); got != n {
t.Errorf("SetLength(%d) round-tripped to %d", n, got)
}
}
}
func TestHandshakeFrameRawDataIncludesHeader(t *testing.T) {
// The transcript hash covers the header plus body, exactly once per
// message. Getting this wrong breaks Finished verification.
msg := []byte{20, 0, 0, 2, 0xaa, 0xbb}
hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(msg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := hf.RawData(); len(got) != 6 {
t.Errorf("RawData len got %d want 6", len(got))
}
if got := hf.Body(); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != 0xaa {
t.Errorf("Body got % x", got)
}
}
func TestForEachExtensionWalksAndToleratesGREASE(t *testing.T) {
// Two extensions: a GREASE type with empty data, then supported_versions.
exts := []byte{
0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00, // GREASE, len 0
0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, // supported_versions
}
var types []tls.ExtensionType
err := tls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(ext tls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
types = append(types, ext)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(types) != 2 || types[1] != tls.ExtSupportedVersions {
t.Fatalf("got %v", types)
}
if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(types[0])) {
t.Errorf("first extension %#x not recognized as GREASE", types[0])
}
}
func TestForEachExtensionTruncated(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range [][]byte{
{0x00}, // partial type
{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00}, // partial length
{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x03}, // length overruns
} {
err := tls.ForEachExtension(tc, func(tls.ExtensionType, []byte) error { return nil })
if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrTruncatedFrame) {
t.Errorf("% x: got %v want ErrTruncatedFrame", tc, err)
}
}
}
func TestForEachExtensionPropagatesCallbackError(t *testing.T) {
sentinel := errors.New("stop")
exts := []byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00}
n := 0
err := tls.ForEachExtension(exts, func(tls.ExtensionType, []byte) error {
n++
return sentinel
})
if !errors.Is(err, sentinel) {
t.Errorf("got %v want sentinel", err)
}
if n != 1 {
t.Errorf("walk continued after callback error: %d calls", n)
}
}
func TestForEachKeyShareAcceptsGREASEEntry(t *testing.T) {
// Chrome sends a GREASE key share whose key_exchange is a single byte.
// Rejecting it as malformed breaks Chrome outright.
extData := []byte{
0x00, 0x0b, // client_shares length 11
0x1a, 0x1a, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, // GREASE group, 1 byte body
0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x02, 0xab, 0xcd, // x25519, 2 byte body
}
type share struct {
g tls.NamedGroup
n int
}
var got []share
err := tls.ForEachKeyShare(extData, func(g tls.NamedGroup, key []byte) error {
got = append(got, share{g, len(key)})
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d shares want 2", len(got))
}
if !tls.IsGREASE(uint16(got[0].g)) || got[0].n != 1 {
t.Errorf("GREASE share mishandled: %+v", got[0])
}
if got[1].g != tls.GroupX25519 || got[1].n != 2 {
t.Errorf("x25519 share mishandled: %+v", got[1])
}
}
func TestForEachALPNProtoRejectsEmptyName(t *testing.T) {
// A zero-length protocol name would make the walk unable to advance.
extData := []byte{0x00, 0x01, 0x00}
err := tls.ForEachALPNProto(extData, func([]byte) error { return nil })
if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
}
}
func TestForEachALPNProto(t *testing.T) {
extData := []byte{
0x00, 0x0c,
0x02, 'h', '2',
0x08, 'h', 't', 't', 'p', '/', '1', '.', '1',
}
var names []string
err := tls.ForEachALPNProto(extData, func(b []byte) error {
names = append(names, string(b))
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(names) != 2 || names[0] != "h2" || names[1] != "http/1.1" {
t.Errorf("got %q", names)
}
}
func TestForEachSupportedVersionUsesU8Prefix(t *testing.T) {
// supported_versions is the one hello list with a single byte prefix.
extData := []byte{0x04, 0x1a, 0x1a, 0x03, 0x04}
var vers []uint16
err := tls.ForEachSupportedVersion(extData, func(v uint16) error {
vers = append(vers, v)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(vers) != 2 || vers[1] != tls.VersionTLS13 {
t.Errorf("got %#x", vers)
}
}
func TestVectorRejectsTrailingBytes(t *testing.T) {
// A prefix that under-describes its buffer leaves bytes whose meaning this
// parser and a middlebox could disagree about.
err := tls.ForEachSupportedGroup([]byte{0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1d, 0xff}, func(tls.NamedGroup) error { return nil })
if err == nil {
t.Error("trailing bytes after vector accepted")
}
}
func TestForEachU16RejectsOddLength(t *testing.T) {
err := tls.ForEachU16([]byte{0x00, 0x1d, 0x00}, func(uint16) error { return nil })
if !errors.Is(err, lneto.ErrInvalidLengthField) {
t.Errorf("got %v want ErrInvalidLengthField", err)
}
}
func TestIsGREASE(t *testing.T) {
// The 16 reserved values of RFC 8701.
for i := range 16 {
v := uint16(i)<<12 | 0x0a00 | uint16(i)<<4 | 0x0a
if !tls.IsGREASE(v) {
t.Errorf("%#04x not detected as GREASE", v)
}
}
for _, v := range []uint16{
0x0000, 0x1301, 0x001d, 0x0403, 0x0a0b, 0x0b0a, 0x1a2a, 0xffff,
} {
if tls.IsGREASE(v) {
t.Errorf("%#04x falsely detected as GREASE", v)
}
}
}
func FuzzNewRecordFrame(f *testing.F) {
f.Add([]byte{22, 3, 1, 0, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
f.Add([]byte{23, 3, 3, 0xff, 0xff})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
rf, err := tls.NewRecordFrame(b)
if err != nil {
return
}
var v lneto.Validator
rf.ValidateSize(&v)
// Accessors must stay in bounds regardless of validation outcome.
_ = rf.ContentType()
_ = rf.LegacyVersion()
_ = rf.Length()
if p := rf.Payload(); p != nil && len(p) != int(rf.Length()) {
t.Fatalf("payload len %d != declared %d", len(p), rf.Length())
}
if raw := rf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
}
})
}
func FuzzNewHandshakeFrame(f *testing.F) {
f.Add([]byte{1, 0, 0, 2, 3, 4})
f.Add([]byte{20, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
hf, err := tls.NewHandshakeFrame(b)
if err != nil {
return
}
var v lneto.Validator
hf.ValidateSize(&v)
if hf.Length() < 0 {
t.Fatalf("negative 24-bit length %d", hf.Length())
}
if body := hf.Body(); body != nil && len(body) != int(hf.Length()) {
t.Fatalf("body len %d != declared %d", len(body), hf.Length())
}
if raw := hf.RawData(); len(raw) > len(b) {
t.Fatalf("RawData %d longer than input %d", len(raw), len(b))
}
})
}
func FuzzNewInnerPlaintext(f *testing.F) {
f.Add([]byte{1, 2, 23, 0, 0})
f.Add([]byte{0, 0, 0})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
ip, err := tls.NewInnerPlaintext(b)
if err != nil {
return
}
if ip.ContentType() == 0 {
t.Fatal("accepted a zero content type")
}
if len(ip.Content())+ip.PaddingLen()+1 != len(b) {
t.Fatalf("content %d + padding %d + 1 != input %d",
len(ip.Content()), ip.PaddingLen(), len(b))
}
})
}
func FuzzForEachExtension(f *testing.F) {
f.Add([]byte{0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04})
f.Add([]byte{0x0a, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x00})
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, b []byte) {
total := 0
err := tls.ForEachExtension(b, func(ext tls.ExtensionType, data []byte) error {
total += 4 + len(data)
if total > len(b) {
t.Fatalf("walked %d bytes past input length %d", total, len(b))
}
// Sub-walkers must also never escape their slice.
_ = tls.ForEachKeyShare(data, func(tls.NamedGroup, []byte) error { return nil })
_ = tls.ForEachALPNProto(data, func([]byte) error { return nil })
_ = tls.ForEachSupportedGroup(data, func(tls.NamedGroup) error { return nil })
_ = tls.ForEachSupportedVersion(data, func(uint16) error { return nil })
_ = tls.ForEachServerName(data, func(uint8, []byte) error { return nil })
return nil
})
if err == nil && total != len(b) {
t.Fatalf("clean walk consumed %d of %d bytes", total, len(b))
}
})
}